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THE “AVE MARIA” EFFECT 
FREDERICK B. JONASSEN* 
“[N]othing in the First Amendment converts our public schools into religion-
free zones or requires all religious expression to be left at the schoolhouse 
door.”1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most everyone is familiar with the concept of “zero-tolerance” as it has been 
applied in public schools by administrators and teachers determined to render their 
schools free of illicit drugs, weapons, or harassing behavior. The 1980s and 1990s 
cultural stew of the Columbine massacre, the war on drugs, the “broken window” 
theory of law enforcement, the Gun Free Schools Act of 1994, and other influences 
conspired to one extent or another to generate the policy.2 A zero-tolerance policy 
is an assignment of “explicit, predetermined punishments to specific violations of 
school rules, regardless of the situation or context of the behavior.”3 Punishments 
for minor infractions include suspension or expulsion from school.4 The policy has 
the benefit of bright lines and certain punishment to discourage violations of any 
kind—at least theoretically. But, worthy as this purpose may be, too often the gen-
eral public becomes aware of zero-tolerance through news articles exposing harshly 
inflexible punishments for trivial violations in which the definitions of weapons and 
drugs have been extended beyond all reason. 
There is the story of the nine-year-old who was suspended from school for 
drug possession and distribution because he shared Certs Breath Mints with class-
mates.5 Another child was suspended for weapons possession when he “formed his 
                                                                
 2. On the influence of Columbine, see Celeste Headlee, 15 Years after Columbine, Are Schools 
Any Safer?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/18/304526475/15-years-after-
columbine-are-schools-any-safer; on the war on drugs, see Stephanie Francis Ward, Schools Start to Rethink 
Zero-Tolerance Policies, A.B.A. (Aug. 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/arti-
cle/schools_start_to_rethink_zero_tolerance_policies/; on the “broken windows” theory of law enforce-
ment, see generally Brian N. Moore, Tolerating Zero Tolerance?, SCH. BUS. AFF. 8 (Oct. 2010), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ914665.pdf; and on the Gun Free Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921–
23 (repealed 2002), see Russell J. Skiba, The Failure of Zero Tolerance, 22 RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH 27, 28 
(2014), and Kathleen M. Cerrone, Comment, The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994: Zero Tolerance Takes Aim 
at Procedural Due Process, 20 PACE L. REV. 131 (1999).    
 3. Christopher Boccanfuso & Megan Kuhfeld, Multiple Responses, Promising Results: Evidence-
Based, Nonpunitive Alternatives to Zero Tolerance, CHILD TRENDS 1 (Mar. 2011), http://www.nea.org/as-
sets/docs/alternatives-to-zero-tolerance.pdf.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Dan Eggen, Boy Brought up on a Candy Rap, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 1997), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/09/23/boy-brought-up-on-a-candy-rap/9f9054fb-afe1-4547-af8e-
c0fbbb8fac92/?utm_term=.394445ae1cd3 (discussing incident in which a nine-year-old student was sus-
pended after bringing Certs to school and allegedly telling another student the candy would make him 
“jump higher”). 
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hand into the shape of a gun and pointed his finger ‘execution-style’ at a class-
mate[.]”6 Yet another incident concerned a seven-year-old who was suspended for 
chewing a pop-tart into the shape of a pistol.7 And the game of tag was banned 
from a school because it involved too much touching.8 As early as 1999, USA Today 
reported that students were removed from school for possessing  
Midol, Tylenol, Alka Seltzer, cough drops and Scope mouthwash—contra-
band that violates zero-tolerance, anti-drug policies. Students have been 
expelled for Halloween costumes that included paper swords and fake 
spiked knuckles, as well as for possessing rubber bands, slingshots and toy 
guns—all violations of anti-weapons policies.9  
These examples could easily be multiplied. There is no evidence that the policy 
has decreased violence and drug use in schools,10 but there is evidence that it has 
damaged trust between students and teachers,11 has been applied disproportion-
ately to minorities,12 and has created a school to prison pipeline.13 Of course, the 
unreasonable implementation of this policy has also led to withering criticism and 
much re-evaluation.14 
                                                                
 6. Patrick Jonsson, Ohio Boy Suspended for Pointing Finger Like a Gun. ‘Zero-Tolerance’ Run 
Amok?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.csmoni-
tor.com/USA/Education/2014/0304/Ohio-boy-suspended-for-pointing-finger-like-a-gun.-Zero-tolerance-
run-amok. 
 7. Melissa Locker, WATCH: Boy Suspended from School for Making “Gun” out of a Pop-Tart, 
TIME (Mar. 4, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/03/04/watch-boy-suspended-from-school-for-mak-
ing-gun-out-of-a-pop-tart/.  
 8. Scott Timberg, Zero-Tolerance Madness: A “No Touching” Rule Means Even Tag Is Out-of-
Bounds for Seattle-Area School Kids, SALON (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/09/25/zero_tol-
erance_madness_a_no_touching_rule_means_even_tag_is_out_of_bounds_for_seat-
tle_area_school_kids/. 
 9. Dennis Cauchon, Zero-Tolerance Policies Lack Flexibility, U.S.A. TODAY (Apr. 13, 1999), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/educate/ednews3.htm. 
 10. Skiba, supra note 2, at 30 (“No data exist to show that out-of-school suspensions and expul-
sions reduce disruption or improve school climate. If anything, disciplinary removal appears to have nega-
tive effects on student outcomes and the learning climate. . . . It is difficult to argue that zero tolerance 
approaches are necessary in order to safeguard an orderly and effective learning climate when schools that 
use school exclusion more have poorer academic outcomes.”). 
 11. Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, supra note 3, at 2 (“Students who trust their teachers, and feel that 
their teachers are respectful, fair, and attentive, are more likely to form bonds with and perform well in 
school.  By restricting the ability of school staff to put student actions into context in some cases, zero tol-
erance policies can inhibit the formation of school bonds.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 12. Stephen Hoffman, Zero Benefit: Estimating the Effect of Zero Tolerance Discipline Policies on 
Racial Disparities in School Discipline, 28 EDUC. POL’Y 69, 90 (2014) (“[Z]ero tolerance policies have an espe-
cially harsh impact on Black students, exacerbating already severe disparities in school discipline between 
Black students and White students.”). 
 13. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in 
the Schools?: An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 852, 856 (2008) (“The in-
creased reliance on more severe consequences in response to student disruption has . . . resulted in an 
increase of referrals to the juvenile justice system for infractions that were once handled in school.  The 
term school-to-prison pipeline has emerged from the study of this phenomenon.” (citations omitted) (orig-
inal emphasis)). 
 14. See, e.g., John Cloud, The Columbine Effect, TIME (Nov. 28, 1999), http://con-
tent.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,35098,00.html; Ward, supra note 2; AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 
ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, supra note 13.  
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If school administrators are able to crack down on Certs Breath Mints and pa-
per firearms, it should surprise no one that they may implement a zero-tolerance 
policy toward religious expression, one that unreasonably and intolerantly prohibits 
any speech that touches on religion. One could certainly devote a law review article 
to an examination of the many cases in which students have been denied religious 
expression in public schools: the first grader whose poster expressing thanks for 
Jesus was the only one his school would not display because of its religious con-
tent;15 the school district that discontinued recitation of a Mohawk Thanksgiving 
address over the public address system because some believed it could be a Native 
American prayer;16 the Montana valedictorian who was not permitted a brief men-
tion of her religious belief in God and Christ at a graduation ceremony;17 the cheer-
leaders who were not permitted to carry banners and run-throughs containing Bible 
verses at football games;18 and a football coach (concededly not an instance of stu-
dent speech) who was fired for praying by himself after football games.19 
Then there is the case of “Ave Maria,” which will serve as the exclusive focus 
of this Article. In this case, Nurre v. Whitehead, the Everett School District in Wash-
ington State prohibited the seniors of the Jackson High School Wind Ensemble from 
                                                                
 15. C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).  The student made the poster in response 
to an assignment asking the students “to make posters depicting what they were ‘thankful for.’” Id. at 201. 
The poster was at first displayed with the others, but then removed, and finally placed in a less prominent 
spot. Id. The Third Circuit remanded the case with instructions to dismiss on what the dissent characterized 
as “a spurious procedural ground never raised by the defendants—viz., that the complaint does not ade-
quately allege facts providing a basis for holding any of the defendants responsible for the treatment of the 
poster.”  Id. at 203 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 16. Jock v. Ransom, No. 7:05-cv-1108, 2007 WL 1879717 (N.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007), aff’d, No. 07-
3162-CV, 2009 WL 742193 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2009). Originally, the school district allowed the OHEN:TON 
KARIHWATEHKWEN or Mohawk Thanksgiving Address to be played over the public address system “for the 
pedagogical purpose of exposing District students to Mohawk language and culture.” Id. at *6. A non-Mo-
hawk student’s parents complained that the recitation of the Address was a prayer. Id. at *1. Following the 
advice of counsel, the school district removed the Address from the public-address system. Id. The parents 
of Mohawk students filed a complaint that the action violated their equal protection rights. Id. at *2. Con-
fronted with conflicting evidence as to the nature of the Address, the court concluded that the actions of 
the school district were at least reasonable. Id. at *12. 
 17. Griffith v. Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, 244 P.3d 321, 333 (Mont. 2010) (finding that school district 
violated student’s free speech rights by prohibiting her from mentioning her religious beliefs: “We find it 
unreasonable for the School District to conclude that Griffith’s cursory references to her personal religious 
beliefs could be viewed by those in attendance at the BHS graduation ceremony as a religious endorsement 
by the School District.”). 
 18. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (356th Judicial Dist. Tex. 
May 8, 2013) (“Neither the Establishment Clause nor any other law prohibits the cheerleaders from using 
religious-themed banners at school sporting events. Neither the Establishment Clause nor any other law 
requires Kountze I.S.D. to prohibit the inclusion of religious-themed banners at school sporting events.”), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 482 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App. 2014) (holding that the case had been rendered moot 
by the school district’s change of policy permitting the banners and run-throughs), rev’d 484 S.W.3d 416 
(Tex. 2016) (holding case is not moot and remanding for further proceedings). 
 19. Brief of Appellant at 4, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. 16-35801, 2016 WL 6611220 
(9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2016) (“Specifically, after the game is over, and after the players and coaches from both 
teams have met to shake hands at midfield, Coach Kennedy feels called to pause on the playing field to 
engage in private religious expression. He takes a knee at the 50-yard line and offers a silent or quiet prayer 
of thanksgiving for player safety, sportsmanship, and spirited competition. That prayer lasts no more than 
30 seconds.”(citations omitted)).   
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performing an instrumental piece of music they had chosen to play for their gradu-
ation ceremony.20 The reason for the prohibition was the sectarian title of the cho-
sen work, “Ave Maria.”21 The district and appellate courts produced opinions ruling 
in favor of the school, prompting a concurrence by Judge Milan D. Smith disagreeing 
with the constitutional reasoning of the majority,22 and a dissent by Justice Samuel 
A. Alito to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari.23 Even after finding that instru-
mental music is constitutionally protected speech, and after ostensibly assuming 
that the performance of the Wind Ensemble was a limited public forum, the lower 
courts found it reasonable to ban the work from commencement because of the 
possibility that the appearance of its title in the graduation program could either 
create an Establishment Clause violation or engender controversy.24 
The case is almost ten years old now. It has provoked some, but not a great 
deal, of critical commentary.25 Nevertheless, there are some things about it that 
stand out. Nurre is not like the cases of religious expression mentioned above. In 
those cases—with the possible exception of the Mohawk case—the messages or 
prayers were intentionally religious. The Nurre case is different in that the students 
who wished to perform “Ave Maria” quite credibly intended no religious message 
at all and would not likely have been understood by their audience to be expressing 
one. Their interest in the music was artistic, not religious. On the other hand, that 
very aspect of Nurre makes the case comparable to the instances of zero-tolerance 
regarding drugs and weapons cited above.26 In those cases of zero-tolerance, school 
authorities punished students for behavior that obviously had nothing to do with 
the reasons for which the policy was implemented: the students in those cases had 
no intention of taking illicit drugs or carrying dangerous weapons, and were not in 
possession of anything illicit or dangerous. In the “Ave Maria” case, the authorities 
prohibited student expression which similarly possessed no intention of conveying 
a religious message, and which was simply not religious. Just as zero-tolerance 
sweeps up harmless behavior, irrelevant to the purposes of the policy, and imposes 
harsh punishment, the school administrators of Jackson High, in their zeal to avoid 
offending the Establishment Clause, unreasonably banned a beautiful work of mu-
sical art, which the Jackson High seniors wanted to play at their graduation. But 
unlike zero-tolerance for the performance of “Ave Maria,” zero tolerance for stu-
dent consumption of Alka Selzer does not implicate the constitutional right of Free 
Speech. 
                                                                
 20. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d 580 F.3d 1087, 
1091 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 559 U.S. 1025 (2010). 
 21. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1225; Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1091. 
 22. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1099 (Smith, J., dissenting in part, but concurring in the judgment). 
 23. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1025 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 24. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095; Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. 
 25. See, e.g., CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 265–67 (2015); William M. Perrine, Religious Music and Free Speech: Philosophical 
Issues in Nurre v. Whitehead, 21 PHIL. MUSIC EDUC. REV. 178 passim (2013); Matthew J. Shechtman, Piercing 
Pearson: Is Qualified Immunity Curbing Students’ Free Speech Rights?, 43 STETSON L. REV. 17 passim (2013); 
Charles J. Russo, Tone Deaf?  The Courts Turn a Deaf Ear to Religious Music in Schools, 257 EDUC. L. REP. 1 
passim (2010); Frederick B. Jonassen, Free Speech and Establishment Clause Rights at Public School Gradu-
ations Ceremonies: A Disclaimer: The Preceding Speech Was Government Censored and Does Not Represent 
the Views of the Valedictorian, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 683, 766–76 (2009).  
 26. See supra notes 3–14.  
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The title of this Article, “The ‘Ave Maria’ Effect,” is not intended to suggest a 
discussion of religious expression per se. Rather, it is meant to signify a narrowing 
of permissible student expression due to unreasonable fear of Establishment Clause 
litigation created by the courts. By allowing the prohibition of an instrumental piece 
of music at graduation because of its name, without deciding whether this could 
have been a genuine Establishment Clause violation, the courts have, in effect, de-
cided that school administrators may implement a zero-tolerance policy at school 
events towards any expression having a scintilla of religion about it. Moreover, the 
precedent has left school administrators with the incentive to do just that in order 
to avoid any imaginable violation of the Establishment Clause or any criticism from 
members of the community no matter how extreme and hostile to religion that 
criticism may be. Finally, the Ninth Circuit opinion permits this prohibition to be 
extended not only to anything suggestive of religious speech, but also to any speech 
that, in the view of school officials, may be controversial,27 a proposition that could 
potentially suppress far more than religious expression. 
Following this introduction, Section II of this Article will present the facts of 
Nurre. Section III will outline the reasoning of the opinions of the district court, the 
appeals court, and the opinions of Judge Smith and Justice Alito. This part of the 
Article is by far the most lengthy in tracing the tortuous and dubious reasoning of 
the district and appellate courts in reaching conclusions that deferred so completely 
to school authorities. Section IV will concern the Oral Argument before the Ninth 
Circuit. And Section V will discuss the Amici Curiae Briefs. A pessimistic Conclusion 
will follow. 
II. THE FACTS OF NURRE V. WHITEHEAD 
In the spring of 2006, the plaintiff, Kathryn Nurre, was a senior member of the 
Wind Ensemble of Jackson High School, located in Everett, Washington.28 As in pre-
vious years, the Wind Ensemble was to perform a musical piece at the school’s grad-
uation ceremony.29 In 2002, when Leslie Moffat replaced Jim Rice as the Faculty 
Director of the Wind Ensemble, the senior members told Moffat that Rice had al-
lowed the seniors to select the music they would perform at graduation.30 Rice, 
however, “testified that he ‘always selected the piece the band played [and] [t]he 
graduating seniors had no input in that selection.’”31 
                                                                
 27. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1094–95 (citing precedent that ostensibly found “that a [School] District's 
concern regarding disruption and controversy were legitimate reasons for restricting content . . . . [and] 
recognized that a school acts reasonably when it takes steps to avoid controversy or maintain an appear-
ance of neutrality[,]” and concluding, “Here, the District was acting to avoid a repeat of the 2005 controversy 
by prohibiting any reference to religion at its graduation ceremonies.”).  
 28. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2007).  
 29. Id. 
 30. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (W.D. 
Wash. 2007) (No. C06-0901RSL), 2007 WL 4868967 (“Lesley Moffat replaced Rice during the Summer of 
2002, which was Nurre’s freshman year. Moffat was told by the students that seniors had a ‘tradition’ of 
selecting the final piece to play at commencement.” (citations omitted)). 
 31. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Nurre, 520 F. 
Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06-0901RSL) (citing Dkt. 13 ¶2). 
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Moffat relied on what the seniors told her and allowed them to choose the 
piece they would perform at graduation for three years (200305).32 For each of 
these years, the seniors chose to perform “On a Hymnsong of Phillip Bliss,” by David 
R. Holsinger, a piece that Rice had earlier selected for the Wind Ensemble to per-
form at graduation during his tenure as Director.33 In 2006, however, the seniors 
“wanted to start [their] own tradition by playing a different song.”34 They unani-
mously chose to play Franz Biebl’s “Ave Maria,” a piece that they had performed at 
the school winter concert earlier in the school year, the title appearing without con-
troversy in the concert program.35 Nurre testified, “Religion didn’t even come into 
our minds at all[.]”36 “The other seniors and I did not choose the ‘Ave Maria’ piece 
because of any religious message it might convey. Rather, the seniors chose it be-
cause of its beauty, we liked how it sounded and the performance would have made 
our graduation a memorable one.”37 
Moffat sent a copy of the music to the Principal of Jackson High, Terry Chesh-
ire, and to the Everett School District’s Associate Superintendent, Karst Brandsma, 
with a note indicating that the words were not to be sung.38 Cheshire recognized 
that the selection might be a problem because of complaints regarding the Jackson 
High School Choir’s performance of a choral piece, “Up Above My Head,” at the 
2005 graduation.39 That was Cheshire’s first year as principal.40 At that time, he was 
unaware that in approving music for graduation, he had the responsibility of re-
viewing not only the titles of the musical pieces, but also their content.41 Because 
                                                                
 32. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30. (“Having no knowledge of Mr. 
Rice’s practice of personally selecting the graduation piece without student input, Moffat permitted stu-
dents to select the music to be performed.” (citations omitted)).  
 33. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. 
 34. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06-
901RSL). 
 35. Nurre, 1222 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.  
 36. Supplemental Declaration of Michael A. Patterson Re: Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exh. 2, Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Kathryn Nurre at 67, Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 
(No. C06-0901RSL) [hereinafter Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Kathryn Nurre]; Plaintiff Nurre’s Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34 (“Plaintiff and the other seniors did not choose the piece be-
cause of any religious message it might convey.”). 
 37. Declaration of Kathryn Nurre in Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment ¶¶ 17–18, 
Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06-901RSL), 2007 WL 4868957; Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 34, at 3 (citing Nurre Dep. at 85); Declaration Of Michael A. Patterson Re: Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 3, Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat at 36, Nurre, 
520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06-0901RSL) [hereinafter Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat] 
(“[The students] really liked the piece, and it’s beautiful, and they said they wanted to play it because of 
that.”). 
 38. Brief of Appellant at 5, Nurre, 580 F.3d 1087 (No. 07-35867) (“Moffat sent copies of the music 
that was to be performed to Terry Cheshire, Principal of JHS, and Karst Brandsma, the District’s Associate 
Superintendent for Instruction. A note accompanying Moffat’s submission stated that the senior members 
chose ‘Ave Maria’ for their piece to play during the ceremony. She also sent the musical score for the piece; 
at the top, Moffat wrote in bold ‘Not sung,’ indicating there would be no vocal parts or lyrics.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 39. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1091. 
 40. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30. 
 41. Id. (“Jackson’s principal, Terry Cheshire, had just begun his tenure at Jackson and was una-
ware that it was his responsibility to review not only the titles of the music, but also the content to ensure 
compliance with District policy.” (citations omitted)). 
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Cheshire did not perceive any religious content from the title of “Up Above My 
Head,” he approved it without examining its lyrics, so that Everett School District 
officials were not aware of the religious content of this piece.42 The Superintendent 
of the Everett School District, Carol Whitehead, testified that members of the audi-
ence complained to her about “Christian” lyrics in the song, such as, “over our 
heads, Jesus reigns.”43 Brandsma testified that complaints were sent to the editor 
of The Herald, the largest newspaper in Snohomish County.44 However, the only 
complaint that was documented in the litigation was a single letter appearing in The 
Herald.45 
Religious song had no place at event 
This letter is regarding Henry M. Jackson High School’s graduation at the 
Everett Events Center, which is, as I understand it, a public venue. 
I would like to express my puzzlement over how the Everett School District 
– including a school board member, superintendent, south area executive 
director, principal and choir director – can justify classroom civics instruc-
tion on the importance of our national and state constitutions specifically 
relating to policy regarding religious activity, while willfully disregarding 
the same by sponsorship of nonsecular entertainment during a public 
graduation ceremony. (The program’s song title of “Up Above My Head” 
gave no indication the words sung would be of a religious nature.) 
Is that the final lesson of our students’ education? If in fact the lesson was 
to demonstrate the meaning of hypocrisy, an “A” grade should be 
awarded. Finally, does putting the violation to music somehow mitigate 
                                                                
 42. Id. (“Because the title to the song ‘Up Above My Head’ appeared secular, Cheshire approved 
it.” (citations omitted)). 
 43. Declaration of Michael A. Patterson Re: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 2, 
Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead at 60–61, Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06-
0901RSL) [hereinafter Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead]. 
Q.   What about the songs [were] Christian? 
A.   At the 2005 on the program the principal had reviewed the titles with the teachers and 
the title was something like – I would have to see it exactly to make sure I’m quoting 
this correctly – but something like up over my head or up over our head, and so he took 
the recommendation from the teacher that reviewed the title.  But when the song was 
sung, the lyrics were something like up over my head Jesus reigns, and so it was clearly 
a song of a Christian nature. 
 44. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30 (“[S]ome [people in the audi-
ence] sent complaints to the editor of the Snohomish County’s largest newspaper.” (citations omitted)).  
(The district court opinion refers to Associate Superintendent Brandsma as “Ms.”  However, the deposition 
makes clear that Karst Brandsma is a “Mr.” See Declaration of Michael A. Patterson Re: Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment, supra note 37, at 20, 31, 42).  
 45. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 6–7, Nurre, 559 U.S. 1025 (No. 09-671) (“School officials 
stated during deposition that they received complaints about the religious nature of ‘Up Above My Head,’ 
but the only specifically documented complaint about the earlier 2005 graduation that Respondent admit-
ted to the record was a single letter to the editor of the local paper mocking the educational competence 
of the Superintendent and her subordinates[.]” (emphasis in original)). 
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the offense? Under no circumstance should this letter be construed as a 
criticism of the very talented performing students!46 
Although Whitehead described the song’s lyrics as Christian, claiming they re-
ferred specifically to Jesus Christ, the source Ms. Whitehead cited, the Kirk Franklin 
lyrics, does not have any specifically Christian references, though it does mention 
“God” repeatedly.47 
Up above my head I hear music in the air 
Up above my head there's a melody so bright 
And fair 
I can hear when I'm all alone 
Even in those times when I feel all hope is gone 
Up above my head I hear joybells ringing 
Up above my head I hear angels singing 
There must be a God somewhere 
There must be a God somewhere 
 
I hear music in the air 
I hear music everywhere 
 
There must be a God somewhere 
There must be a God somewhere 
There must be a God somewhere 
There must be a God somewhere48 
After the 2005 controversy, Mr. Cheshire was instructed to review all musical 
selections for content as well as title, especially in the context of commencement 
exercises.49 But as Moffat indicated, no words were to be sung in the wind ensem-
ble’s performance of “Ave Maria,”50 so, unlike “Up Above My Head,” the instrumen-
tal music to be performed had no explicit religious content, except for its title. 
                                                                
 46. Declaration of Michael A. Patterson re: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 4, 
Letter to the Editor of the Everett Herald published June 26, 2005, Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (No. C06-
0901RSL). 
 47. The Defendant references these lyrics in Appellee’s Answering Brief, at 5, Nurre, 580 F.3d 
1087 (No. 07-35967) (citing KIRK FRANKLIN Lyrics–UP ABOVE MY HEAD, that may be found at 
http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/kirkfranklin/upabovemyhead.html).  
 48. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 6, n.3.  
 49. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30. 
 50. Brief of Appellant, supra note 38. 
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Cheshire informed the School District’s Executive Director of Instruction and 
Curriculum, Lynn Evans, about his concerns that “Ave Maria” might not be con-
sistent with the District’s policy in the light of the controversy of the previous year.51 
Evans brought the matter to Brandsma, who agreed with Evans and Cheshire that 
“Ave Maria” should not be played at the graduation.52 When Whitehead learned of 
the matter, she called a meeting with Brandsma and Evans to discuss the Wind En-
semble’s selection of “Ave Maria.”53 At the meeting, it was decided that the perfor-
mance would not be permitted at the graduation ceremony.54 As Whitehead testi-
fied, “[W]e made the decision that because the title of the piece would be on that 
program and it’s Ave Maria and that many people would see that as religious in 
nature, that we would ask the band to select something different.”55 It appears that 
no one at the meeting clearly understood the meaning of the words, “Ave Maria.”56 
Whitehead testified that she did not understand their meaning.57 In her deposition, 
Nurre demonstrated she did not understand the meaning of the words either.58 The 
decision was made without any input or attempt to receive input from the stu-
dents.59 
After the meeting, Brandsma sent an email to the high school principals of the 
District in which he requested that the principals provide a copy of the musical se-
lections that would be performed including any lyrics that would be sung.60 
Brandsma noted that School Policy 2340 and Procedure 2340P allowed musical 
presentations with religious themes as long as the selections were based on their 
artistic and educational value and are accompanied by comparable non-religious 
works.61 However, Brandsma mandated that 
                                                                
 51. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
 54. Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead, supra note 43, at 77. 
 55. Id. at 76–77. 
 56. “[Whitehead’s] sole concern and that of the persons attending the meeting was the listing 
of the two-word title of the piece, although no one at the meeting knew what the words ‘Ave Maria’ meant, 
other than that they thought it had a religious connotation.”  Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, supra note 34, at 4 (citations omitted).  
 57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 18 (citing Excerpts from the Record on Appeal 
(hereinafter ER 229) (“Superintendent Whitehead disclaimed knowing what the words Ave Maria even 
meant, though she viewed it as having a ‘religious connotation.’”). 
 58. Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Kathryn Nurre, supra note 36, at 35–36. 
 Q. Do you know what [“Ave Maria”] stands for? 
   *** 
 A. I’m not sure.  I know it’s – I think it’s Latin and it has to do with Mary, and it 
means like Holy Mary or something.  I’m not sure. 
 59. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 5 (“During their delibera-
tions and discussions, neither the Defendant nor any of the school administrators ever allowed the students 
to give them input or additional information.  They engaged in absolutely no dialogue with the students and 
conducted no genuine investigation into their selection of ‘Ave Maria’ or its origins.”).   
 60. Id. at 4. 
 61. Id. 
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music selections for graduation be entirely secular in nature. My rationale 
is based on the nature of the event. It is a commencement program in cel-
ebration of senior students earning their high school diploma. It is not a 
music concert. Musical selections should add to the celebration and should 
not be a separate event. Invited guests of graduates are a captive audi-
ence. I understand that attendance is voluntary, but I believe that few stu-
dents (and their invited guests) would want to miss the culminating event 
of their academic career. And lastly there is insufficient time at graduation 
to balance comparable artistic works.62 
Whitehead made a similar distinction between commencement ceremonies 
and other school programs in her deposition. 
It’s my understanding that the commencement is a once in a lifetime op-
portunity for students and their families, that it should be a neutral expe-
rience so that every student and every family can feel comfortable coming 
there. Because based on what I understand about a Federal Supreme Court 
decision, it is not really an opportunity that would be voluntary in that 
should the student or their parents or other family members opt not to 
attend, they would never have another opportunity to get that back, which 
is very different than attending another assembly or attending another 
concert.63 
The Everett School District had a policy, Board Policy 2430P, in force at the 
time of this controversy, which provided rules for the performance of music with 
religious associations.64 School Board Policy 2430P did not reflect the distinction 
which Mr. Brandsma and Ms. Whitehead drew between a high school graduation 
and other school programs.65 The Policy read as follows: 
Religious services, programs or assemblies shall not be conducted in school 
facilities during school hours or in connection with any school sponsored 
or school related activity. Speakers and/or programs that convey a reli-
gious or devotional message are prohibited. This restriction does not pre-
clude the presentation of choral or musical assemblies, which may use re-
ligious music or literature as a part of the program or assembly. 
Musical, artistic and dramatic presentations, which have a religious theme 
may be included in course work and programs on the basis of their partic-
ular artistic and educational value or traditional secular usage. They shall 
                                                                
 62. Id. at 4–5 (emphasis in original). 
 63. Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead, supra note 43, at 33–34. 
 64. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 10 (“This policy reflects 
the settled rule that it is not improper for public school music groups to perform music with religious 
themes.”). 
 65. Id. at 11 (“Defendant Whitehead has sought to justify the exclusion of ‘Ave Maria’ in this case 
on the grounds that commencement exercises are different and require that all musical performances be 
secular.  However, the only school board policy governing music performances and religion is Policy 2340P, 
. . . and there is no separate school board policy that covers performances at commencement ceremonies.  
Therefore, school district policies do not treat music performances at commencement differently from 
other music performances.” (citations omitted)). 
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be presented in a neutral, non-devotional manner, be related to the ob-
jective of the instructional program, and be accompanied by comparable 
artistic works of a non-religious nature.66 
In his deposition testimony, Brandsma explained the School District’s role in 
overseeing graduation. 
Everett School District holds graduation ceremonies for all of its high 
schools at the Everett Events Center. Though the Everett School District 
does not own the Everett Events Center, it rents the facility and does spon-
sor and fund the graduation ceremony of each of its three comprehensive 
high schools . . . The Everett School District is responsible for the conduct 
and content of all speeches and performances that occur at these gradua-
tion ceremonies. . . . [A]nd the District maintains supervisory control over 
each aspect of the ceremony. Speeches are reviewed in advance to ensure 
they are compliant with District policies. Music is also reviewed. If any 
speech were inappropriate, such as containing language that was lewd, of-
fensive, profane, or proselytizing (which is not meant to be an exhaustive 
list), the District would not allow it.67 
Consistent with this statement, the defendant claimed that the school admin-
istration sponsored the graduation in its entirety, used its funds to rent the facility 
where the graduation took place, planned the details of the ceremony, was fully 
responsible for all content and conduct that occurred, maintained supervisory con-
trol over all aspects of the event, and reviewed speeches and music in advance to 
be sure that they complied with school district policies.68 
As indicated above, the concern of the school officials was that the title of 
“Ave Maria” would appear in the graduation program and be recognized as reli-
gious.69 After receiving Brandsma’s email, Moffat spoke with Cheshire for clarifica-
tion, and suggested that the program simply list the piece at issue as “A Selection 
by France [sic] Biebl,” thus suppressing the sectarian title of the music.70 But Chesh-
ire told her, without other explanation, “[I]t would be unethical to inaccurately or 
untruthfully list the titles to pieces.”71 Moffat then informed the Wind Ensemble 
                                                                
 66. Complaint para. 15, Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C06–
901RSL), 2006 WL 2302614. 
 67. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 31. 
 68. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30. 
 69. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 70. Regarding this conversation between Mr. Cheshire and Ms. Moffat, Ms. Moffat testified. 
  A. I did ask for clarification as to why. 
  Q. And what did Mr. Cheshire say? 
  A. That–well, in the conversation, I said, “Could we change and just write ‘A selec-
tion by France [sic] Biebl’?” 
Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat, supra note 37, at 40. In subsequent quotations of this 
conversation, the composer’s first name, Franz, will be spelled correctly. 
 71. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (citing Dkt. # 12 (Cheshire 
Decl.) at ¶ 4).  Ms. Moffat continued her testimony: 
 A.       And then I was–that was where he said that that would not be, I believe the 
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that they needed to select a different piece of music to play at the graduation.72 
Nurre and the other members of the Ensemble were upset by the decision.73 Rather 
than boycott the commencement, they reluctantly decided to play the fourth move-
ment of the “Holst Second Suite in F” which was performed at the graduation on 
June 17, 2006.74 It was listed as Gustav Holst’s “Second Suite for Military Band.”75 
At the ceremony, Nurre and the other senior members of the Wind Ensemble re-
ceived their diplomas.76 
Whitehead later testified that it would not have been “appropriate” to play 
“Ave Maria” without listing its title in the program.77 However, several pieces played 
by the High School Jazz Combo at the beginning of the ceremony when attendees 
were taking their seats were not listed.78 These pieces, however, were not “fea-
tured” as was the performance of the Wind Ensemble.79 In any event, Whitehead 
indicated that she would have objected to “Ave Maria” even if it were not listed on 
the graduation program, “[b]ecause it is a religious piece.”80 
The commencement ceremony included a variety of instrumental and vocal 
music, both student–performed and recorded.81 Aside from the Wind Ensemble’s 
performance, the Jazz Combo played six separate instrumental works, “Freedom 
Jazz Dance,” “Day by Day,” “Let’s Fall in Love,” “Unforgettable,” “Un Poco Loco,” 
and “Travelling Light.”82 Then the processional followed, an instrumental-only re-
cording of “Pomp and Circumstance,” which was also used for the recessional.83 
Once assembled, the “graduates stood to the ‘National Anthem,’ sung by Aubrey 
Logan of the Class of 2006.”84 After remarks by a class speaker, the school Choir 
performed “Mother Africa.”85 
                                                                
word “ethical.”  I’m not 100 percent sure, but on that line, would not be okay to 
do that. 
  * * * 
  Q. Did he state why it was unethical or wrong or whatever to have an alternate 
title? 
  A. No, I don’t believe so. 
Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat, supra note 37, at 40-41. 
 72. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 5. 
 73. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 10.  
 74. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 6; Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1226. 
 75. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1226. 
 76. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 2. 
 77. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 8 (citing ER 22526). 
 78. Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 4. 
 79. Brief in Opposition [to Petition for Certiorari], at *10–11, Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025 
(2010) (No. 09-671), 2010 WL 128006 (“Because the song [“Ave Maria”] was a featured piece as opposed 
to a prelude to the ceremony, the District concluded that it would be more appropriate to choose another 
song, rather than simply list the name of the piece in the program under a different title.”).  
 80. Brief of Appellant, supra note 38, at 32 (citing ER 227). 
 81. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at *10. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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On June 26, 2006, Nurre filed her complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
violations of the Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.86 
III. THE OPINIONS 
The title of Biebl’s work is certainly religious. “Ave Maria” is Latin for “Hail 
Mary,” the Roman Catholic prayer to the Virgin Mary, the Mother of Jesus Christ.87 
Among the many musical settings for this prayer, perhaps the two best known are 
the version by Johann Sebastian Bach and Charles Gounod, and the version by Franz 
Schubert; but there are many others.88 Comparatively speaking, the setting by Franz 
Biebl is obscure, composed as it was in 1964 for a German fire brigade choir en-
gaged in a choral competition.89 Today, it has some currency both performed with 
words and performed as an instrumental piece by various ensembles.90 
The question of whether the sectarian title of the piece could legally appear 
in a public school graduation program will be assessed later in this Article. However, 
that issue is something of a red herring. Moffat’s suggestion that the piece be iden-
tified in the program as, “A Selection by Franz Biebl,” not only indicated the lack of 
religious motive in presenting this work, but would also have avoided the problem 
school administrators had with the piece by excluding its title from the graduation 
program altogether.91 Whatever the validity of Cheshire’s reason for rejecting the 
offer, another topic reserved for later treatment, the students clearly only wished 
to perform “Ave Maria” for artistic reasons. In fact, Nurre v. Whitehead is not a case 
about religious expression at all, but rather a case about artistic expression sup-
pressed by an unreasonable fear of violating the Establishment Clause. 
                                                                
 86. Complaint, supra note 66, ¶¶ 17–34. 
 87. The district court took judicial notice that “Ave Maria” means “Hail Mary.” Nurre v. White-
head, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225, n.3 (W. D. Wash 2007) (citing WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY 
DICTIONARY 141 (1984) (defining “Ave Maria” as “The Hail Mary”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 150 (1981) (unabridged) (defining “Ave Maria” as “1. a salutation to the Virgin Mary combined 
as now used in the Roman Catholic Church with a prayer to her as mother of God”)). 
 88. Justice Alito makes this point.  “Many composers including Schubert, Gounod, Verdi, Mozart, 
Elgar, Saint-Saéns, Rossini, Brahms, Stravinsky, Bruckner, and Rachmaninoff, composed music for the Ave 
Maria.”  Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025, 1026, n.1 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 89. Wilbur Skeels, Program Note, Franz Biebl’s Ave Maria (Angelus Domini), https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20110719132345/http://cantusquercus.com/ave.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). In pro-
gram notes to Biebl’s Ave Maria, the choral conductor, Wilbur Skeels, relates that Franz X. Biebl, the choir-
master of a parish near Munich, Germany, composed the work for a local fire brigade chorus to perform at 
festivals and competitions. Id.  The work gained popularity when the Cornell University Glee Club, after a 
visit to Germany, brought it to the United States. Id. 
 90. Chanticleer, Ave Maria-Franz Biebl- Chanticleer, YOUTUBE (Dec. 26, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XVyCJlPiHFg (a performance of the spoken words by Chanticleer); 
Robert C. Cameron, Franz Biebl: Ave Maria (arr. Robert C. Cameron), YOUTUBE (Aug. 14, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymtVCizCVi4 (an instrumental version).  
 91. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Decision to Assess Nurre’s Constitutional Claims 
On September 20, 2007, Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the Western District of 
Washington issued the district court opinion.92 Before the court were cross motions 
for summary judgment.93 As an initial matter, the court had to decide (1) whether 
Nurre’s case was moot because she had agreed to perform an alternative piece at 
her commencement and received her degree; and (2) whether the court could 
simply grant Whitehead qualified immunity and dispense with any further analysis 
of Nurre’s constitutional claims.94 
The court agreed with Whitehead that Nurre’s graduation mooted her claims 
for declaratory and injunctive relief.95 She had already suffered any alleged damage 
from the school’s prohibition of “Ave Maria” so that those forms of relief no longer 
served any purpose and were not available.96 However, Nurre’s graduation did not 
moot her claim for monetary damages.97 
On the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, the court applied the then 
controlling Supreme Court test from Saucier v. Katz, which required that in deciding 
whether to grant a defendant qualified immunity the court must first determine 
whether a constitutional right had been violated on the facts alleged and then, as-
suming such a violation had occurred, the court would  determine whether the right 
in question had been clearly established.98 In 2009 the Supreme Court issued Pear-
son v. Callahan, giving the lower courts discretion to decide which of the two prongs 
to address first and encouraging dismissal of a case without discussion of the con-
stitutional claim when the court has found the pertinent law was not clearly estab-
lished.99 Had the Nurre case been decided after Pearson, the discussion of Nurre’s 
constitutional claims probably would not have occurred since the district court not 
only found there was no constitutional violation, but also found that pertinent law 
                                                                
 92. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
 93. Id. at 1224. 
 94. Id. at 1226–27. 
 95. Id. (citing Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000) and Doe 
v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 96. Id. at 1226 (“[D]efendant requests dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief as moot 
because plaintiff has graduated and will never again participate in an Everett School District graduation cer-
emony.  The Court agrees.  Now that plaintiff has graduated, her claims for declaratory relief are dismissed 
as MOOT.”) (citation omitted). 
 97. Id. at 1227. 
 98. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d  at 1227; Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), receded from by 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must 
consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, 
do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry 
. . . . [I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential 
step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” (citations omitted)). 
 99. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude 
that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. 
The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound dis-
cretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in 
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”).   
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was not clearly established.100 But because the then current law required the dis-
trict court to assess the constitutional claims first, it addressed Nurre’s alleged vio-
lations of three distinct constitutional rights: (1) the Free Speech Clause; (2) the Es-
tablishment Clause; and (3) the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.101 The following discussion will focus mostly on the Free Speech issue, 
though it will include the court’s treatment of the Establishment and Equal Protec-
tion allegations as well as that of the qualified immunity defense where these are 
relevant to the court’s Free Speech analysis. 
B. The Performance of the Instrumental Music from Biebl’s “Ave Maria” as 
Constitutionally Protected Speech 
i. The District Court 
Turning to the free speech issue, the court began its analysis by asking 
whether an instrumental piece of music such as Biebl’s “Ave Maria” is protected 
speech under the First Amendment.102 Whitehead had argued that such instrumen-
tal music is not protected speech because Nurre had not shown an intent to com-
municate a particularized message nor that any such message would have been 
communicated to anyone.103 Under Spence v. Washington, both are required if non-
verbal conduct is to constitute protected speech.104 Judge Lasnik, however, found 
ample authority supporting the constitutional protection of instrumental music as 
free speech. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court declared, “Music, 
as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amend-
ment.”105 Noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit had specifi-
                                                                
 100. The oral argument before the Ninth Circuit in Nurre took place on January 22, 2009, one day 
after the Supreme Court issued the Pearson decision, and the first question that arose was whether the 
court any longer needed to resolve the constitutional issue to decide the qualified immunity claim, when it 
could simply dispose of the case by deciding the issue of whether the law would have been clear to a rea-
sonable school official.  However, as the panel’s opinion indicates, the Ninth Circuit decided to address the 
constitutional issue as well.  Transcript of Oral Argument, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(No. 07-35867), 2009 WL 482112. 
 101. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1227–28. 
 102. Id. at 1228 (“The threshold issue in determining whether plaintiff’s free speech rights were 
violated by defendant’s prohibition of the performance of Franz Biebl’s ‘Ave Maria’ is whether this piece of 
music is protected ‘speech’ under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment made applicable to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974))) (“For nonverbal conduct 
to qualify as speech, and thus implicate First Amendment ‘free speech’ protections, the Court asks ‘whether 
“[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that 
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’”).  Whitehead quoted a district court case which 
took the view that instrumental music might not be protected speech.  Id. n.7 (quoting Fla. Cannabis Action 
Network, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1366 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“[O]nly some forms of 
music may be protected expression while others, such as an instrumental orchestra performance, are 
not.”)). 
 105. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989)). 
The Ward court went on to say, “In the case before us the performances apparently consisted of remarks 
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cally held instrumental music to be protected, the court cited other circuits and Su-
preme Court dicta to this effect.106 In commenting on the passage quoted above 
from Ward, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit had found it implausible 
that the Supreme Court “thought it was speaking only of vocal music; . . . ”107 Posner 
also noted that the Seventh Circuit had held that “wordless music is speech within 
the meaning of the First Amendment”108 in Reed v. Village of Shorewood, a case 
stating that in forbidding the playing of rock and roll, a municipality, “would be in-
fringing a First Amendment right, even if the music had no political message—even 
if it had no words—and the defendants would have to produce a strong justification 
for thus repressing a form of ‘speech.’”109 In Steadman v. Texas Rangers, the Fifth 
Circuit stated,  
“Speech,” as we have come to understand that word when used in our First 
Amendment jurisprudence, extends to many activities that are by their 
very nature non-verbal: an artist’s canvas, a musician’s instrumental com-
position, and a protester’s silent picket of an offending entity are all exam-
ples of protected, non-verbal “speech.”110  
In Bernstein v. United States Department of State, a court in the Northern District 
of California declared, “Music . . . is speech protected under the First Amend-
ment.”111 Judge Lasnik also quoted Supreme Court dicta from Hurley v. Irish-Amer-
ican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, stating, “[A] narrow, succinctly ar-
ticulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined 
to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unques-
tionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jab-
berwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”112 Based on this authority, the court concluded 
that the instrumental version of “Ave Maria” was protected speech.113 
                                                                
by speakers, as well as rock music, but the case has been presented as one in which the constitutional chal-
lenge is to the city’s regulation of the musical aspects of the concert; and, based on the principle we have 
stated, the city’s guideline must meet the demands of the First Amendment.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 790. 
 106. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1228–29. 
 107. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring) 
(rev’d on other grounds, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991)) (quoted by Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 
2d at 1228–29).  Posner based this view on the Supreme Court’s reference to “music’s appeal to the emo-
tions, and its citation to an article about Soviet ambivalence toward Stravinsky—a composer primarily of 
nonvocal music . . . .”  Id. (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 790 (citing Soviet Schitzophrenia toward Stravinsky, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 1982, section 1, p. 25, col. 2)). 
 108. Id. at 1096 (quoted by Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229). 
 109. Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 950 (7th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds 
by Brunson v. Murray 843 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoted by Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229) (emphasis 
added by Nurre).  
 110. Steadman v. Texas Rangers, 179 F.3d 360, 367 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoted by Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 
2d at 1229). 
 111. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (quoted by Nurre, 
520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229). 
 112. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group 
of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citations omitted)).  
 113. Id. (“Based on this persuasive authority, the Court concludes that the Wind Ensemble’s in-
strumental performance of Franz Biebl’s ‘Ave Maria,’ constitutes ‘speech’ under the First Amendment.”).  
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ii. The Appellate Court 
In addressing the free speech issue, the Ninth Circuit opinion, written by Judge 
Richard C. Tallman, began by quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, that students “do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”114 But the appellate court also noted 
that Supreme Court precedent taught that “‘the constitutional rights of students in 
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings’ . . . and ‘must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.’”115 On the question of whether instrumental music can constitute 
speech, the appellate court followed the district court in finding that musical ex-
pression is speech that is protected under the free speech clause, citing the same 
authorities for this proposition.116 “[W]e hold . . . [the instrumental arrangement of 
Franz Biebl’s ‘Ave Maria’] . . . is . . . [free] . . . speech as contemplated by the First 
Amendment.”117 
Despite these rulings, both courts were to have difficulty with the concept of 
wordless music as protected speech. Though judicial precedent indicated that in-
strumental music need not convey a particularized message to be entitled to con-
stitutional free speech protection, the issue was to arise again under the guise of 
whether such music had a “viewpoint” under public forum analysis. This was a cru-
cial issue. 
iii. Music as Protected Speech 
Clearly, courts have stated that instrumental music is protected under the 
First Amendment. But as Alan K. Chen has pointed out, “[N]o court has ever ex-
plained in any meaningful way why the musical, as opposed to lyrical, component 
of such [musical] expression is independently covered by the Constitution.”118 Sim-
                                                                
 114. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393, 406 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))). 
 115. Id. at 1093 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 116. Id. at 1093–95. 
 117. Id. at 1093 (“Nurre and her classmates sought to perform an entirely instrumental arrange-
ment of Franz Biebl’s ‘Ave Maria,’ which we hold is speech as contemplated by the First Amendment.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
 118. Alan K. Chen, Instrumental Music and the First Amendment, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 381, 384 (2015).  
Chen acknowledges that “[t]he most thoughtful lower court discussion of music” took place in Miller v. Civil 
City of South Bend, which invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting public nudity as applied to non-obscene 
nude dancing for entertainment. Id. at 393. Several judges commented on whether music was protected 
speech.  Id.  Judge Posner argued that if nude dancing is not speech, then non-vocal music is not speech 
either. Id. at 394. “If the striptease dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge is not expression, Mozart’s piano concer-
tos and Balanchine’s most famous ballets are not expression.”  Miller, 904 F.2d at 1093 (Posner, J., concur-
ring). Judge Easterbrook agreed that music is protected speech but argued that it is distinguishable from 
nude dancing: “That a dance in Salome expresses something does not imply that a dance in JR’s Kitty Kat 
Lounge expresses something, . . .  [A]ll that we call music is the product of rational human thought and 
appeals at least in part to the same faculties in others. It has the ‘capacity to appeal to the intellect’, . . . is 
not ‘conduct’, and is closer to speech (even an emotional harangue is speech) than to smashing a Ming vase 
or kicking a cat, two other ways to express emotion.” Id. at 1125 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted). 
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ilarly, “[t]he scholarly literature is also surprisingly bereft of comprehensive discus-
sions of the theoretical or doctrinal foundations for treating purely instrumental 
music as expression under the Constitution.”119 Chen, however, demonstrates that 
instrumental musical expression has possessed sufficient meaning to incur suppres-
sion by totalitarian, fascist, and theocratic states: 
Hitler’s regime banned the publication, sale, performance, and broadcast 
of “Entartete Musik” (degenerate music) . . . [by] Stravinsky, Mahler, and 
Gershwin. Jewish composers, such as Mendelssohn, were specifically tar-
geted for censorship . . . as was jazz music, quite probably because of its 
association with African Americans . . . . [A] long history of music censor-
ship marks several periods of the Soviet regime . . . including . . . the regu-
lation of the work of Shostakovich . . . . [T]he previously Taliban-controlled 
Afghanistan and the current Iranian government banned instrumental mu-
sic . . . . [A]n Islamist rebel group in northern Mali . . . . targeted what they 
viewed as “Satan’s music” . . . offensive to the standards of Sharia.120 
In Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court similarly observed: 
“From Plato’s discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own 
times, rulers have known [music’s] capacity to appeal to the intellect and 
to the emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the 
needs of the state . . . . The Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our 
own legal order.”121  
This history of censorship suggests that, with or without words, music has expres-
sive qualities that threaten oppressive regimes. Expression that tyrants believe is 
worth suppressing may well be worth protecting in free societies. 
Instrumental music, however, does not immediately suggest a form of expres-
sion protected by the First Amendment because music without words is generally 
not a vehicle for expressing cognitive ideas. Unlike novels and plays, instrumental 
music has no words. Nor do musical sounds consist of images that may evoke or 
symbolize such ideas, as do visually representational arts like painting and sculp-
ture. Instrumental music is highly nonrepresentational.122 Some musical works may 
evoke or intensify specific ideas by association. A John Philip Sousa march can 
arouse thoughts of patriotic parades, or the music of Wagner’s Bridal Chorus can 
evoke thoughts of weddings. But this is largely due to cultural experience. Though 
the character of the music may be receptive to these ideas, the specific associations 
are largely extrinsic to the sounds of the music itself. A central challenge to treating 
instrumental music as speech “is that music inherently lacks a particularized mes-
sage or idea. In fact, one of the reasons music can be so uniquely expressive is in 
this very absence of [any particular] message.”123 
                                                                
 119. Chen, supra note 118, at 384. 
 120. Id. at 400–01 (footnotes omitted). 
 121. Ward, 491 U.S. at 790. 
 122. Chen, supra note 118, at 436. 
 123. Id. 
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As with other associations, the sounds of music do not in and of themselves 
present a message, religious or sectarian, except by association.124 Take for exam-
ple, the melody to which the lyrics of “Greensleeves” and “What Child Is This?” are 
set.125 Originally, the traditional folk melody was accompanied by lyrics suggestive 
of a romantic encounter.126 Later, religious lyrics were applied to the melody mak-
ing it a religious Christmas carol.127 The melody itself is not inherently romantic or 
religious, but only takes on these qualities by its association with the words that it 
has attracted to itself. Likewise, the melody for one of the well-known versions of 
“Ave Maria,” that of Bach-Gounod, originated as Bach’s instrumental Prelude No. 1 
in C Major.128 This appears in Book One of the Well-Tempered Clavier, which was 
not a religious work at all, but rather an exercise of composing keyboard works in 
each of the major and minor keys to show the advantages of a particular method of 
tuning.129 Charles Gounod later set the religious lyrics to Bach’s melody, and this is 
                                                                
 124. Perrine, supra note 25, at 184, argues that the legal distinction between religious and secular 
does not neatly apply to musical genres:  
[C]ategorical distinctions between . . . the sacred and secular are not quite so clear cut.  In 
music, the Western classical tradition grew out of a complex interplay between the musical 
requirements for worship . . . and state requirements for musical performance . . . . Ostensibly 
sacred genres such as the mass were written for performance in secular venues. . . . Important 
instrumental genres such as the sonata originally developed through the patronage of and for 
performance within the church.  Franz Biebl’s Ave Maria . . . was written for a German fire 
department choir to sing at an amateur choral festival.  
Id.  
 125. There is a recording of “Greensleeves” from the television series, “The Tudors” (2007-10), at 
hiserature, The Tudors: Greensleeves, YOUTUBE (Dec. 23, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmh9__mI51g.  A recording of “What Child Is This” by Josh Grobin 
(2010) may be found at MyJesusGod1, Josh Grobin, What Child Is This, YOUTUBE (Dec. 22, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=brmRUlKbF7g.  
 126. A song by this title appears as a broadside ballad by Richard Jones, entitled, “A Newe North-
ern Dittye of ye Ladye Greene Sleves.”  See John M. Ward, And Who But Ladie Greensleeues?, in THE WELL 
ENCHANTING SKILL: MUSIC, POETRY, AND DRAMA IN THE CULTURE OF THE RENAISSANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF F.W. 
STERNFELD 181 (John Caldwell, Edward Olleson, & Susan Wollenberg, eds., 1990).  
 127. The melody became associated with Christmas and New Year’s texts as early as 1686. Id. at 
193. In 1865, William Chatterton Dix wrote a poem entitled, “The Manger Throne.” WILLIAM D. CRUMP, THE 
CHRISTMAS ENCYCLOPEDIA 437–38 (McFarland, 3d ed. 2012) (2001). In 1871, three stanzas from this poem were 
set to the melody of “Greensleeves” under the title of “What Child Is This?” Id.  See CHRISTMAS CAROLS OLD 
AND NEW, Hymn XIV, 32-33 (Henry Ramsden Bramley & John Stainer, eds. 1871). 
 128. BAKER’S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF MUSICIANS 1339 (Nicolas Slonimsky ed., 7th ed. 1984) 
(1900) (“One of [Gounod’s] most popular settings to religious words is Ave Maria, adapted to the 1st prelude 
of Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier, but its original version was Meditation sur le premier Prelude de Piano de 
J.S. Bach for Violin and Piano (1853); the words were later added (1859).”).  See Jonassen, supra note 25, at 
758 n.482. 
 129. The Well-Tempered Clavier was a highly practical musical exercise demonstrating how mu-
sical pieces may be written in every key for a keyboard instrument, the clavier, when it is evenly tuned or 
“tempered.” BAKER’S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF MUSICIANS 1:161 (Nicolas Slonimsky ed., 7th ed. 1984) (1900).  
(“Bach’s system of ‘equal temperament’ (which is the meaning of ‘well-tempered’ in the title Well-Tem-
pered Clavier) postulated the division of the octave into 12 equal semitones, making it possible to transpose 
and to effect a modulation into any key, a process unworkable in the chaotic tuning of keyboard instruments 
before Bach’s time.”). 
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what associates the particular melody with a religious theme.130 It is perhaps true 
that certain melodies have qualities that are receptive to certain words or thoughts. 
Nevertheless, instrumental religious music does not, in and of itself, project any 
particularized religious message, though it certainly can receive one through asso-
ciation. Separated from any association, religious or secular, all that can be said is 
that music projects the aesthetic qualities of its own sound and rhythm performed 
and received for its beauty as an artistic expression, regardless of the name given 
to the music.131 
Some scholars have taken a narrow view of what speech the First Amendment 
protects.132 Robert Bork, for example, asserted, “Constitutional protection should 
be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial 
intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that 
variety of expression we call obscene or pornographic.”133 Under this theory, the 
Constitution protects only cognitive ideas that advance the democratic values of 
debate and discussion in the marketplace of ideas.134 This cognitive theory of First 
Amendment protection also appears in case law requiring a particularized message 
such as Spence v. State of Washington.135 However, in Texas v. Johnson, the Su-
preme Court extended free speech protections beyond “particularized meaning” in 
recognizing the burning of an American flag as speech not because the act was a 
specific, particularized message, but rather because it was expressive conduct that 
was intentional and overtly political.136 The context made the flag burning “suffi-
ciently imbued with elements of communication.”137 In National Endowment for the 
                                                                
 130. Id. at 2.1339.  Gounod’s application of Bach’s Prelude from the Well-Tempered Clavier to a 
prayer demonstrates that music really consists of an aesthetic arrangement of sounds with scant corre-
spondence to lexical meaning. 
 131. For that matter, names in general, and religious names in particular, do not necessarily de-
note the character of the objects they signify.  Objecting to the name, “Ave Maria,” which happens to signify 
a piece of music, logically leads to intolerance for the names of many American cities which might appear 
in graduation programs, such as Sacramento, Corpus Christi, Las Cruces, San Diego, Los Angeles, or St. Louis.  
See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting in part, but concurring in 
judgment) (“As amicus for Nurre notes, many common proper nouns to secular entities have religious ori-
gins.  For example, the cities Los Angeles (originally ‘our lady of the city of angels’), San Diego (‘Saint 
Didacus’), and Las Cruces (‘the crosses’) each contain overt religious references.”). Id. at 1102 n.3. 
 132. Chen, supra note 118, at 404. 
 133. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 
(1971) (quoted by Chen, supra note 118, at 404). 
 134. But, “[I]f the purpose and scope of the First Amendment’s speech and press clauses are ex-
hausted in the protection of political speech, because freedom of political speech is all that is necessary to 
preserve our democratic political system, this implies the exclusion from the amendment’s protections not 
only of all art (other than the political) but also of science.  For one can have democracy without science, 
just as one can have democracy without art.”  Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 
1990) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 135. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).  The Supreme Court held that nonverbal 
conduct is protected speech only when there is present “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message . . . 
and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [is] great that the message would be understood by 
those who viewed it.” Id. 
 136. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06 (1989).  See Chen, supra note 118, at 389–90 (“[I]n . 
. . Texas v. Johnson, the Court recognized the burning of an American flag as speech, even though neither 
the flag burner’s intent nor the audience’s understanding of his message could be said to be particular-
ized.”).   
 137. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 409).  
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Arts v. Finley, the Court extended protections for nonverbal speech by assuming the 
works of a variety of artists to be speech without discussing whether their art would 
convey a specific or particularized message to those who viewed it.138 And, as noted 
above, the Supreme Court has stated, “[A] narrow succinctly articulable message is 
not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions con-
veying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded 
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”139 Thus, Bork and Spence notwithstanding, the courts should not re-
quire nonverbal expression to convey a particularized message from speaker to lis-
tener in order to bestow Free Speech protection upon instrumental music.140 
After examining several theories of why instrumental music should enjoy the 
protection of the First Amendment, Chen concludes that two aspects of pure instru-
mental music justify constitutional protection: (1) “[I]t advances expression of im-
portant forms of cultural, religious, nationalist, and other social values . . . .”141 Thus, 
music unites people who share in their familiarity and appreciation of the music in 
question and also provides respect for diversity of taste given the distinct music that 
various cultures generate and admire. (2) “[It] serves a completely individualizing 
function, . . . to the extent that it promotes highly personal expressions and experi-
ences of emotion.”142 In this respect, music develops self-realization, self-fulfill-
ment, and individual autonomy. 
Chen’s second justification is particularly relevant to Nurre because, in pro-
moting personal expression, musical sounds do not have to be associated with any 
extrinsic ideas. Nurre testified that the students did not choose Ave Maria to com-
municate a “religious message,” but rather because of its “beauty,” and nowhere in 
the record of the case does any evidence contradict this statement, nor did the 
courts question it.143 Accordingly, the students only intended to convey the beauty 
                                                                
 138. Nat’l Endowment of Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 571 (1998).  See Chen, supra note 118, at 
390. 
 139. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (cita-
tion omitted). 
 140. Chen, supra note 118, at 390.  The standard should be applicable to instrumental music, 
which is also expressive conduct, but which usually cannot be said to have a particularized meaning in-
tended by the performer and recognized by the audience.  Id. 
 141. Id. at 437 (“In its expression of culture, music serves important social functions by connecting 
people within and between different communities, and its recognition as a form of speech ensures that 
government efforts to establish a cultural orthodoxy, like attempts to create a political or religious ortho-
doxy, are thwarted.”). 
 142. Id. at 438 (“Instrumental music allows people to express (through composition, perfor-
mance, and feeling) and experience (through listening, interpreting, and feeling), as no other medium of 
communication can. Thus, while music serves a community building function in terms of cultural expression, 
it simultaneously advances an autonomy-promoting function in its facilitation of individualized emotional 
expression and experience. As developed in more detail above, music’s role in expressing, evoking, and 
experiencing the emotional could easily be argued to promote self-realization.”). 
 143. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  Nurre herself was not Catholic.  See Declaration 
of Kathryn Nurre, supra note 37, ¶ 34 (“While I am not a Catholic and oppose praising any ‘Mary’ to the 
point of deification, I had no and have no objection or taken offense to the title of the song we chose, ‘Ave 
Maria,’ the listing of such title in my school printed program or the playing of such song at any graduation 
ceremony.”).  In “Ave Maria,” or the “Hail Mary,” there is no deification of the Virgin Mary, which is contrary 
to Catholic theology.  Rather the prayer is a request for intercession with God, as its words indicate, “Holy 
Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners, now and at the hour of our death.  Amen.” 
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of the piece of music they had selected. The desire to perform “Ave Maria” was 
nothing more nor less than an attempt to share with the audience the notes, mel-
ody, harmony, and orchestration of the work, all as interpreted by the students in 
their performance. It was an artistic message which the school authorities sup-
pressed, and not any particularized message or viewpoint about religion or anything 
else. 
As this Article will show, in Nurre, the idea that a mode of expression which 
does not project any particularized message is due constitutional protection as 
speech created a distinct problem for the courts in their application of public forum 
analysis. In a limited public forum, the government is not permitted to discriminate 
against viewpoint.144 Does this mean that the mode of expression must have a par-
ticularized message, such as a religious statement, in order to have a viewpoint and 
thereby merit protection? What is the viewpoint of artistic expression that is gen-
erated only for its beauty and not for any particularized message? If wordless music 
lacks such a specific point of view, does that mean this form of expression has no 
protection under public forum analysis? And if such music has no viewpoint or pro-
tection, then what is the point of all that precedent stating that instrumental music 
is protected speech? 
The courts in Nurre were rather inattentive, if not clueless, as to how the non-
representational nature of the music affected their treatment of viewpoint and the 
students’ rights of free speech. While the district court treated “Ave Maria” as if it 
could mean anything, sometimes having a message, or viewpoint, and sometimes 
not, the appellate court treated the music as if it meant nothing at all and was there-
fore devoid of viewpoint, or constitutional protection. What was common to both 
approaches was an unfavorable result for the speech rights of the students.145 
C. The Wind Ensemble’s Performance as a Limited Public Forum 
i. The District Court 
In the cross motions for summary judgment that were before the district 
court, both parties had argued that public forum analysis should be applied to de-
termine the extent of First Amendment protection that ought to be afforded to the 
students’ performance of “Ave Maria.”146 The court noted that forum analysis is “a 
means of determining when the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its 
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the 
property for other purposes.”147 Though the graduation ceremony did not take 
                                                                
 144.  “The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not ‘reasonable in light of the 
purpose served by the forum,’ nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint.” Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   
 145. Cf. Perrine, supra note 25, at 193 (“Franz Biebl’s Ave Maria falls within a cultural tradition in 
which musical works can function aesthetically within both a secular and religious context.  This cultural 
precedent should be respected by the courts. . . . Teachers and schools which allow a forum for student 
expression should respect students’ artistic choices.”). 
 146. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1229 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (“Both parties assert that 
in determining the First Amendment’s reach in this case, the Court should look to the forum where the 
speech is presented.”).   
 147. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)). 
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place on school property, forum analysis was applicable because the Everett School 
District rented the facility and sponsored the event.148 
The district court ably presented Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent 
on forum analysis. Government property is divided into three basic categories: The 
“public forum, [the] designated public forum, and [the] nonpublic forum.”149 The 
public forum is a place such as a street or park that has been traditionally open for 
public use, such as speech and communication.150 A designated government forum 
is a government property which the state has intentionally opened for public ex-
pression.151 A nonpublic forum is a government property which neither tradition 
nor government designation has made a forum for public discourse.152 The Supreme 
Court has indicated that the state may also create a “limited public forum,” that is, 
a nonpublic forum in which the state may limit speech for the use of certain groups 
or the discussion of certain subjects.153 
The ability of the government to limit a person’s speech is contingent upon 
the type of forum in which the speech occurs. A court applies strict scrutiny to gov-
ernment speech limitations in traditional or designated public forums.154 In a tradi-
tional or designated public forum, the state may enforce a content-based restriction 
on speech only if it can show that the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose.155 The state may also 
apply time, place, and manner limitations on speech as long as these limitations are 
narrowly tailored to achieve a government interest and allow for alternative chan-
nels of communication.156 In a nonpublic forum, a regulation on speech need only 
be reasonable and not an effort to suppress the speaker’s viewpoint.157 The govern-
ment may limit speech in a limited public forum as long as the restriction is reason-
able in the light of the forum’s purpose and does not discriminate against a point of 
view.158 
Whitehead argued that the Jackson High School graduation was simply a non-
public forum because the school district exercised supervisory control of all conduct 
and speech at the graduation ceremony, setting parameters on the music that the 
Wind Ensemble could play.159 Nurre contended that the Wind Ensemble perfor-
mance, as opposed to the rest of the graduation ceremony, was a limited public 
                                                                
 148. Id. at 1229–30 (citing Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007), va-
cated by Duchesne City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 1210 (2009)). 
 149. Id. at 1230. 
 150. Id. (citing DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir. 
1999)); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 151. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (citing DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 964); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
 152. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 153. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (citing Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 
F.3d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 2007), abrogated by Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).  
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.).   
 154. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 155. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 156. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 157. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (citing Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672, 679 (1992)). 
 158. Id. (citing Glover 480 F.3d at 908); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 
806.)   
 159. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30. 
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forum.160 Nurre argued that the designation depended on whether Jackson High 
School had a tradition in which the school had opened a portion of the graduation 
ceremony to a group, the seniors of the Wind Ensemble, for them to choose their 
form of musical expression, thereby creating the limited public forum.161 Both 
Moffat and Nurre testified that Jackson High School had a tradition for the previous 
three years of allowing the graduating senior members of the Wind Ensemble to 
choose an instrumental piece to perform at graduation.162 Nurre claimed this tradi-
tion existed even before the three years Moffat had given the Wind Ensemble sen-
iors this choice.163 Whitehead presented the testimony of the previous director, 
Rice, that he had never allowed the students to choose the music they would play 
at graduation.164 The district court noted that under the Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the court was “required to view all facts and draw all reason-
able inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”165 The court, therefore, con-
cluded, “for purposes of summary judgment there are sufficient facts showing that 
the School District created a limited public forum when it allowed the Wind Ensem-
ble’s seniors to choose the piece for performance at the JHS 2006 graduation.”166 
ii. The Appellate Court 
After following the district court in finding that the performance of “Ave Ma-
ria” was free speech protected by the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit also 
turned to the public forum question.  Judge Tallman agreed that since the perfor-
mance was to take place within a government property, the next step was to deter-
mine the type of forum that was created and assess whether the school district’s 
restriction was constitutionally permitted under that forum.167 Tallman observed 
that a school is typically a non-public forum, but it may become a public forum “if 
school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities ‘for indis-
criminate use by the general public,’ or some segment of the public, such as student 
organizations.”168 The appellate court noted that Nurre did not claim the graduation 
ceremony was a public forum, but rather that school administrators created a “lim-
ited public forum” by permitting the students to select the musical piece to perform 
                                                                
 160. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230–31; Plaintiff Nurre’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C06-
901RSL), 2007 WL 4868958. 
 161. Plaintiff Nurre’s Response in Opposition, supra note 160. 
 162. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (citing Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat, 
supra note 37, at 17:4-7 (“Q. Does the Jackson High School wind ensemble have a tradition of having the 
seniors choose a final piece for the graduation.  A. Yes.”); Declaration of Kathryn Nurre, supra note 37,  ¶ 11 
(“Part of this traditional [graduation] performance by the Wind Ensemble included having the graduating 
seniors choose an instrumental piece to be performed at their graduation ceremonies.”)). 
 163. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30. 
 164. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (citation omitted). 
 165. Id. (citation omitted). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1093 (“[W]e must determine the type of forum created by the government 
when Nurre sought to perform ‘Ave Maria’—that is, the relevant forum—and then assess whether the Dis-
trict’s restriction was constitutionally permissible in light of that forum.”).   
 168. Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47). 
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during graduation.169 However, the Ninth Circuit had “never definitively determined 
what forum is created when a school district holds graduation, or, as in this case, 
when part of the graduation ceremony presents student-selected work.”170 The ap-
pellate court believed that it did not have to decide the question in this case be-
cause “the [School] District d[id] not challenge Nurre’s contention that a limited 
public forum existed here. Instead, it simply argue[d] that the restriction placed on 
Nurre was reasonable in light of the purpose served by the graduation ceremo-
nies.”171 The court concluded, “[t]herefore, we assume, without deciding, that a 
limited public forum was created.”172 
iii. The Assumption of a Limited Public Forum 
Both district and appellate courts assumed Jackson High School had estab-
lished a limited public forum in regard to the part of its graduation ceremony in 
which the Wind Ensemble seniors would perform the music of their choice. Neither 
actually found that Jackson High School did in fact do so. The district court assumed 
there existed a limited public forum since the plaintiff had alleged facts which, if 
proven, would be sufficient to show the school had established such a forum.173 
This was a question of fact which, on Whitehead’s summary judgment motion, the 
court had to resolve in favor of the non-moving party, Nurre. The appeals court 
explicitly said it was not deciding whether part of a public school graduation cere-
mony becomes a limited public forum when students select their own music to per-
form, but only assumed a limited public forum was created because the school dis-
trict did not contest the issue at the appellate level.174 
Once these courts assumed the existence of a limited public forum, they 
should not have granted summary judgment to the defendant school district unless 
there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the school district had not vio-
lated the students’ rights within the limited public forum.175 This conclusion could 
not be reached by any reasoning that would contradict or vitiate the assumption 
that a limited public forum existed. The courts’ analysis should not have been influ-
enced or affected by any underlying doubt that the court would eventually hold 
that no part of a public school graduation ceremony could possibly be a limited 
public forum, by any belief that Nurre’s factual allegations would be disproven at 
trial, or by any undue deference to the school officials’ authority. Having declined 
to rule on the matter given the alleged facts before the court, and having explicitly 
                                                                
 169. Id. at 109394. 
 170. Id. at 1094. 
 171. Id.  Although Whitehead argued at the district court that the Wind Ensemble performance 
was a nonpublic forum, it is correct, as the Circuit Court has it, that Whitehead did not contest this issue in 
its Appellee’s Answering Brief, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-35867). 
 172. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1094. 
 173. See id. at 1093. 
 174. See id. at 1094. 
 175. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. A party 
may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—
on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.”). 
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accepted the assumption, the courts should have produced a rigorous analysis as if 
they indeed had decided that the Wind Ensemble’s performance was a limited pub-
lic forum. And given their assumption that the Wind Ensemble performance was a 
limited public forum, the courts could not countenance the school’s unreasonable 
termination of that forum. “Once it has opened a limited forum . . . the State must 
respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude speech 
where its distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the fo-
rum.”176 
D. The Application of Forum Analysis to the Wind Ensemble’s Performance of the 
Instrumental Music from Biebl’s “Ave Maria” 
After stating its assumption that the Wind Ensemble portion of the graduation 
ceremony was a limited public forum, the district court turned to the task of apply-
ing the test for permissible government limitations on speech in a limited public 
forum. Under this test, the government would be able to restrict speech if the re-
striction was (1) viewpoint neutral, and (2) reasonable in the light of the purpose of 
the forum.177 Both conditions of viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness must be 
met for the restriction to be constitutional.178 The government may choose the 
group that is entitled to speak and the subjects that may be discussed in a limited 
public forum so that the government may restrict the speakers and content of 
speech accordingly.179 
i. Viewpoint Neutrality 
a. The District Court 
In regard to viewpoint, the government may not discriminate against a partic-
ular viewpoint or deny access to a speaker with a particular perspective that is 
within the forum’s limitations of content.180 The district court recognized that the 
distinction between content and viewpoint regulation is not a precise one.181 Nev-
ertheless, the court found the “exclusion of ‘Ave Maria’ was based on permissible 
content restriction, not impermissible viewpoint discrimination,” because the ex-
clusion resulted from “a decision to keep religion out of graduation as a whole, not 
                                                                
 176. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citations omit-
ted).  
 177. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d. at 1231 (“[D]efendant’s prohibition on the performance of ‘Ave Ma-
ria’ is not a violation of plaintiff’s free speech rights if the restriction is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in 
light of the purpose of the forum.” (citing Glover, 480 F.3d at 908)); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
 178. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. 
 179. Id. at 1231. 
 180. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983) (“A public forum 
may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups (student groups), or for the discussion 
of certain subjects (school board business.”) (citations omitted)).   
 181. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (citing Glover, 480 F.3d at 911 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 
at 829)). (“In determining whether the restriction is viewpoint neutral, the Court must identify whether 
exclusion of ‘Ave Maria’ is ‘content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purpose of 
[the] limited forum [or] viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against 
speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”).   
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to discriminate against a specific religious sect or creed.”182 The court quoted 
Brandsma’s e-mail instructing principals that music for graduation ceremonies be 
“entirely secular” in nature, and also Whitehead’s testimony to the same effect.183 
The court then made the following statement: 
The case would be different if the exclusion had been based on excluding 
a particular religious sect or creed. However, the Court finds the blanket 
restriction on the exclusion of religious music that occurred in this case is 
one based on content, not viewpoint.184 
The district court’s argument relies heavily on Faith Center Church Evangelistic 
Ministries v. Glover, a Ninth Circuit opinion.185 In that case, the Ninth Circuit found 
that a public library created a limited public forum by allowing community organi-
zations to use its conference room facilities.186 The Circuit held that the Contra 
Costa County Library did not discriminate against the religious viewpoint of Faith 
Center Church Evangelistic Ministries in prohibiting the use of the library’s meeting 
rooms for “religious services or activities”187 because the prohibition was applicable 
to all religious groups rather than to this particular religious group.188 The district 
court quoted the Glover opinion’s pertinent statement:  
If the County had, for example, excluded from its forum religious worship 
services by Mennonites, then we would conclude that the County had en-
gaged in unlawful viewpoint discrimination against the Mennonite reli-
gion. But a blanket exclusion of religious worship services from the forum 
is one based on the content of speech.189 
This very quotation should have indicated to the district court that Glover is obvi-
ously distinguishable from Nurre. The Glover case concerned “religious worship ser-
vices”; Nurre did not.190 The Jackson High seniors did not intend to lead the audience 
in any semblance of prayer or worship. It was for aesthetic reasons that they 
wanted to perform a musical work whose title happened to be “Ave Maria.”191 The 
                                                                
 182. Id. at 1231–32. 
 183. Supra notes 6263 and accompanying text. 
 184. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1232. 
 185. Id. (citing Glover, 480 F.3d at 915). 
 186. Glover, 480 F.3d at 910 (“We therefore hold that the Antioch Library meeting room is a lim-
ited public forum whose restrictions to access may be based on subject matter . . . so long as the distinctions 
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.” (citations and 
quotations omitted)).  
 187. Id. at 903. 
 188. Id. at 915 (“Religious worship, . . . is not a viewpoint but a category of discussion within which 
many different religious perspectives abound.”). “We therefore conclude that prohibiting Faith Center’s re-
ligious worship services from the Antioch meeting room is a permissible exclusion of a category of speech 
that is meant to preserve the purpose behind the limited public forum.” Id. at 918 
 189. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (quoting Glover, 480 F.3d at 915). 
 190. Glover, 480 F.3d at 910; Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222. 
 191. See supra notes 3637 and accompanying text; Jonassen, supra note 25, at 756–57 (“The 
performance of religious music in a secular setting such as a graduation or a concert is distinguishable from 
worship, since in such a setting the audience primarily appreciates the music for its artistic merits, and not 
as a vehicle to communicate with God.”). 
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music was instrumental only, purged of any religious reference except for its title.192 
With or without the title, it was unrealistic to think the audience would have per-
ceived the performance to be a religious service or worship. The graduation perfor-
mance of “Ave Maria,” therefore, could not reasonably be construed as religious 
worship. 
Further examination of Glover only deepens its dissimilarity from Nurre. 
Glover held that there is a difference between speech that is dedicated to worship 
or praise of God and speech that is about religion or that simply possesses religious 
content. The Glover court based this view on a fragment of dicta from Good News 
Club, which, the Glover court argued, distinguished between “mere religious wor-
ship, divorced from any teaching of moral values” and therefore possessing no 
viewpoint, and other religious activities which provide opinions about moral values, 
and which therefore possess viewpoints.193 Because religious worship is devoid of 
viewpoint, the argument proceeds, worship does not constitute protected speech 
for the purposes of public forum analysis, whereas speech about religion contains 
viewpoints which are protected under public forum analysis.194 In the Glover pas-
sage discussing the impermissibility of excluding one religion and not another, the 
Ninth Circuit was talking about the exclusion of “religious worship services,” not 
religious commentary.195 Based on this distinction, the Glover court held that the 
County Library could maintain a blanket exclusion of religious worship ceremo-
nies.196 
However, the Glover majority made it quite clear that the County Library’s 
policy would not have been constitutional if it had prohibited the Faith Center 
                                                                
 192. See Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. 
 193. Glover, 480 F.3d at 913 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 96, 112 
n.4 (2001)).  See contra, id. at 899–901 (Bybee, J., with whom O’Scannlain, Kleinfeld, Tallman, Callahan, Bea, 
and Smith, Jr., join, dissenting from denial of hearing en banc) (“The [Supreme] Court was pointing out only 
that the Club’s activities were reasonably related to the purposes of the limited forum: in that sense, the 
Club’s activities were not ‘mere religious worship’ lacking any connection to the purpose of the forum.  If 
the Club had attempted to conduct worship that contained no references to moral and character develop-
ment in children, the school could have denied permission for such use, just as it could have denied permis-
sion for a ‘mere political discussion’ or a ‘mere Tupperware party’ also devoid of such content. The relevant 
distinction was between ‘mere religious worship’ and worship that bore a relationship to the narrow pur-
poses of the dedicated forum, not between a category of fully protected religious speech with a secular 
component or counterpart and speech that is less protected because it is exclusively religious.”).  
 194. The Glover court went on to argue that the government may not be competent to distinguish 
between the two, but the Faith Center Church itself made that distinction by separating its worship services 
from discussions about religion. Id. at 918 (“The distinction to be drawn here is thus much more challeng-
ing—one between religious worship and virtually all other forms of religious speech—and one that the gov-
ernment and the courts are not competent to make. That distinction, however, was already made by Faith 
Center itself when it separated its afternoon religious worship service from its morning activities. Faith Cen-
ter admits that it occupied the Antioch forum in the afternoon of May 29, 2004 expressly for ‘praise and 
worship.’ The County may not be able to identify whether Faith Center has engaged in pure religious wor-
ship, but Faith Center can and did.”).   
 195. Id. at 915. 
 196. Id. (“Pure religious worship, however, is not a secular activity that conveys a religious view-
point on otherwise permissible subject matter. For every other topic of discussion that Faith Center engages 
in—the Bible, communication, social and political issues, life experiences—religious and non-religious per-
spectives exist. The same can be said for moral and character development in Good News Club, child rearing 
in Lamb’s Chapel, and the topic of religion itself in Rosenberger.”).  See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
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Church from using the library’s facilities to discuss religious topics, “such as how to 
communicate effectively with one’s God.”197 Such commentaries would present a 
religious viewpoint, so that banning them in a limited public forum would be illicit 
viewpoint discrimination. “It would . . . be viewpoint discrimination for the County 
to exclude Faith Center’s perspective on the subject of communication because of 
the religious content of Faith Center’s speech.”198 
The proposed performance of “Ave Maria” at the Jackson High School gradu-
ation was certainly not worship. Although it was not intended to be religious com-
mentary either, it could conceivably be construed as musical commentary on a re-
ligious idea. But even if it were, Glover would stand for protecting this speech in a 
limited public forum precisely because of the distinction the Ninth Circuit made be-
tween religious worship and religious commentary. Banning “Ave Maria” then, 
would be viewpoint discrimination under Glover.  Thus, Glover did not approve of a 
blanket policy prohibiting any and all expression related to religion in a limited pub-
lic forum, as was implemented by the school officials in Nurre: it did the opposite. 
b. The Appellate Court 
Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit adopted the limited public forum test: 
“In a nonpublic forum opened for a limited purpose, restrictions on access ‘can be 
based on subject matter . . . so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light 
of the purpose served by the forum’ and all the surrounding circumstances.”199 
Judge Tallman, however, did not follow the district court’s argument that relied so 
heavily on Glover. This is, perhaps, because he had penned a rather robust dissent 
in that very case.200 Tallman disagreed that there was a constitutional distinction 
between the speech of religious worship and the speech of religious discussion. He 
had rather good grounds for his dissent, for he quoted the Supreme Court in its 
refusal to recognize such a distinction in Widmar v. Vincent, which said “religious 
worship and discussion . . . are forms of speech and association protected by the 
First Amendment.”201 Given his previous dissent, Tallman could not depend on 
Glover for the proposition that the performance of “Ave Maria” had no viewpoint 
and therefore no protection because it would be religious worship.202 Nor could he 
                                                                
 197. Glover, 480 F.3d at 914 (“[T]he morning workshop was devoted to the topic of communica-
tion and how to communicate effectively with one’s God. Although Faith Center’s activities may have in-
cluded ‘quintessentially religious’ speech such as a call to prayer, Good News Club makes clear that such 
speech in furtherance of communicating an idea from a religious point of view cannot be grounds for exclu-
sion.”).  
 198. Id.   
 199. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting DiLoreto v. Downey Unified 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. 
Fund, Inc,, 473 U.S. 788, 806, 808 (1985))). 
 200. Glover, 480 F.3d at 921 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 201. Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981)). 
 202. Glover, 480 F.3d at 91415. 
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square the prohibition of “Ave Maria” as religious commentary given Glover’s hold-
ing that the banning of such speech would be viewpoint discrimination.203 There-
fore, Tallman used a different approach, one that was, perhaps, suggested by the 
district court. 
In a footnote, Judge Lasnik mentioned an alternative means of disposing of 
the viewpoint issue. “Plaintiff’s case is further weakened . . . by the fact that she 
appears to have no religious viewpoint on the performance of ‘Ave Maria.’”204 The 
idea appears to be that because Nurre had disclaimed any religious intent or mes-
sage, she had no viewpoint which warranted constitutional protection. 
Judge Tallman did not discuss viewpoint discrimination in the text of the ap-
pellate opinion.205 Instead, he summarily disposed of the entire issue in a footnote, 
declaring, “[T]his is not a case involving viewpoint discrimination which would be 
impermissible no matter the forum. Nurre concedes that she was not attempting 
to express any specific religious viewpoint, but that she sought only to ‘play a pretty 
piece.’”206 The appellate court then quoted Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
the University of Virginia: “When the government targets not subject matter, but 
particular views taken by the speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amend-
ment is [viewpoint discrimination]….The government must abstain from regulating 
speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the 
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”207 The point of the quotation seems to 
be that viewpoint discrimination is only concerned with regulating the “motivating 
ideology, or the opinion or perspective of the speaker,” and because Nurre had de-
clared she intended to convey no religious message (no religious ideology, opinion, 
or perspective), the government could not have been guilty of viewpoint discrimi-
nation. There simply was nothing to discriminate against, except the desire to “play 
a pretty piece.” By assuming that the only possible viewpoint Nurre could have had 
in her desire to perform “Ave Maria” had to be religious, the court enabled itself to 
conclude that no viewpoint at all was involved and therefore no viewpoint discrim-
ination. 
c. The Courts’ Discussions of Viewpoint 
Both the district and appellate courts had ruled that instrumental music was 
protected speech, and both had assumed the existence of a limited public forum. 
In order to rule in favor of the school district, the courts had to find there was no 
viewpoint discrimination. To do this the courts chose distinct paths to argue there 
was no such discrimination because the students simply had no point of view. The 
district court treated the performance of “Ave Maria” as a species of religious wor-
ship when, in fact, it was no such thing, and wrongly interpreted Glover to justify a 
blanket prohibition of all religious expression when in fact Glover explicitly stands 
                                                                
 203. Id.  
 204. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1232 n.15 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (citation omitted). 
 205. See Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1087.  
 206. Id. at 1095 n.6. 
 207. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(emphasis added by the Ninth Circuit)). 
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for the permissible blanket exclusion of religious worship, but not religious com-
mentary, in a limited public forum.208 
On the issue of the constitutional distinction between religious worship and 
religious commentary, Judge Tallman was probably right, and Glover wrong. The 
Supreme Court has never adopted this distinction. It was Justice Stevens who, in a 
dissent from Good News Club, attached constitutional significance to the categories 
of religious discussion, religious worship, and proselytizing.209 But even Justice Ste-
vens noted that “a public school that permitted its facilities to be used for the dis-
cussion of family issues and child rearing could not deny access to speakers present-
ing a religious point of view on those issues,”210 and probably would have protected 
the musical performance of “Ave Maria” if he had construed the music as religious 
commentary. 
The appellate court therefore rejected the district court’s reliance on Glover, 
choosing instead to assume that the only possible viewpoint involved in performing 
a work with a title such as “Ave Maria” was a religious one, and since the students 
disclaimed any intent to communicate a message about religion, there was no view-
point that could have suffered discrimination. These positions, however, render nu-
gatory the findings of both courts that instrumental music is protected expression 
under the First Amendment.211 It makes no sense to find that instrumental music is 
protected speech, and then deny any protection for such expression by finding that 
instrumental music has no viewpoint to protect. It would have been more logical to 
have found that instrumental music was not protected speech.  But that, of course, 
would have contradicted the dicta of the Supreme Court and several circuits. The 
“no viewpoint” positions also rendered null the assumption both courts made that 
the school had established a limited public forum for the musical performance of 
the wind ensemble. If the music Nurre wished to perform had no viewpoint, what 
was the sense of finding there was any limited public forum for the performance of 
this music to begin with? It would have been more logical for the court to have 
found there was no limited public forum because the performance of music without 
a message has no viewpoint. But the courts did not take that line. The evidence and 
basic civil procedure indicated to the district court there was a genuine question of 
material fact as to whether the school had established a limited public forum. And 
the appeals court noted that the defendant did not contest the existence of a lim-
ited public forum. Finally, the contrived requirement that the music express a view-
point such as an ideology, opinion, or perspective in order to deserve free speech 
                                                                
 208. The district court’s interpretation of Nurre’s interest in performing “Ave Maria” as religious 
worship which has no First Amendment protection based on Glover, and, in the alternative, as expression 
lacking any religious message or viewpoint to be protected based on Nurre’s disclaimer, indicates that the 
district court had no consistent understanding of the musical performance. See supra notes 186–97 and 
accompanying text.  
 209. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 96, 130 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted) (“Speech for ‘religious purposes’ may reasonably be understood to encompass three differ-
ent categories. First, there is religious speech that is simply speech about a particular topic from a religious 
point of view . . . . Second, there is religious speech that amounts to worship, or its equivalent . . . . Third, 
there is an intermediate category that is aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular 
religious faith.”). 
 210. Id. (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1993)). 
 211. See supra III(B)(i)(ii). 
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protection was really a camouflage for the “particularized meaning” requirement, 
a proposition which Supreme Court precedent in Johnson and Finley and dicta in 
Hurley had long ago rejected.212 
The courts obviously did not think about any of this. They were not attentive 
to the nonrepresentational nature of music, which does not, per se, project a cog-
nitive ideology or perspective, but rather presents an artistic expression to which 
the listener might or might not attach such cognitive ideas.213 The courts failed to 
recognize that the students’ expression possessed an artistic point of view to which 
judicial precedent had accorded full constitutional protection. By prohibiting the 
musical performance, the school was practicing viewpoint discrimination, not 
against a religious point of view, but rather against an artistic point of view. Refer-
ring to the music as merely “a pretty piece” doesn’t change this. 
ii. Reasonableness 
The second requirement for the legality of government speech restrictions in 
a limited public forum is reasonableness. To be permissible, the school district’s 
censorship of “Ave Maria” had to be reasonable in its exclusion of content that did 
not serve the purpose for which the limited public forum was established.214 At the 
end of its discussion of the viewpoint element of the limited public forum analysis, 
the district court declared that the school district’s decision to prohibit the perfor-
mance of “Ave Maria” was not only viewpoint neutral but also reasonable on the 
basis of the “Establishment Clause Defense,” so that there had been no constitu-
tional violation of free speech.215 However, the district court had not yet examined 
the reasonableness prong of the limited public forum test, but rather only an-
nounced it would do so in a subsequent section of the opinion. 
The Court also finds, as discussed below in the context of an “Establish-
ment Clause defense,” that the prohibition on the performance of “Ave 
Maria” was reasonable in light of the purposes of the 2006 JHS graduation 
ceremony. See Section II.B.2.b, infra. As a result, under the forum analysis, 
the Court concludes that defendant's restriction was viewpoint neutral 
and reasonable. Accordingly, defendant did not violate plaintiff's rights un-
der the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by prohibiting the per-
formance of “Ave Maria” at the 2006 JHS graduation ceremony. 216 
Section II.B.2.b deals with the defendants’ qualified immunity defense.217 Thus, ra-
ther than discuss the issue of the reasonableness of the speech restriction under its 
limited public forum analysis, the court elected to postpone its treatment of that 
issue to its discussion of the defendants’ qualified immunity defense. But before 
                                                                
 212. See supra notes 133–140 and accompanying text. 
 213. Jonassen, supra, note 25, at 757 (“The court’s comments miss a crucial aspect of the case. 
Plaintiff’s statement was evidence that she did not intend to express anything religious. But just because 
she did not have a religious viewpoint does not mean that she did not have a musical viewpoint.”). 
 214. See supra notes 176 and 199 and accompanying text. 
 215. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–33. 
 216. Id. at 1232–33. 
 217. Id. at 1236–40.   
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discussing Whitehead’s qualified immunity defense, the court also discussed rea-
sonableness in regard to Nurre’s Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause 
claims as well.218 
This Article focuses on the Free Speech issues in Nurre. However, the district 
court’s analyses of Nurre’s Establishment and Equal Protection claims and White-
head’s qualified immunity defense are all relevant to that issue because rather than 
discuss reasonableness under the reasonableness prong for government re-
strictions on speech in a limited public forum, the court dealt with the reasonable-
ness of the school officials under these other issues, concluding, it appears, that if 
the school officials were reasonable for the purposes of these other issues, they 
were reasonable for the purposes of the limited public forum. In its discussion of 
these other issues of the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection claims and the 
Qualified Immunity defense, the district court supported its contention that the Ev-
erett School District officials acted reasonably on the basis of the Establishment 
Clause Defense. 
a. Reasonableness: Establishment Clause and Equal Protection 
1. The District Court 
Nurre’s Establishment Clause claim is unusual in that she was not arguing the 
school district was endorsing a religious belief with which she disagreed, or was 
preventing her from worshipping as she wished.219 Rather, Nurre was arguing that 
by unreasonably excluding “Ave Maria” only because of its religious title, the school 
district was demonstrating a hostility to religion.220 The claim may have been ill-
advised because it drew attention to religious expression, when the case was really 
about artistic expression. 
In any event, the district court applied the Lemon test, the first prong of which 
requires the government action under review to have a secular purpose.221 The 
court quoted Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, an opinion in which the Ninth Circuit 
                                                                
 218. The court justified this shift in a footnote stating that an examination of “the graduation cer-
emony as a whole is relevant in evaluating the reasonableness of defendant’s action in denying the perfor-
mance of ‘Ave Maria.’”  Id. at 1232 n.16.  The court relied upon Glover, 480 F.3d at 910, for this proposition.  
Id.  The shift, however, obscures the distinction between the musical performance, which both courts as-
sumed was a limited public forum, from the rest of the graduation ceremony, which did not enjoy that 
assumption.  In another footnote, the court states that the school district’s policies and procedures are not 
controlling because they refer to choral and musical assemblies, and not specifically to graduation ceremo-
nies.  Id. at 1233 n.17.  The footnote does point out, “The only policy or procedure expressly addressing 
graduation states: ‘Neither the District nor individual schools shall conduct or sanction invocations, bene-
dictions or prayer at any school activities including graduation.’”  Id. at 1233 n.17 (citing to Dkt. No. 10, Ex. 
2 at 3).  But, of course, an instrumental musical performance is not an invocation, benediction, and, though 
the music was composed to accompany the prayer, “Ave Maria,” the performance of the music for its art-
istry alone, without the words of the prayer, is not a prayer. 
 219. Id. at 1234 (quoting Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
American Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002))) (“The 
Ninth Circuit has ‘noted that “because it is far more typical for an Establishment Clause case to challenge 
instances in which the government has done something that favors religion or a religious group, [there is] 
little guidance concerning what constitutes a primary effect of inhibiting religion.”’”).   
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 1233 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 61213 (1971)). 
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found Los Angeles County’s removal of a cross from the county seal was not a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause. “[T]o hold that the removal of . . . objects to cure 
an Establishment Clause violation would itself violate the Establishment Clause 
would . . . result in an inability to cure an Establishment Clause violation and thus 
totally eviscerate the [E]stablishment Clause.”222 The court then pointed to White-
head’s deposition testimony that in not allowing the performance of “Ave Maria” 
at graduation, she was relying on Lee v. Weisman, where the Supreme Court pro-
hibited school officials from arranging for clergy to lead prayers at public high school 
graduations because that would be a coercive imposition of religion by the govern-
ment on those attending the graduation, an Establishment Clause violation.223 
Therefore, the court found that the purpose of prohibiting the performance of “Ave 
Maria” was to avoid this potential Establishment Clause violation, which is a secular 
purpose, so that the first prong of Lemon was satisfied.224 
The court went on to argue that the prohibition did not violate the other two 
prongs of the Lemon test. The second prong prohibits “government action that has 
the ‘principal or primary effect’ of advancing or disapproving religion.”225 Again re-
lying on Vasquez, the court found that a “reasonable observer” familiar with the 
history and controversy surrounding religious speech at graduation exercises would 
not perceive the primary effect of the defendant’s action as one of hostility toward 
religion. “Rather, it would be viewed as an effort by Defendant to comply with the 
Establishment Clause and to avoid unwanted future litigation.”226 
The third prong of Lemon provides that the government action must not foster 
an “excessive government entanglement with religion.”227 The district court argued 
that “given plaintiff’s stance on the lack of religious content of ‘Ave Maria’ . . .  plain-
tiff cannot show that excessive entanglement occurred.”228 
The claim might be stronger if plaintiff believed that the performance of 
Biebl’s “Ave Maria” conveyed a religious message. But she does not . . . 
Based on this, the plaintiff cannot take the position that defendant acted 
with hostility toward religion or the School District’s action fostered ‘ex-
cessive entanglement with religion’ when plaintiff does not assert that the 
speech that was excluded conveyed a religious message.229 
Thus, the district court thought that because Nurre had no religious message to 
convey, the government could not have been demonstrating any hostility against 
religion or fostering excessive entanglement with religion. 
                                                                
 222. Id. at 123334 (quoting Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1256 n.8). 
 223. “Q. Where did you obtain your information that the commencement was required to be a 
neutral setting?  A. From the Supreme Court decision about commencement.” [Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577 (1992)].   Id. at 1234 (citing Deposition upon Oral Examination of Carol Whitehead, supra note 43, at 
34). 
 224. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. (“The Court finds that defendant’s action was motivated by 
an effort to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation.”).   
 225. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612). 
 226. Id. (quoting Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1257). 
 227. Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613). 
 228. Id. at 1234.  
 229. Id. 
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Again, there are defects in this argument. For one thing, the district court’s 
finding of no religious intent in its discussion of the Establishment Clause overlooks 
the court’s earlier treatment of the performance as if it were religious worship.230 
Under its viewpoint analysis, the court treated the students’ expression as religious 
worship in spite of their disclaimer of any religious intent, an approach which, in the 
court’s view, undercut their free speech claim. For purposes of the Establishment 
Clause claim, the court took the disclaimer seriously as an indication that the stu-
dents had no religious intent in their expression, which now undercut their Estab-
lishment Clause claim. For the court to earlier treat the performance as if it were a 
species of religious worship, and now find there was no government entanglement 
because the performance was not intended to be religious after all, appears incon-
sistent to say the least. 
Another problem with this argument is its lack of attention to what a reason-
able observer would understand about the performance. As the court itself indi-
cated, the determination of whether the school district was expressing hostility to-
wards religion depended on what a reasonable observer would understand from 
the prohibition of the performance, and not on what Nurre intended.231 Indeed, the 
school officials banned the musical performance not on the basis of what was in-
tended, but on the basis of what might be perceived due to the religious title of the 
music. But it was questionable whether a reasonable observer would have per-
ceived the musical performance as government support of religion merely because 
of the music’s name or origin. Banning the music because of its religious name, even 
though the music had no religious intent or message, could be unreasonable hostil-
ity to religion, one which excludes expression out of all reasonable proportion to its 
religious significance, regardless of what was intended and what could have been 
perceived. 
In attempting to demonstrate the reasonableness of the school district’s ac-
tion of prohibiting the performance of Ave Maria, the district court relied on 
Vasquez in much the same way as it relied on Glover, and just as inappropriately. 
Once again, the district court chose a case that was clearly distinguishable from 
Nurre. Vasquez concerned an objection to the removal of a cross from the official 
Los Angeles County seal.232 Such a seal is a representation of the authority of the 
county government.233 An official county seal could not be considered a limited pub-
lic forum in which private speakers are allowed to contribute symbols of their 
choice. A county seal is more appropriately identified as no public forum at all, in 
which the government speaks by selecting the symbols with which the government 
                                                                
 230. Supra notes 18494 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra, note 226 and accompanying text. 
 232. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1247–48. 
 233. Consider, for example, the significance of the county seal in Robinson v. City of Edmund, 68 
F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1995): “Since 1965 the seal has been used extensively by the City, and appears 
on City limits signs, on City flags, on the uniforms of City police officers and firefighters, on official City vehi-
cles, on stickers identifying City property, and in the City Council chambers. Additionally, the seal appears 
on each utility bill sent out by the City, as well as on official City stationery and the Utility and Sanitation 
Department’s newsletter. The seal has been registered as a trademark under Oklahoma law.” 
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represents its authority.234 The government may include or exclude any symbol it 
chooses.235 It is especially important in this type of forum that the government 
avoid expression supportive of a specific religion or religion in general in order not 
to violate the Establishment Clause.236 In Vasquez, a potential Establishment Clause 
violation hinged on the appearance of the cross, the most fundamental symbol of 
the Christian religion, on a county seal.237 Certainly in a nonpublic forum such as 
this where the government is speaking, there is a realistic danger that the commu-
nity would think the municipality was endorsing a particular religion by including a 
cross; so the Ninth Circuit was justified in finding that a reasonable observer would 
not construe the removal of the cross to be an act of hostility towards religion, but 
rather conclude “[d]efendants' removal of the cross is more reasonably viewed as 
an effort to restore their neutrality and to ensure their continued compliance with 
the Establishment Clause,”238 especially because such crosses on municipal seals 
had recently been found unconstitutional.239 What may be a reasonable govern-
ment prohibition in the forum which Vasquez addressed may not be a reasonable 
prohibition at all in the limited public forum assumed by the court in Nurre, in which 
students were allowed to choose the work of instrumental music they wished to 
perform. Vasquez, therefore, was not persuasive in demonstrating the reasonable-
ness of the school district’s prohibition. 
While failing to distinguish Vasquez, the district court distinguished three 
cases involving religious music at a public school. In Stratechuk v. Board of Educa-
tion of South Orange-Maplewood School District, the Third Circuit found that a com-
plaint alleging a categorical school ban on exclusively religious music having the ex-
press purpose of sending a message of disapproval of religion states a claim and 
should not be dismissed.240 The district court, however, found the denial of a mo-
                                                                
 234. Cf. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (citation omitted), which 
found that the monuments which the city government had selected for a public park were government 
speech: “In this case, it is clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park represent government 
speech. Although many of the monuments were not designed or built by the City and were donated in 
completed form by private entities, the City decided to accept those donations and to display them in the 
Park. Respondent does not claim that the City ever opened up the Park for the placement of whatever 
permanent monuments might be offered by private donors. Rather, the City has ‘effectively controlled’ the 
messages sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.” 
 235. Id. at 467–68 (citations omitted) (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation 
of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”). 
 236. Id. at 468 (“This does not mean that there are no restraints on government speech. For ex-
ample, government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.”). 
 237. Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007); Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 
725 (2010) (“The cross is of course the preeminent symbol of Christianity[.]“). 
 238. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1257. 
 239. Id. (citing Robinson, 68 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1995); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 
1413 (7th Cir. 1991); Friedman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 778 (10th Cir. 1985); and Murray v. City 
of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 163 (5th Cir.1991) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219, 112 S. Ct. 
3028, 120 L.Ed.2d 899 (1992) (noting “constant . . . judicial disapproval of government use of Christian 
crosses . . . on municipal seals” and pointing out that “[t]he Supreme Court itself has repeatedly disapproved 
in dicta the governmental display of crosses”). 
 240. 200 Fed. Appx. 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2006). In Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., S. Orange-Maplewood Sch. 
Dist., 587 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 828 (2009), the Third Circuit ruled that the school board’s 
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tion to dismiss insufficient to apply to Nurre which concerned summary judg-
ment.241 In Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit found 
no Establishment Clause violation in the performance of a religious choral piece, 
“The Lord Bless You and Keep You,” as the Choir Theme Song.242 Rather, the Circuit 
stated that prohibiting or limiting the song’s performance would “require hostility, 
not neutrality, toward religion. Such animosity towards religion is not required or 
condoned by the Constitution.”243 Despite this dicta, the district court found this 
case irrelevant because it did not concern a “hostility to religion” claim as did Nurre, 
nor did Duncanville concern the graduation context.244 In Bauchman for Bauchman 
v. West High School, the Tenth Circuit found that the school choir’s practice and 
performance of religious choral music even at religious sites did not offend the Es-
tablishment Clause.245 The district court distinguished this case because it also did 
not deal with the “hostility to religion” issue and the Tenth Circuit had granted an 
injunction against the performance of such music at the school’s graduation pend-
ing appeal.246 However, the district court neglected to consider the Tenth Circuit’s 
eventual finding, that the singing of the Choir Theme Song at graduation would not 
have been the kind of religious activity found in Weisman, so that it would not have 
entailed a state endorsement of religion in the context of a school graduation.247 
                                                                
policy of eliminating religious songs to celebrate the holiday season at school sponsored activities was con-
stitutional. However, the policy did permit the performance of religious music that had an educational pur-
pose, did not refer to the holidays, and tended to be in foreign languages such as Latin or Italian. Thus, songs 
such as “Joy to the World,” “O Come All Ye Faithful,” “Hark, the Herald Angels Sing,” and “Silent Night” 
would not be permitted, but music such as Antonio Vivaldi’s “Gloria in Excelsio” (sic for “Gloria in Excelsis 
Deo,” that is, “Glory to God in the Highest”), Arcangelo Corelli’s “Concerto VIII, fatto per note di natali” 
(“Concerto No. 8 composed for Christmas Eve”), a “Jubilate” (unidentified composition with the title of “Re-
joice” that could refer to the birth of Christ), and “Agnus Dei/cum sanctis” (“Lamb of God/with the Saints” 
the “Lamb of God” is a prayer recited at the Catholic Mass) would be allowed.  Id. at 602. Apparently, choral 
music that refers to the event Christmas celebrates, the birth of Christ, would be acceptable as long as the 
references occur in classical works in a foreign language and not in popular Christmas carols.  
 241. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1240 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 242. 70 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 953 (1998).   
 243. Id. at 407–08. “The argument that students likely identify their choir by its theme song is well 
taken but misses the crucial point that particularly in the world of choral music, singing about religion is not 
the same as endorsing or exercising religion. Students who identify DISD’s choir with The Lord Bless and 
Keep You will certainly feel unity with past choirs from the same school but we are hard pressed to find that 
this unity necessarily stems from a common belief in Christianity or Judaism rather than the fact that the 
earlier students also attended the same high school.” Id. at 408 n.8. 
 244. Id. at 1240. 
 245. 132 F.3d 542, 556 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 246. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (quoting Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 547 n.4 (“Ms. Bauchman also 
requested an injunction pending appeal, which we granted, thereby enjoining the singing of the two songs, 
‘The Lord Bless You and Keep You’ and ‘Friends’ by the Choir at West High School’s 1995 graduation cere-
monies.” (emphasis added by district court))). 
 247. Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 552, n.8 (stating in reference to the graduation exercise, “[W]e do 
not believe the singing of religious songs alone constitutes prayer . . . . The facts as alleged by Ms. Bauchman 
simply do not identify a religious activity analogous to that addressed in Lee or other school prayer cases. 
Accordingly, we conclude a coercion analysis is inapplicable to the facts at hand.”). The Tenth Circuit thereby 
affirmed the district court’s opinion distinguishing Weisman which was concerned with prayer at graduation 
and not music. Bauchman by and through Bauchman v. West High School, 900 F. Supp. 254, 268 (D. Utah 
1995) (“Singing of songs is not an ‘explicit religious exercise,’ like the graduation prayer was deemed to be 
by the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman, or like other prayers and singing in cases cited by plaintiff. Music 
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These cases, though distinguishable on grounds far more tenuous than cases such 
as Glover and Vasquez, could nevertheless have been read as an indication that, 
generally speaking, religious music studied and performed for artistic or historical 
reasons is acceptable at events sponsored by a public school, including graduation. 
Consistent with those opinions, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that 
the study of religion itself in public schools, to say nothing of the performance of 
religious music, passes constitutional muster.248 However, these cases did not per-
suade the district court that the performance of “Ave Maria” at the Jackson High 
School graduation might not have offended the Constitution, and were quickly dis-
patched. 
In regard to the Equal Protection claim, the district court noted that Nurre was 
not claiming that the prohibition deprived her of a fundamental right or discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of a suspect classification. Rather, Nurre claimed that 
she “and her Wind Ensemble classmates were singled out for different treatment 
because, unlike previous senior classes, their choice of a performance piece at grad-
uation was not allowed. This different treatment was not reasonable or rational.”249 
In support of her theory, Nurre relied on the Supreme Court’s “class of one” equal 
protection jurisprudence.250 However, this theory only required rational scrutiny to 
justify the government’s action. The court readily found a rational basis for the gov-
ernment’s action in the school officials’ concern that the performance of “Ave Ma-
ria” at graduation would be an Establishment Clause violation. 
Perhaps the court was a bit hasty in concluding the school’s action passed ra-
tional scrutiny. For several years, the Wind Ensemble of Jackson High School had 
presented graduation performances of “On a Hymnsong of Philip Bliss,” an instru-
mental work by David R. Holsinger with many religious connections.251 The term, 
“hymn” is plain English (as opposed to Latin) for “1(a): a song of praise to God; (b) 
a metrical composition adapted for singing in a religious service.”252 The particular 
                                                                
has a purpose in education beyond the mere words or notes in conveying a feeling or mood, teaching cul-
ture and history, and broadening understanding of art.”). This is a clear distinction the courts in Nurre failed 
to recognize. 
 248. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (“[T]he Bible may constitutionally be used 
in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like.”); Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578. 606–08 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (“As a matter of history, schoolchildren can 
and should properly be informed of all aspects of this Nation’s religious heritage . . . . In fact, since religion 
permeates our history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is necessary to understand many 
historical as well as contemporary events. In addition, it is worth noting that the Establishment Clause does 
not prohibit per se the educational use of religious documents in public school education. . . . The [Bible] is, 
in fact, ‘the world’s all-time best seller’ with undoubted literary and historic value apart from its religious 
content.”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[O]ne’s education is 
not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the 
advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and 
historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when pre-
sented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First 
Amendment.”). 
 249. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (citation omitted). 
 250. Id. 
 251. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
 252. Hymn, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/hymn (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1100 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith, 
J., dissenting in part, concurring in judgment) (“In marked contrast to what was done in this case, in previous 
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term, “hymnsong,” was coined by the composer—Holsinger—for his compositions 
which make use of melodies derived from hymns.253 Philip Bliss was a nineteenth-
century composer of hymns well-known in Christian musical circles.254 And David 
Holsinger is a contemporary composer who has written many musical works with 
Christian themes and is currently Composer and Director of the Wind Ensemble at 
Lee University, which describes itself as a Christ-Centered Liberal Arts University, 
located in Cleveland, Tennessee.255 Members of the audience would have been 
more likely to recognize the religious significance of “Hymsong” than of the Latin 
title, “Ave Maria,” and those who were more knowledgeable would have known the 
many Christian aspects of this work.256 And if, in fact, the “Hymnsong” was chosen 
by the previous Director of the Wind Ensemble—Jim Rice—as he testified,257 the 
performance of this religious work at a public school graduation would have made 
a much better case for government endorsement of religion and an Establishment 
Clause violation than the performance of “Ave Maria,” since the former was chosen 
by a school official, which implies government approval of the religious expression, 
and the latter was chosen by students, which supports the existence of a limited 
public forum in which members of the public speak and not the government. The 
school district approved and allowed the “Hymnsong” for several years with no con-
cern about an Establishment Clause violation, and then disapproved the “Ave Ma-
ria” for that very reason.258 This does not appear particularly rational. 
2. The Appellate Court 
The appellate court treated Nurre’s Establishment Clause and Equal Protec-
tion claims in much the same manner as the district court. Like Judge Lasnik, Judge 
                                                                
years the School District had condoned the ensemble’s playing a piece titled On a Hymnsong by Phillip Bliss 
at the school’s graduation ceremony.”). 
 253. E-mail to Frederick Jonassen from David R. Holsinger Conductor, Wind Ensemble, Lee Uni-
versity (August 29, 2008, 17:33 EDT) (on file with author) (“[‘Hymnsong’ is] just a term I made up to refer to 
my compositions based on hymn melodies.”).  
 254. Philip Bliss (1838 to 1876) “is the second most famous Christian song writer in history.” Ed 
Reese, The Life and Ministry of Philip Bliss, CHRISTIAN BIOGRAPHY, http://www.wholesomewords.org/biog-
raphy/biobliss.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). His hymns include titles such as, Dare to Be a Daniel; Hallelu-
jah, ‘Tis Done!; Hallelujah, What a Savior!; Jesus Loves Even Me; and many others. Id.  
 255. David R. Holsinger (b. 1945) is a composer who has written many musical works with Chris-
tian themes. See Dr. David R. Holsinger, Biography, http://www.davidrholsinger.com (last visited Mar. 1, 
2018). His titles include Liturgical Dances and The Easter Symphony.  Id. About Lee University, LEE UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.leeuniversity.edu (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).  
 256. Justice Alito points out that “On a Hymnsong by Phillip Bliss,” which the District had approved 
for several years, “not only includes the term ‘hymn’ in its title, [but] is an arrangement of Philip Bliss’ hymn 
‘It is Well with My Soul’ that has fervently religious lyrics, including the following: 
‘Though Satan should buffet, though trials should come, 
Let this blest assurance control, 
That Christ hath regarded my helpless estate, 
And hath shed His own blood for my soul.’” 
Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1027 n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting SPAFFORD & BLISS, It is Well 
with My Soul, in GOSPEL HYMNS No. 2, p. 78 (P. Bliss & I. Sankey 1876)).  
 257. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 258. Jonassen, supra note 25, at 761. 
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Tallman applied the Lemon test.259 He found the first prong satisfied as “an effort to 
avoid conflict with the Establishment Clause.”260 Relying heavily on Vasquez, the 
appellate court, like the district court, found Lemon’s second prong satisfied be-
cause “a reasonable person . . . would understand that the action had the secular 
effect of maintaining neutrality and ensuring the District’s continued compliance 
with the Establishment Clause.”261 On the third prong, the appellate court distin-
guished between two types of state entanglement in religious matters: administra-
tive entanglement and political entanglement.262 There was no administrative en-
tanglement because the ban on religious music “occurred only once that year and 
was done merely by reviewing song titles for overtly religious references.”263 There 
was no political entanglement because the record did not provide “any evidence 
that this policy caused political divisiveness,” despite Nurre’s objection and that of 
the other students.264 Regarding Nurre’s equal protection claim, the appellate court 
found that the school district’s action passed rational-basis review because the “re-
quirement that all musical selections be secular was a reasonable action taken to 
avoid confrontation with the Establishment Clause.”265 Thus, the appellate court 
found it rational, even reasonable, for the school district to ban the music to avoid 
the appearance of government support of religion to a reasonable observer, even 
though the court had found Nurre to have had no religious message at all under its 
viewpoint analysis. 
3. Comments on the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Analyses 
What is most troubling about the treatment both courts afforded Nurre’s 
claims is that the courts put Nurre in a double bind. The double bind originated from 
Whitehead’s conundrum argument, that Nurre’s claims fail whether she had a reli-
gious message or not. 
Ms. Nurre now finds herself in a legal conundrum. She has stated 
that the senior members of the wind ensemble did not intend to convey 
any particular point by playing “Ave Maria” during graduation. Thus, she 
cannot genuinely argue that her free speech rights have been violated. On 
the other hand, if she now admits that the music was intended to convey 
a message, it was reasonable for the District to conclude that such message 
was religious in nature, given the title and origins of the piece, “Hail 
Mary.”266 
Of course, this argument is specious because it misstates what Nurre said. She 
said she had no religious message; she did not say she had no message at all. This 
                                                                
 259. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095–97. 
 260. Id. at 1096. 
 261. Id. at 1097. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 1098. 
 264. Id.  
 265. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1099. 
 266. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 14–15, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 
07-35867). 
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leaves open the possibility of an artistic message entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. Whitehead’s argument that, if Nurre had a religious message, she loses under 
the Establishment Clause defense, and if she had no religious message, she loses 
her Free Speech claim, because she had no viewpoint to protect, is a bit of logical 
chicanery that is defensible as client advocacy. It is not defensible on the part of the 
courts to tacitly adopt this reasoning, and apply it even more subtly and effectively. 
Whitehead’s argument at least seems to concede that either Nurre had a re-
ligious message or not. What the courts did was to find that Nurre both had no 
message at all for purposes of deciding the viewpoint prong of the limited forum 
analysis, and had a religious message for purposes of deciding whether the school 
officials had an Establishment Clause defense for all the other claims and for the 
qualified immunity defense. 
The district court found Nurre had no message by treating her musical perfor-
mance as a form of worship as in Glover.267 The appellate court, rejecting this ques-
tionable distinction, treated her performance as simply having no viewpoint at all.268 
Therefore, there was no viewpoint discrimination. The district court also found that 
Nurre’s performance would have projected a religious message so that the school 
district’s prohibition was reasonable under the Establishment Clause defense.269 But 
when it came to Nurre’s own Establishment Clause claim, the district court accepted 
Nurre’s disclaimer of no religious intent in order to nullify her allegation that the 
state had shown hostility to religion.270 
The appellate court, after stating its view that Nurre had no message at all in 
a footnote, nevertheless saddled her with a religious message perceptible to the 
reasonable observer in using the Establishment Clause defense to dismiss Nurre’s 
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection claims.271 Without having to refer to any 
“conundrum” or “dilemma,” both courts placed Nurre’s case in a double bind by 
ignoring her artistic message and assigning to it either no message at all, which took 
care of the viewpoint prong on her free speech claim, or a religious message, which 
took care of everything else. With this kind of manipulative reasoning, there was no 
way Nurre could win on anything. That is the real conundrum of the case. 
b. Qualified Immunity and Reasonableness 
The district court, at the outset of this section, announced its belief that, pur-
suant to the Saucier test for qualified immunity, the court had shown the school 
district did not violate any of Nurre’s constitutional rights.272 Of course, the court 
had not really shown this in regard to the free speech claim because the court had 
not addressed the reasonableness prong for government restrictions of speech in a 
                                                                
 267. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1232 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
 268. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095. 
 269. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1232–40. 
 270. Id. at 1235. 
 271. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095–99. 
 272. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1236 (“Although the Court’s conclusion above that plaintiff’s con-
stitutional rights were not violated entitles Dr. Whitehead to qualified immunity as an individual defendant, 
for the record, the Court also grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity for 
the separate reason that it was not clearly established that defendant’s actions were unlawful.”).   
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limited public forum, which the court said it would treat in this selfsame Section 
II.B.2.b, on qualified immunity.273 Be that as it may, the court found under the Sauc-
ier test that, besides not having violated any of Nurre’s constitutional rights, White-
head was also entitled to qualified immunity.274 Judge Lasnik noted the Supreme 
Court’s statement in Malley v. Briggs that qualified immunity protects “all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”275 This is the standard 
the district court would apply in deciding the reasonableness of the school district’s 
Establishment Clause defense for purposes of qualified immunity.276 
Judge Lasnik began by quoting from several Supreme Court cases which af-
firmed student free speech but left open the possibility that avoidance of an Estab-
lishment Clause violation may provide a compelling reason to suppress such 
speech.277 In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, the Su-
preme Court observed, as it did in the earlier Widmar v. Vincent, that the State’s 
interest “in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation ‘may be [a] compelling’ one 
justifying an abridgment of free speech otherwise protected by the First Amend-
ment.” 278 In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, the Court stated, “[I]t is not 
clear whether a State’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would 
justify viewpoint discrimination.”279 In all these cases—Widmar, Lamb’s Chapel, and 
Good News Club—the Supreme Court did not reach the issue because, under the 
facts presented, the Court found “there would have been no realistic danger that 
the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular 
creed.”280 This, of course, implies that the Establishment Clause defense justifies 
                                                                
 273. Id. at 1232–33. 
 274. Id. at 1236. 
 275. Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 
 276. Id. at 1236–40. 
 277. Id. at 1236–37. 
 278. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)). 
 279. Id. (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001)). 
 280. Id. (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113). The full quotation from Good News Club reads 
as follows: 
 We rejected Establishment Clause defenses similar to Milford’s in two previous free 
speech cases, Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar. In particular, in Lamb’s Chapel, we explained that 
“[t]he showing of th[e] film series would not have been during school hours, would not have 
been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church 
members.” 508 U.S. at 395, 113 S. Ct. 2141. Accordingly, we found that “there would have 
been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing reli-
gion or any particular creed.” Ibid. Likewise, in Widmar, where the university’s forum was 
already available to other groups, this Court concluded that there was no Establishment 
Clause problem. 454 U.S. at 272–273, and n. 13, 102 S. Ct. 269. 
 The Establishment Clause defense fares no better in this case. As in Lamb’s Chapel, the 
Club’s meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by the school, and open to any 
student who obtained parental consent, not just to Club members. As in Widmar, Milford 
made its forum available to other organizations. The Club’s activities are materially indistin-
guishable from those in Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar. Thus, Milford’s reliance on the Establish-
ment Clause is unavailing. 
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113.  The passage is a strong indication that the existence of a limited public 
forum is a weighty factor against construing what is said in the forum as bearing the imprimatur of the 
government and thereby violating the Establishment Clause. 
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government limitations on speech only when the prohibited speech could realisti-
cally convey an endorsement of religion and create an Establishment Clause viola-
tion. 
The district court then declared that although the question of “‘whether a 
State’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify view-
point discrimination’ is an open one,” for the Supreme Court,281 “[t]he question . . . 
is not an open one in the Ninth Circuit.”282 “The Ninth Circuit has recognized that 
Establishment Clause concerns can justify speech restrictions ‘in order to avoid the 
appearance of government sponsorship of religion.’”283 For this proposition, the 
court cited Cole and Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified School District, both Ninth Cir-
cuit cases that concerned proselytizing student speeches at public high school grad-
uations.284 This Article will address these cases more fully below.285 
The court argued that in the graduation context, the performance of “Ave Ma-
ria” would have appeared to be the school district’s speech and not the private 
speech of the plaintiff or the Wind Ensemble.286 The court cited Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier for the proposition that a public school may exercise control over student 
speech in school-sponsored activities where members of the public might reasona-
bly believe that the student’s speech bears the imprimatur, or approval, of the 
school.287 Brandsma and Whitehead had made the point reflected in Weisman that 
graduation ceremonies are particularly sensitive school-sponsored activities be-
cause students who may not want to be subjected to religious messages neverthe-
less feel compelled to attend this once-in-a-lifetime event.288 Supporting the notion 
that schools are responsible for whatever is said at a school-sponsored event, the 
court underscored the control school administrators usually exercise over gradua-
tions, quoting the Supreme Court’s Weisman opinion, “[a]t high school graduation, 
teachers and principals must and do retain a high degree of control over the precise 
contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and 
the decorum of the students.”289 Judge Lasnik then quoted the Ninth Circuit in Cole, 
“[T]he District’s plenary control over the graduation ceremony, especially the stu-
dent speech, makes it apparent [that the sectarian] speech would have borne the 
imprint of the District”;290 and in Lassonde: “[T]he essence of graduation is to place 
the school’s imprimatur on the ceremony—including the student speakers that the 
                                                                
 281. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (quoting Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F. 3d 1044, 
1053 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. (citing Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 285. See infra Sections III(D)(ii)(b)(2). 
 286. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1237–38 (“[G]iven the graduation context, the Wind Ensemble’s 
performance of ‘Ave Maria’ would have appeared to be the School District’s speech not the ‘private speech’ 
of the plaintiff or the Wind Ensemble.”).   
 287. Id. (citing Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)). 
 288. For Brandsma, see Plaintiff Nurre’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 34, at 5, and 
accompanying text; for Whitehead, see Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Carol Whitehead, supra 
note 43, at 33–34, and accompanying text. 
 289. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1238 (alteration in original) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
597 (1992)). 
 290. Id. (quoting Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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school selected.”291 Because of this control over student speech at a graduation cer-
emony, the Lassonde court stated in regard to Cole, “[T]he school district had to 
censor the [sectarian] speech in order to avoid the appearance of government spon-
sorship of religion”; and “allowing the speech would have had an impermissibly co-
ercive effect on dissenters, requiring them to participate in a religious practice even 
by their silence.”292 Judge Lasnik concluded: 
[T]he Court finds that the Wind Ensemble’s performance of “Ave Maria” 
would have borne the imprimatur of the school because the performance 
took place at graduation, the School District exercised control over the per-
formance by placing restrictions on its content, and the performance was 
by the “Jackson Band” as listed in the 2006 JHS graduate program.293 
Judge Lasnik never quite states that the performance of “Ave Maria” would 
have been an Establishment Clause violation. He did not formally apply the Lemon 
test, endorsement test, or coercion test to the hypothetical performance of “Ave 
Maria” at the Jackson High graduation. However, in stating the “finding” that the 
performance would have borne the “imprimatur” of the school, Judge Lasnik was 
employing language indicating the performance would have satisfied Justice O’Con-
nor’s endorsement test and that he would have found an Establishment Clause vi-
olation if the issue were before the Court. Judge Lasnik then went on to argue for 
qualified immunity, applying the “plainly incompetent” and “in knowing violation 
of the law” standard. 
Given the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in Cole and Lassonde, and in the light 
of the district’s Establishment Clause concerns, the Court cannot say that 
the contours of plaintiff’s rights in the context of a graduation ceremony 
were “sufficiently clear” that the defendant would understand that by pro-
hibiting the performance of “Ave Maria” defendant was knowingly violat-
ing the law. . . . Therefore, the Court cannot say that defendant was “plainly 
incompetent” or “knowingly violate[d] the law” by assuming that her ac-
tions restricting “Ave Maria” were proper under the Establishment Clause. 
For this reason, the Court concludes that defendant as an individual is en-
titled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's free speech claim.294 
Although the district court conceded that the “conflict” with the Establish-
ment Clause was much greater in Cole and Lassonde,295 nevertheless, in regard to 
the performance of “Ave Maria,” the Court found enough of a conflict to quote Jus-
tice Blackmun’s concurrence in Weisman, “[T]he Supreme Court has stated that 
‘[t]he Establishment Clause proscribes public schools from conveying or attempting 
to convey a message that religion or a particular religion is favored or preferred.’”296 
                                                                
 291. Id. (quoting Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 292. Id. (quoting Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 983 (citing Cole, 228 F.3d at 1101)). 
 293. Id. (citations omitted). 
 294. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1238–39 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 295. Id. at 1239. 
 296. Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604–05 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (empha-
sis in original)). 
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The district court’s apparent dicta, that the performance of “Ave Maria” would 
have been an Establishment Clause violation, is remarkable. This was a musical per-
formance, not a prayer, not proselytizing, not a religious message. Not to recognize 
that was to exit the realm of reality. The dicta contradicts case law from other cir-
cuits which found that school-sponsored student performances of music, even mu-
sic with religious lyrics, for non-religious purposes do not convey an endorsement 
of religion or constitute Establishment Clause violations.297 The court’s dicta also 
contradicts Supreme Court dicta approving the study of religion itself in the public 
schools for artistic and historical purposes.298 Finally, the facts of this case are far 
removed from Weisman. The performance of “Ave Maria” was not a prayer. School 
authorities did not select and arrange this music. It did not convey a religious mes-
sage. None of the reasons justifying the prohibition in Weisman are present in 
Nurre. The court’s approval of the imposition of a ban on all religious music, in fact, 
appears unmindful of Weisman’s balanced and nuanced teaching: 
A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every as-
pect of public life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution. 
We recognize that, at graduation time and throughout the course of the 
educational process, there will be instances when religious values, reli-
gious practices, and religious persons will have some interaction with the 
public schools and their students.299 
It is not surprising that the appellate court did not follow the district court in basing 
the reasonableness of the prohibition exclusively on the Establishment Clause de-
fense, and pointedly declined to make any finding that the performance of “Ave 
Maria” could have resulted in an Establishment Clause violation.300 It should also be 
no surprise that the district court’s conclusion depends on numerous defects in rea-
soning. 
In shifting the discussion of reasonableness from the opinion’s discussion on 
the limited public forum issue to the section discussing qualified immunity, the dis-
trict court effectively weakened the reasonableness standard that should have 
been applied. By means of this move, the judge avoided discussing whether the 
complete exclusion of any religious reference from the wind ensemble’s perfor-
mance was a reasonable limitation of content for purposes of preserving the pur-
pose of the limited public forum. Instead the court applied the reasonableness 
standard for qualified immunity in which the government action would be accepta-
ble as long as it was not “plainly incompetent” or in “knowing[] violat[ion of] the 
law.”301 Moreover, this minimal standard of reasonableness was to be applied to 
the Establishment Clause defense, the standard for which the district court also 
weakened. 
In a footnote, the court acknowledged that under Ninth Circuit law, the Estab-
lishment Clause defense “does not apply unless the school district proves that the 
                                                                
297.    See supra notes 240247 and accompanying text.  
 298. See supra note 248.   
 299. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 598–99 (citations omitted). 
 300. See infra notes 344-346 and accompanying text. 
301.  Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236, 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
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Establishment Clause would have been violated had the activity at issue been al-
lowed to proceed”302 and quoted Hills v. Scottsdale Unified School District, No. 48 
for this proposition.303 In that case, a school district prohibited the distribution of 
religious pamphlets in what the court found to be a limited public forum.304 The 
school district pled the Establishment Clause defense.305 But because “[t]he District 
[did] not . . . demonstrate[] that the Establishment Clause would be violated if it had 
permitted distribution of literature that advertised religious programs or events,”306 
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the school district’s prohibition discriminated against 
the plaintiff’s viewpoint.307 The district court also quoted Cole v. Oroville Union High 
School District, a Ninth Circuit case in which the school district prohibited student 
speakers from delivering proselytizing speeches at graduation.308 “[I]t is clear the 
District’s refusal to allow Cole to deliver a sectarian invocation as part of the grad-
uation ceremony was necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.”309 
Thus, Ninth Circuit precedent indicated that a school district that justifies the pro-
hibition of speech in a limited public forum on the basis of the Establishment Clause 
defense must prove that allowing the speech would have caused an Establishment 
Clause violation. Judge Lasnik, however, simply chose not to follow this clear prec-
edent and fashioned his own standard:  
 If the Establishment Clause “defense” is to provide any meaningful 
shelter for a school district, . . . the defense should not depend on a hind-
sight determination by the court, but rather on the reasonableness of the 
school district’s belief at the time that an activity would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.310 
It is not clear why the Wind Ensemble’s performance would not be an Estab-
lishment Clause violation in hindsight when a court makes a determination, and yet 
would appear to be a violation at the time of the activity.  Moreover, it seems that 
the district court arranged its analysis so that this “reasonableness” was to be based 
not on whether there was a realistic possibility of an Establishment Clause violation, 
but under the plainly incompetent or in knowing violation of the law standard for 
qualified immunity. 
Thus, by analyzing reasonableness under the issue of qualified immunity, the 
district court reduced in two ways what Whitehead would need to show to justify 
the banning of “Ave Maria” within a limited public forum. Whitehead would not 
need to show that banning “Ave Maria” from graduation was necessary to avoid an 
actual Establishment Clause violation, which was Ninth Circuit law. Instead, she 
would only have to show that her belief that the performance might have violated 
                                                                
 302. Id. at 1237 n.20. 
 303. Id. (quoting Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 304. Hills, 329 F.3d at 1049. 
 305. Id. at 1053. 
 306. Id.  
 307. Id. at 1056 (“When the District denied Hills access to the school’s limited public forum, it 
discriminated against him because of religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 308. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1237 n.20 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (quoting Cole v. 
Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id.  
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the Establishment Clause was reasonable. Secondly, that belief would be reasona-
ble as long as the court could not find Whitehead to be plainly incompetent or act-
ing in knowing violation of the law. Not only was this standard applied to the quali-
fied immunity defense, but it appears it was used to satisfy the reasonableness 
prong of the test for government speech restrictions in a limited public forum. What 
should have been a discussion of whether the school district was reasonable in its 
blanket exclusion of any religious reference in order to preserve the purpose of the 
limited public forum became a discussion of whether Whitehead was plainly incom-
petent or in knowing violation of the law for excluding “Ave Maria” in order to avoid 
a remotely possible violation of the Establishment Clause. Applying such a feeble 
standard facilitated the court’s finding that the school administrators acted reason-
ably regarding Nurre’s Free Speech claim.311 
Ironically, Whitehead did not argue, let alone prove, that the performance of 
“Ave Maria” would have been a violation of the Establishment Clause, and seemed 
quite willing to concede it would not have been. The defense argued that White-
head was not required to allow the performance of “Ave Maria” whether or not it 
would have been such a violation: 
In theory, Nurre may be correct that allowing “Ave Maria” would have 
been constitutional. But this argument is a non sequitor. Simply because 
the Establishment Clause allows some display of religion does not mean it 
requires the same. Applied to the present case, even if the District could 
constitutionally allow “Ave Maria” to be played at a high school graduation 
does not mean it was required to do the same.312 
Because the district court assumed that there was a limited public forum, this argu-
ment was spurious. If the school district had established a limited public forum, it 
could only prohibit speech on a reasonable and non-viewpoint-discriminatory basis. 
It could not prohibit speech for no reason at all or just because it wanted to. 
The reader may recall that for purposes of viewpoint analysis, the district 
court treated the performance of “Ave Maria” as a religious service or worship.313 
However, in its analysis of Nurre’s Establishment Clause claim, the district court 
treated the performance as non-religious because of Nurre’s disclaimer of any reli-
gious intent.314 But now, for the purposes of analyzing reasonableness in regard to 
the Establishment Clause defense, the district went back to treating the perfor-
mance as a religious service or message once again.315 Perhaps the nonrepresenta-
tional character of instrumental music, which could invite a variety of different 
meanings, was responsible for the chameleon-like form which presented itself to 
the perception of the district court. However, the court could have avoided this 
troubling inconsistency by perceiving the music as an artistic statement, and not 
religious. 
                                                                
 311. See Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1233, 1239. 
 312. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 30 (citations omitted). 
 313. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–32. 
 314. Id. at 1233–1235. 
 315. Id. at 1233–40. 
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In order to find qualified immunity, it was not necessary for the district court 
to also suggest the performance of “Ave Maria” would have been government en-
dorsement of religion. The court could have found that Whitehead was entitled to 
qualified immunity under the “plainly incompetent” or in “knowing[] violat[ion of] 
the law” standard because of the complex and unsettled state of the governing law. 
The court could have made that finding and also found that it was unreasonable to 
ban the music for the purposes of the limited public forum because the ban did not 
meet the higher standard of reasonableness for restrictions of speech in a limited 
public forum. There was no need to argue that the performance of “Ave Maria” 
would have resulted in a constitutional violation.  Much of the district court’s rea-
soning was also irrelevant. Under Hazelwood, for example, a graduation ceremony 
is a school-sponsored activity in which student speech is subject to school regula-
tion.316 But the district court had assumed that the school had created a limited 
public forum for the performance of the Wind Ensemble;317 in which case Hazel-
wood does not apply.318 If, as the district court and the appellate court assumed, 
the school had established a limited public forum when the school had allowed the 
students to choose the music they would play at graduation, then the speech of the 
students was not school-sponsored, and the school district could only regulate the 
speech to the extent that its limitations were reasonable and not discriminatory of 
viewpoint.319 If there were any question whether members of the audience might 
think the musical expression was school-sponsored, Jackson High School could have 
made it clear that the students’ musical expression was their own and not the 
school’s, as Catherine Ross suggests in her book, Lessons in Censorships: How 
Schools and Courts Subvert Students’ First Amendment Rights.320 “The performance 
guide could have indicated that the players chose the piece and the criterion they 
used, or a member of the group could have made an announcement to the same 
effect before the group began to play.”321 If, in the minds of school officials, the 
performance of “Ave Maria” realistically presented a potential Establishment 
                                                                
 316. See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988). 
 317. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1231; Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1094.  See Reply Brief of Petitioner for Writ 
of Certiorari, Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025 (2010) (No. 09-671), 2010 WL 28540 (“In upholding the 
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 318. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267–70 (finding that the student newspaper was not a public 
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 320. See supra note 25. 
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Clause violation, a disclaimer could have made clear that the school was not en-
dorsing religion.322 Of course, such a disclaimer by itself may not have dispelled an 
actual Establishment Clause violation.323 However, there simply wasn’t any.   
1. Prayer and Proselytizing vs. Musical Performance 
Perhaps the most clearly inappropriate precedents Judge Lasnik cited in his 
opinion were Cole and Lassonde in support of the Establishment Clause defense. 
These two cases are obviously distinguishable from Nurre. In both, students wanted 
to deliver graduation speeches containing proselytizing language or sectarian refer-
ences.324 Cole concerned two students, John Niemeyer and Ferrin Cole, who were 
to deliver the valediction and invocation respectively at the Oroville Union High 
School graduation.325 The Ninth Circuit described their speeches as follows: 
Niemeyer’s proposed speech was a religious sermon which advised the au-
dience that “we are all God’s children through Jesus Christ [sic] death, 
when we accept his free love and saving grace in our lives,” and requested 
that the audience accept that “God created us” and that man’s plans “will 
not fully succeed unless we pattern our lives after Jesus’ example.” Finally, 
Niemeyer’s speech called upon the audience to “accept God’s love and 
grace” and “yield to God our lives.” Cole’s proposed invocation referred 
repeatedly to the heavenly Father and Father God, and concluded “We ask 
all these things in the precious holy name of Jesus Christ, Amen.”326 
In Lassonde, the Ninth Circuit exemplified the proposed proselytizing speech with 
the following passage from that speech: 
                                                                
 322. In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court found that the University of Virginia’s program of funding 
the publications of student groups constituted a limited public forum, and applying the rules of such a fo-
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 324. See Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F. 3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003); Cole v. Oroville 
Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 325. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1095. 
 326. Id. at 1097. 
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I urge you to seek out the Lord, and let Him guide you. Through His power, 
you can stand tall in the face of darkness, and survive the trends of “mod-
ern society.” 
As Psalm 146 says, “Do not put your trust in princes, in mortal men, who 
cannot even save themselves. When their spirit departs, they return to the 
ground; on that very day their plans come to nothing. Blessed is he whose 
help is the God of Jacob, whose hope is in the Lord his God, the Maker of 
heaven and earth, the sea, and everything in them—the Lord, who remains 
faithful forever. He upholds the cause of the oppressed and gives food to 
the hungry. The Lord sets prisoners free, the Lord gives sight to the blind, 
the Lord lifts up those who are bowed down, the Lord loves the righteous. 
The Lord watches over the alien and sustains the fatherless and the widow, 
but he frustrates the ways of the wicked.” 
. . . “For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through 
Jesus Christ our Lord.” Have you accepted the gift, or will you pay the ulti-
mate price?327 
In Weisman, the Supreme Court prohibited public schools from arranging for out-
side clergy to lead others in prayer at graduations,328 and in Santa Fe, the High Court 
prohibited public schools from arranging, even indirectly, for students to lead pray-
ers at football games.329 In Cole and Lassonde, the Ninth Circuit held that, like gov-
ernment arranged prayer, student prayer and proselytizing at graduation “would 
have constituted District coercion of attendance and participation in a religious 
practice because proselytizing, no less than prayer, is a religious practice.”330 The 
inclusion of such speech at a public school graduation “would have constituted gov-
ernment endorsement of religious speech,” and “lent [the School] District approval 
to the religious message of the speech,” and “carried the District's seal of ap-
proval.”331 
What all these cases have in common is the finding of state endorsement of 
religion and Establishment Clause violations because the State was either imposing, 
                                                                
 327. Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 981.   
 328. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (“The sole question presented is whether a reli-
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causing to be imposed, or allowing to be imposed, a religious practice–either prayer 
or sermon-like proselytizing speech–on an audience. In contrast, the performance 
of “Ave Maria” at the Jackson High School graduation was neither a prayer nor an 
effort to proselytize or sermonize. Whereas Cole and Lassonde involved the censor-
ship of explicit, particularized religious messages, the instrumental music at issue in 
Nurre by its very nature could not have conveyed any particularized religious mes-
sage at all. The essential difference between the speeches and prayers in Cole, Las-
sonde, Weisman, and Santa Fe on the one hand, and the musical performance in 
Nurre on the other, was that the former were religious rituals while the latter was 
an artistic event. Contrary to the district court’s suggestion that Cole and Lassonde 
presented a “conflict” with the Establishment Clause that was greater in degree 
than the “conflict” presented by Nurre,332 the difference between the expression in 
the prior cases and the expression in Nurre presented a difference in kind, so that 
even though the speeches in Cole and Lassonde might indeed have presented vio-
lations of the Establishment Clause, the music in Nurre could not. 
 2. Limited Public Forums vs. Plenary Control 
However appropriate the decisions in Cole and Lassonde may have been, 
these particular cases present a problem in their reasoning which later infects and 
consumes the district court’s reasoning in Nurre. As noted above, the district court 
fashioned its argument on the basis that the performance of “Ave Maria” would 
have conveyed an endorsement of religion by the school.333 The argument begins 
with Hazelwood’s proposition that a school may exercise control over student 
speech at a school-sponsored event in which the speech might reasonably be un-
derstood to have the imprimatur or approval of the school.334 The district court then 
cited Weisman, Cole, and Lassonde, for the idea that if a school exercises “plenary” 
control over a school-sponsored event such as a graduation, it is reasonable for the 
audience to construe student speech as having the endorsement of the school.335 
Finally, “because the performance took place at graduation, the School District ex-
ercised control over the performance by placing restrictions on its content, and the 
performance was by the ‘Jackson Band’ as listed in the 2006 JHS graduate program,” 
it was reasonable to understand the performance of a religiously inspired and 
named musical work to be an approval of religion.336 Because the school’s approval 
of religion would create an Establishment Clause violation, the school officials were 
reasonable in prohibiting the performance, if not required to do so.337 
But there is a logical defect in this argument. Before developing its “plenary 
control” analysis, the Cole opinion states, “Even assuming the Oroville graduation 
ceremony was a public or limited public forum, the district's refusal to allow the 
students to deliver a sectarian speech or prayer was necessary to avoid violating 
the Establishment Clause under the principles applied in Santa Fe Independent 
                                                                
 332. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
 333. Id. at 1233–40.  
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School District v. Doe and Lee v. Weisman.”338  For one thing, the statement is ques-
tionable because neither the Weisman nor the Santa Fe courts were dealing with a 
limited public forum.  Be that as it may, the Cole court was saying that even if it 
assumed the student speeches were within a limited public forum, they were im-
permissible because they would have created an Establishment Clause violation. 
This indicates that the reasoning in Cole implicitly, or perhaps hypothetically, took 
into account the assumption that the students’ speeches were within a limited pub-
lic forum. But in Nurre, the district court, and later the appellate court, explicitly 
assumed that the performance of the Wind Ensemble was a limited public forum. 
Under that assumption, it is not logical to say that the school still exercises “plenary” 
or complete and absolute control of the school event, at least not in regard to the 
expressive area of the limited public forum.339 This is because in establishing the 
limited public forum, the school has yielded at least some control of the speech 
within this area of the limited public forum, evidenced by the requirement that gov-
ernment limitations on speech be viewpoint neutral and reasonable. To assume the 
State has created a limited public forum, but then also say that the State maintains 
plenary control, is self-contradictory. Either there is a limited public forum in which 
the State is subject to limitations on its control of speech, or there is plenary gov-
ernment control, but not both. If a court assumes that the school has created a 
limited public forum within its graduation exercises, it is irrelevant that the school 
reviews the speeches or has control over all other aspects of the graduation cere-
mony, unless the court is considering these facts as evidence that there is no limited 
public forum to begin with. Thus, in Nurre, when the district court applies the ple-
nary control argument, the court has, in effect, ignored or abandoned its assump-
tion that there is any limited public forum at all. 
At the heart of the plenary control argument is circular reasoning. It goes like 
this. The court must decide whether the students’ speeches may be censored or 
not. Because the school censors the speech, a reasonable observer would conclude 
the school endorses the speech it does allow. Because a reasonable observer would 
conclude the school endorses the speech it allows, the school must censor the 
speech it does not endorse. Without the intermediate steps, the logic is that the 
school must censor student speech because it censors student speech. Instead of 
asking whether the school may censor the speech within the assumed limited public 
forum, this reasoning posits the fact of censorship as conclusive that censorship is 
permissible, even required. As Caleb McCain observed in respect to Cole, “it is a 
tautology to require censorship to prevent unconstitutional speech that derives its 
unconstitutionality from that very censorship.”340 
In a very odd footnote, the district court states, “Although the Court considers 
the parties’ forum analysis assertions, as the Court discusses in Section II.B.2.b be-
low, based on Ninth Circuit authority, a forum analysis is not required to determine 
the viability of an Establishment Clause defense where the speech at issue bears 
                                                                
 338. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 339. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, defines plenary as “complete in every respect: ab-
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the imprimatur of the school.”341 The court then provides the passage from Cole 
quoted above, stating that even if it is assumed that the school had created a limited 
public forum, it was necessary for the school to disallow student speech which 
would violate the Establishment Clause.342 The statement is odd because if there 
was a limited public forum, as the court assumed, then the speech within that fo-
rum would not bear the imprimatur of the school. But if it is the case that the court 
thought forum analysis was unnecessary because the speech bore the imprimatur 
of the school, the court’s forum analysis had no purpose. All that was necessary for 
the court to do was to find that the Establishment Clause defense was viable be-
cause allowing the speech would produce government endorsement of religion and 
an Establishment Clause violation. Why Judge Lasnik undertook a forum analysis 
which he suggests was unnecessary is unclear. In any event, the concurrent assump-
tion of a limited public forum and finding of plenary control does not indicate that 
the forum analysis is unnecessary; instead, what this indicates is that the court’s 
reasoning is defective if not incoherent. 
c. The Appellate Court’s Discussion of Reasonableness 
As noted above, the appeals court adopted the same limited public forum test 
accepted by the district court, which meant that the speech restriction imposed had 
to be “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and all the surround-
ing circumstances.”343 However, the appellate court did not base its own finding of 
reasonableness upon the Establishment Clause defense.344 Unlike Judge Lasnik, 
Judge Tallman very clearly denied that the appellate court was making any finding 
or suggestion as to whether the performance of “Ave Maria” would have violated 
the Establishment Clause.345 “[W]e . . . wish to make clear that we do not hold that 
the performance of music, even ‘Ave Maria,’ would necessarily violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.”346 
The appellate court opted to address the reasonableness standard, as it 
should, in terms of the government’s purpose in creating the limited public forum: 
“The ‘reasonableness’ analysis focuses on whether the limitation is consistent with 
preserving the property for the purpose to which it is dedicated.”347 The court con-
cluded, “[T]he District’s action in keeping all musical performances at graduation 
‘entirely secular’ in nature was reasonable in the light of the circumstances sur-
rounding a high school graduation, and therefore did not violate Nurre’s right to 
free speech.”348 The circumstances which made the prohibition reasonable related 
to the desire to avoid the controversy that attended the performance of “Up Above 
My Head” at the previous year’s graduation.349 “Here, the District was acting to 
                                                                
 341. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 n.10. 
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 343. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
 344. Id. at 1098. 
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2018 THE “AVE MARIA” EFFECT 783 
 
avoid a repeat of the 2005 controversy by prohibiting any reference to religion at 
its graduation ceremonies.”350 
To legally support the avoidance of “controversy” as a reasonable basis for 
prohibiting the performance of Ave Maria at graduation, the appellate opinion cited 
several cases in which courts had decided that a school district’s concerns for dis-
turbance and controversy were legitimate reasons for the school to restrict speech 
in a limited public forum.351 The court cited DiLoreto v. Downey Unified School Dis-
trict Board of Education, in which the Ninth Circuit found that restricting advertise-
ments on a high school baseball park fence for the purpose of avoiding disturbance 
and controversy was legitimate because the audience included impressionable 
youths in a school setting.352 The appellate opinion also cited Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis 
v. Spang, which noted that a consent-decree provision restricting a student’s pros-
elytizing speech at graduation might be a valid restriction even when the valedicto-
rian speech is considered a limited public forum.353 Finally, the court cited Student 
Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School District Board of School Directors, which 
held that banning the use of school facilities for an anti-nuclear exposition was rea-
sonable to avoid political controversy and maintain the school’s appearance of neu-
trality.354 The Ninth Circuit majority then found that the Everett School District, like 
the school authorities in the cited cases, acted to avoid a controversy, such as that 
which occurred following the 2005 graduation, by prohibiting any reference to reli-
gion at the 2006 graduation, such as the title, “Ave Maria.”355 
The Ninth Circuit’s shift from the Establishment Clause defense to an avoid-
ance of controversy defense as a justification for the school district’s action is sig-
nificant. Either the majority thought that the performance of “Ave Maria” at a pub-
lic school graduation could not have posed any realistic danger of an Establishment 
Clause violation, or believed that finding such a realistic danger as a basis for cen-
soring the music in Nurre was questionable and could be overruled by the Supreme 
Court. Certainly, the controversy rationale provided a more straightforward argu-
ment to satisfy the reasonableness prong of the test for speech restrictions in a 
limited public forum than did the arguments of the district court. However, this ar-
gument fails just as clearly. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari so that 
the argument did not undergo further scrutiny,356 the controversy rationale drew 
substantial criticism from the concurrence of Judge Smith and dissent of Justice 
Alito.357 
                                                                
 350. Id. at 1095. 
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Smith, who issued a concurrence to the Ninth Circuit opinion, distinguished 
the cases which the majority cited.358 Rather than delay presenting these distinc-
tions to the section on Smith’s concurrence below, these distinctions are presented 
forthwith. DiLoreto concerned the placement of a large banner advertising the Ten 
Commandments on school property, and Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang was about 
a student’s evangelizing speech at graduation, both attempts at explicit proselyti-
zation.359 Student Coalition for Peace concerned a large politically partisan rally that 
would advocate denuclearization to achieve world peace and had the potential of 
generating controversy and disruption at the school.360 However, the performance 
of “Ave Maria,” Smith argued, was not proselytizing and could not have caused the 
controversy or disruption created by the previous year’s performance of “Up Above 
My Head” because the performance was to be completely instrumental and not 
contain references to the Lord or heaven, let alone Jesus Christ or any other words 
that would advocate controversial ideas.361 No proselytizing religious or political 
message could have been conveyed.362 
Aside from Judge Smith’s points, the Ninth Circuit neglected to note that in 
the Student Coalition for Peace case, the Third Circuit found that the district court 
did not consider whether the school district had created a limited public forum and 
remanded the case in order to make this determination.363 The district court found 
that while the school district had not created a limited public forum for the athletic 
field, it did create such a forum for the school gymnasium, and therefore the court 
enjoined the school district from prohibiting the student group from using the 
school gym, despite the potential for controversy.364 Because the Nurre courts as-
sumed that the Wind Ensemble’s performance was a limited public forum, Student 
Coalition for Peace ultimately supports Nurre’s position that banning a student 
group from a limited public forum merely because of an unsubstantiated potential 
controversy is a constitutional violation. 
                                                                
 358. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1099 (Smith, J., concurring). 
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As to “controversy,” it is true that Superintendent Whitehead and Associate 
Superintendent Brandsma spoke of complaints and “letters” of complaint sent to 
the Herald, the largest newspaper in Sonomish County, from those who attended 
the 2005 graduation performance of the Kirk Franklin song, “Up Above My Head.”365 
But the record of this case documented only one letter of complaint that appeared 
in the Herald.366 Surely, if there were a serious controversy over the Jackson High 
School Choir’s 2005 performance of “Up Above My Head,” the defense would have 
produced more letters and affidavits from offended parties. 
The author of the one letter complained about the references to God in lyrics 
sung by the Choir and expressed “puzzlement” about the efficacy of the school’s 
“civic instruction” regarding “the importance of our national and state constitutions 
specifically relating to policy regarding religious activity, while willfully disregarding 
the same by sponsorship of nonsecular entertainment during a public graduation 
ceremony.”367 Adopting a mocking tone, the letter-writer went on to state, “[i]f in 
fact the lesson was to demonstrate the meaning of hypocrisy, an “A” grade should 
be awarded.”368 This author appears to consider it self-evident that any mention of 
God in a government-sponsored forum, even in a musical performance, is a viola-
tion of the Constitution. While expressing disdain for the teachers and administra-
tors who permitted the performance of “Up Above My Head,” the letter certainly 
does not present a reasoned argument for this position. There is no mention of 
school policies, limited public forum analysis, Supreme Court cases, or any of the 
other subtleties that attend this complex issue. But most importantly, the letter is 
irrelevant to the issue of “Ave Maria,” for the letter concerned the performance of 
a choral piece containing explicit references to God, which the letter writer may 
have thought was selected by the school.369 
Presumably, the author of the letter was present at the 2005 graduation when 
the Wind Ensemble played “On a Hymnsong,” by Phillip Bliss, with all of the religious 
trappings that work presented.370 Yet the author did not complain about the 
“Hymnsong.” In fact, for several years the Wind Ensemble had played the 
“Hymnsong,” which its former director, Mr. Rice, had selected,371 and yet the de-
fense produced no evidence of protest or controversy over it, even though the reli-
gious background of this work is at least as evident as that of “Ave Maria.”372 Nor is 
there a hint of any threat of lawsuits by individuals or organizations, like the ACLU 
or Americans United for Separation of Church and State, over religious music at the 
Jackson High School graduation. It is far from clear that the letter’s author or anyone 
else would have objected to the performance of student-selected instrumental mu-
sic whose religious title could have been omitted from the program altogether. In-
deed, the “controversy” objection to “Ave Maria” doesn’t work any better than the 
“Establishment Clause defense” objection treated earlier. Given this history, was it 
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rational to attach a rather minor controversy concerning the words of a religious 
song performed by the School Chorus to the instrumental works performed by the 
Wind Ensemble that had never attracted any controversy at all? One extremely 
cranky letter about the Chorus does not a controversy make about the Wind En-
semble. 
The Ninth Circuit was also concerned with the prospect of a captive audience 
subjected to an obviously religious work.373 The appellate court distinguished the 
graduation from a musical concert by arguing:  
[W]hen there is a captive audience at a graduation ceremony, which spans 
a finite amount of time, and during which the demand for equal time is so 
great that comparable non-religious musical works might not be pre-
sented, it is reasonable for a school official to prohibit the performance of 
an obviously religious piece.374  
Here the Ninth Circuit overlooked several issues of fact aside from the question of 
whether there would be any real controversy at all about the music performed by 
the Wind Ensemble. Any one of these issues of fact could have precluded summary 
judgment. For instance, it was not a certainty that the audience would have recog-
nized the Latin name, “Ave Maria,” as indicative of a religious piece of music.375 The 
court also overlooked the evidence that a good deal of other secular music was 
played at the graduation, so that the audience was not subjected to exclusively “re-
ligious” music. Aside from the Wind Ensemble’s performance, there were six num-
bers performed by the Jazz Combo: a recording of “Pomp and Circumstance” played 
twice, the national anthem sung by a graduating senior, and the School Chorus’s 
performance of “Mother Africa,” not to mention student speeches.376 The court also 
seemed to have forgotten its finding that because Nurre had no religious motive in 
wanting to perform “Ave Maria,” she therefore had no religious viewpoint pro-
tected by the First Amendment.377 It seems contradictory simultaneously to argue 
that a work, which had no viewpoint to protect, nevertheless would be controver-
sial because of its viewpoint. Finally, it is also questionable that a public high school 
concert audience is any less captive than a graduation ceremony audience, an issue 
to be discussed below.378 
The failure of the Ninth Circuit to examine evidence of the likely controversy 
and the other circumstances that allegedly made it reasonable for the school to 
                                                                
 373. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 374. Id. 
 375. Neither the school administrators who decided to prohibit the performance, nor Nurre her-
self, were certain about exactly what the religious significance of the title was.  See supra notes 56–58 and 
accompanying text.   
 376. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 10, supra notes 45 and 81–85 and accompanying text.  
Incidentally, as the Petition points out at *10 n.4, “There are also lyrics to ‘Pomp and Circumstance’ which 
include repeating twice the following phrase, ‘God who made thee mighty, Make thee mightier yet.’”  See 
Perrine, supra note 25, at 185 (noting that “Pomp and Circumstance” is associated with the coronation of 
Edward VII, which marked both his ascension to the role of king and to the Head of the Church of England). 
 377. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095 n.6.  (“[T]his is not a case involving viewpoint discrimination . . . . 
Nurre concedes that she was not attempting to express any specific religious viewpoint, but that she sought 
only to ‘play a pretty piece.’”).  See also supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text. 
 378. See infra notes 427430. 
 
2018 THE “AVE MARIA” EFFECT 787 
 
prohibit the performance of “Ave Maria” are particularly striking in the light of 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, where the Supreme 
Court emphasized the need for courts to assess a school’s claim of disruption and 
disorder to its educational mission as a basis for limiting or punishing student 
speech.379 While the day-to-day environment and circumstances at school are dif-
ferent from those of the graduation ceremony, the issue of curtailing student 
speech on the basis of disturbance and controversy is the common element be-
tween Tinker and the rationale upon which the Ninth Circuit rested its holding in 
Nurre.380 In Tinker, school officials punished students who wore black armbands at 
school to express their opposition to the war in Vietnam because the school claimed 
the expression of protest would be disruptive to school discipline.381 On this ques-
tion, the Supreme Court made it clear that unsubstantiated claims of disorder do 
not justify limitations on student speech. “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression.”382 The Court continued: 
 In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify pro-
hibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that 
its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engag-
ing in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school,’ the prohibition cannot be sustained.383 
Because the Tinker Court found no “facts which might reasonably have led school 
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises [had] in fact oc-
curred,” the Court ruled in favor of the students.384 The Ninth Circuit should have 
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given the factual record some consideration rather than uncritically accept the 
school administrators’ claims of controversy.385 
E. The Concurrence and the Dissent 
i. Judge Milan D. Smith, Dissenting in Part, but Concurring in the Judgment 
Judge Smith joined in the judgment of the Ninth Circuit panel because he 
agreed that Whitehead was entitled to qualified immunity.386 Judge Smith also 
thought along with the majority that the school’s restriction was viewpoint neu-
tral.387 But he forcefully argued that Whitehead’s prohibition was not reasonable 
“in the light of the purpose served by the forum,” so that the restriction failed the 
limited public forum test.388 
I would hold that, in prohibiting Nurre and her classmates from playing 
their selected piece of music, the School District misjudged the Establish-
ment Clause’s requirements and, in so doing, violated Nurre’s First Amend-
ment rights. I am concerned that, if the majority’s reasoning on this issue 
becomes widely adopted, the practical effect will be for public school ad-
ministrators to chill—or even kill—musical and artistic presentations by 
their students in school-sponsored limited public fora where those presen-
tations contain any trace of religious inspiration, for fear of criticism by a 
member of the public, however extreme that person’s views may be.389 
Smith’s major concern was that the majority’s ruling would lead to the inhibition of 
student expression and cause the nation’s youth to become “Philistines, who have 
little or no understanding of our civic and cultural heritage.”390 
Aside from distinguishing the case law the majority relied upon for its “con-
troversy” rationale, Smith pointed to “the far-reaching influence of religion and re-
ligious institutions on music.”391  He cited Doe v. Duncanville for testimony that “60-
75 percent of serious choral music is based on sacred themes or text,”392 and he 
quoted a law review article stating, “[A]pproximately forty-four percent of the mu-
sic recommended by the Music Educators National Conference for inclusion in the 
public school curriculum—for the secular purpose of preserving ‘America’s vast and 
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varied music heritage’—has religious significance.”393 He also enumerated classical 
and modern works and popular music which, though originally inspired by religion, 
have become secularized: Handel’s Hallelujah Chorus from The Messiah, Steffan 
and Ward Howe’s The Battle Hymn of the Republic, Beethoven’s Ode to Joy, Mo-
zart’s Requiem Mass in D Minor, and even Purvis and Black’s When the Saints Go 
Marching In.394 He argued that if the purpose of the graduation ceremony was to 
acknowledge the achievements of the graduating seniors by providing an oppor-
tunity for them to express themselves through speech and music, purging the cer-
emony of all vestiges of religion did not advance this purpose, but rather, given the 
religious influence on music, had just the opposite effect of curtailing the students’ 
ability to demonstrate their achievements through their artistic expression.395 The 
prohibition was therefore unreasonable since it did not advance the very purpose 
of the limited public forum. 
As discussed above, Smith found no legal grounds for banning the perfor-
mance because of the potential that it would cause controversy, distinguishing the 
cases of DiLoreto, Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis, and Student Coalition for Peace.396 More-
over, Judge Smith argued that unlike these cases, “the playing of the “Ave Maria” 
arrangement could not have reasonably been interpreted to convey a religious mes-
sage, nor was any such message intended,” and “the performance would not have 
been viewed as proselytizing [because] the arrangement contains no words at 
all.”397 
Nor, according to Smith, did this case present grounds for the “Establishment 
Clause defense,” which would only be available if the school district’s “refusal to 
allow the students to [perform “Ave Maria”] is necessary to avoid violating the Es-
tablishment Clause,” a proposition for which Judge Smith cited several cases includ-
ing Cole, Weisman, and Santa Fe, which the district court and the majority had ac-
tually used in support of their reasoning.398 Under Lassonde, Smith noted, a school 
district may be obligated to censor a religious message for two reasons: (1) “to avoid 
the appearance of government sponsorship of religion”; and (2) to avoid “imper-
                                                                
 393. Id. (citing Richard Collin Mangrum, Shall We Sing? Shall We Sing Religious Music in Public 
Schools?, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815, 866 (2005)). 
 394. Id.  Nurre also points out that a great deal of modern popular music with religious references 
might also be excluded under the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.  
Students who perform rock-and-roll or pop tunes are likely to encounter problems.  The Beat-
les sang about ‘Mother Mary’ in Let It Be.  Stairway to Heaven by Led Zeppelin, The Prayer by 
Celine Dion, and Livin’ on a Prayer by Jon Bon Jovi all contain allusions to religion in their titles.  
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 29.   
 395. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1100–01. 
 396. Id. at 1101 (citing DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 967 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1992); Student Coal. for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 776 F.2d 431, 437 (3d Cir. 1085)). 
 397. Id. at 1101. 
 398. Id. (quoting Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 
(2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)). 
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missibly coerc[ing] . . . dissenters, requiring them to participate in a religious prac-
tice even by their silence.”399 Judge Smith found neither reason present.400 In 
Smith’s opinion, it was unlikely that many people would recognize “Ave Maria” as 
an “obviously religious piece” and a “well known Catholic prayer” when Superinten-
dent Whitehead herself “only had a vague sense that the term had some religious 
origin.”401 “Simply allowing the playing of a student-selected instrumental piece of 
classical music (with a title in a dead language whose meaning would be unrecog-
nizable to most attendees of the graduation) cannot reasonably be construed as 
‘government sponsorship of religion.’”402 Likewise, Smith argued, merely attending 
a graduation in which one of several musical pieces is “an obscure classical piece” 
cannot constitute “participat[ing] in a religious practice.”403 While there is a com-
pelling government interest “in not committing actual Establishment Clause viola-
tions,” the government has no legitimate interest in “‘discriminating against religion 
in whatever other context it pleases, so long as it claims some connection, however 
attenuated, to establishment concerns.’”404 
Judge Smith closed with an expression of sympathy for school officials who 
are subject to criticism and lawsuits regardless of what they do.405 But he also ex-
pressed the need for the courts to provide guidance in order to alleviate confusion, 
discourage litigation, and enhance student expression, something which the Nurre 
majority, in explicitly making no finding on whether the performance of “Ave Maria” 
would have been an Establishment Clause violation, conspicuously failed to do.406 
ii. Justice Alito’s Dissent to Denial of Certiorari 
In his dissent to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, Justice Alito began 
by declaring, “The Ninth Circuit's decision in this case is not easy to square with our 
free speech jurisprudence.”407 Unlike Judge Smith, Alito made it clear he thought 
there was an issue regarding viewpoint discrimination in this case.408 Alito distin-
guished Nurre from situations where “a public school administration speaks for it-
self and takes public responsibility for its speech.”409 In such instances the school 
“may say what it wishes without violating the First Amendment's guarantee of free-
dom of speech.”410 However, when the school allows students to make their own 
                                                                
 399. Id. (citing Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2003); Cole, 
228 F.3d at 1101, 1104)). 
 400. Id. 
 401. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1102.  
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 730 n.2 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original)). 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025, 1026 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 408. See infra note 420 and accompanying text. 
 409. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1028. 
 410. Id. (citing Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009)).  Justice Alito, 
of course, was the author of the Summum decision.  In that case, a religious organization, Summum, brought 
a section 1983 action against the City of Pleasant Grove because the City denied Summum permission to 
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choice of music to perform, school administrators “must respect the students’ free 
speech rights . . . [and] not behave like puppeteers who create the illusion that stu-
dents are engaging in personal expression when in fact the school administration is 
pulling the strings.”411 Citing the Supreme Court school access cases Rosenberger 
and Widmar, Justice Alito asserted that a limited public forum is created when a 
public school purports to allow students to express their own views.412 In a limited 
public forum, he went on, “the State ‘must not discriminate against speech on the 
basis of viewpoint,’”413 and cited the other school access cases, Good News Club and 
Lamb’s Chapel as well as Rosenberger.414 
Justice Alito particularly paused over the footnote in which the majority of the 
Ninth Circuit panel asserted that this was not a case of viewpoint discrimination 
because Nurre had “‘concede[d] that she was not attempting to express any specific 
religious viewpoint’ but instead ‘sought only to “play a pretty piece.”’”415 Alito 
found this reasoning “questionable at best”416 because: (1) the appellate court’s 
holding “[did] not appear to depend in any way on petitioner’s motivation” in se-
lecting the piece.417 “Nothing in the body of the court’s opinion suggests that its 
decision would have come out the other way if petitioner had favored the Biebl 
piece for religious rather than artistic reasons.”418 And (2) the school district banned 
the piece precisely because of its perceived religious message, “that members of 
the audience would view the performance . . . as the district’s sponsorship of [reli-
gion].”419 Alito stated, “Banning speech because of the view that the speech is likely 
to be perceived as expressing seems to me to constitute viewpoint discrimina-
tion.”420 
                                                                
erect a stone monument containing the “Seven Aphorisms of Summum” in a park in which a similar monu-
ment containing the Ten Commandments already stood.  As in his dissent in Nurre, Alito set out the distinc-
tion between a forum in which tradition or government designation permits private speech, and a forum in 
which the government exercises its own right to speak.   
If petitioners [the City of Pleasant Grove] were engaging in their own expressive conduct, then 
the Free Speech Clause has no application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government reg-
ulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. (“[T]he Government’s own 
speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”); (“Government is not restrained by the 
First Amendment from controlling its own expression”). A government entity has the right to 
“speak for itself.” “[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes,” and to select the views that it wants 
to express (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view.”). 
Summum, 555 U.S. at 467–68, 470 (citations omitted).  Finding that “Permanent monuments displayed on 
public property typically represent government speech,” the Court ruled in favor of the City: “In sum, we 
hold that the City’s decision to accept certain privately donated monuments while rejecting respondent’s is 
best viewed as a form of government speech. As a result, the City’s decision is not subject to the Free Speech 
Clause, and the Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.” Id. at 481. 
 411. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1028. 
 412. Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995); 
and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272–73 (1981)). 
413. Id. (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 96 (2001)). 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. at 1029 (quoting Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1095 n.6). 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1029.  
 419. Id. 
 420. Id.  
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Justice Alito suggested that he also disagreed with the notion that the censor-
ship of Ave Maria could be justified by a reasonableness rationale based on the pos-
sibility that the performance could have generated unwanted controversy.421 Alito 
cited other cases supporting his statement that the Supreme Court had “categori-
cally reject[ed] the proposition that speech may be censored simply because some 
in the audience may find that speech distasteful,” including the student speech 
cases, Board of Education Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico and 
Tinker.422 Alito perceived what he called a “tension” between this case law and the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that after creating a limited public forum the public school 
could ban a performance of a religious piece of music because it might offend some 
members of a “captive audience at a graduation ceremony.”423 Like Judge Smith, 
Alito was concerned with the implications of the decision for the “nearly 10 million 
public school students in the Ninth Circuit.”424 He agreed with Judge Smith that the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning had broader implications in that it could “be applied to 
almost all public school artistic performances,” and that some school administrators 
“may choose to avoid ‘controversy’ by banishing all musical pieces with ‘religious 
connotations.’”425 Justice Alito concluded: 
A reasonable reading of the Ninth Circuit's decision is that it authorizes 
school administrators to ban any controversial student expression at any 
school event attended by parents and others who feel obligated to be pre-
sent because of the importance of the event for the participating students. 
A decision with such potentially broad and troubling implications merits 
our review.426 
iii. Comments on the Opinions of Judge Smith and Justice Alito 
The concurrence of Judge Smith and the dissent of Justice Alito are trenchant 
criticisms of the lower court opinions, especially in regard to their concern that a 
broad reading of Nurre could lead to the prohibition of religiously inspired works at 
all school functions. Much of what Brandsma and Whitehead said in their invocation 
of Weisman about school control of graduation ceremonies might also be said of 
any school event.427 Although the audience of a graduation is “captive” in the sense 
that the graduates and their families and friends would not want to miss the event, 
or have it ruined by proselytizing religious expression that they have no use for or 
even find offensive, the same may be said for a concert, or a play, or any other 
school event that may be of great importance to a particular student who wishes to 
perform or participate in the event. The Supreme Court’s transference of the ra-
tionale for banning government organized prayer from the graduation ceremony in 
                                                                
 421.  See id.  
 422. Id. at 1028–29 (citing Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., No. 26 v. Pico, 457 
U.S. 853, 871–72 (1982); and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969)). 
 423. Id. at 1029 (quoting Nurre, 508 F.3d at 1095) (“The tension between this reasoning and the 
fundamental free speech principles noted above is unmistakable.”). 
 424. Nurre, 559 U.S. at 1030. 
 425. Id. (citing Nurre, 508 at 1095, 1091). 
 426. Id. 
 427. See supra notes 6263, 67 and accompanying text.  
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Weisman to the high school football game of Santa Fe is evidence of the permeable 
line between graduation and other school events.428 If the title of an instrumental 
musical work such as “Ave Maria” may be objectionably controversial at graduation, 
it could be controversial and therefore deemed unacceptable at any event a school 
sponsors.429 But the final irony is that, contrary to Whitehead and Brandsma, Weis-
man itself did not perceive graduations to be so special as to require the complete 
exclusion of any religious trappings: “[A]t graduation time . . . there will be instances 
when religious values, religious practices, and religious persons will have some in-
teraction with the public schools and their students.”430 
In her book, Lessons in Censorship, Ross traces the evolution of the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of student speech rights.431 After West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette,432 and Tinker, the Court proceeded to cut back on student 
rights in several cases, of which Hazelwood is the most significant.433 In holding that 
schools may censor student speech in sponsored school activities where members 
of the audience may attribute the speech to the school, Hazelwood, as noted above, 
provided the district court with the starting point in its argument that Jackson High 
School could legally censor Nurre’s musical performance.434 But many courts forget 
Hazelwood’s second requirement for a school’s censorship of student speech, as 
did the courts in Nurre. School officials may restrict student speech as long as the 
speech occurs in the context of a school-sponsored activity, and “so long as [the 
school officials’] actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns.”435 If the prohibition in Nurre was as unreasonable and overblown as Smith 
and Alito suggest, potentially leading to the prohibition of any music that has any 
relation to religion in any school-sponsored event, the action of the school officials 
was far more deleterious than beneficial to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 
The persuasive legal arguments Smith and Alito advance notwithstanding, 
their opinions are even more provocative in regard to the educational effects of the 
                                                                
 428. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301–02 (2000) (“In Lee v. Weisman . . . we 
held that a prayer delivered by a rabbi at a middle school graduation ceremony violated that Clause. Alt-
hough this case involves student prayer at a different type of school function, our analysis is properly guided 
by the principles that we endorsed in Lee.” (citations omitted)). 
 429. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at *19, (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jack-
sonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (citations omitted) (“The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our 
pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, ‘we are inescapably cap-
tive audiences for many purposes.’ . . . Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and 
moral, sensibilities.  Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of 
otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or 
viewer.”)). 
 430. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577, 598–99 (1992). 
 431. ROSS, supra note 25, at 13–62. 
 432. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  In Barnette, the Supreme Court 
held that school officials violated the free speech rights of students who were Jehoveh’s Witnesses by pun-
ishing them for refusing to salute the flag, an act contrary to their religious beliefs.  Id. at 642.  The opinion 
includes the robust language, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which 
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”  Id. 
 433. ROSS, supra note 25, at 44–54.   
 434. See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).  
 435. Id. at 273. 
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Ninth Circuit opinion, for both jurists argue that the unconstitutional narrowing of 
students’ free speech could lead to a stifling constriction in all areas of knowledge 
and creativity that public schools should, on the contrary, zealously foster and nour-
ish. 
IV. THE ORAL ARGUMENT436 
The significance of statements made in oral argument should be considered 
with caution since such statements are likely expressed with less deliberation and 
forethought than arguments made in briefs and court opinions. However, because 
they arise spontaneously and instinctively, these statements might provide genuine 
insight into the real motives underlying the positions taken by the litigants, litiga-
tors, and judges, motives that are not expressed officially in court documents be-
cause they won’t quite withstand legal scrutiny and, in short, don’t look so good. 
Aside from the Ninth Circuit panel’s occasional indulgence in witticisms about 
the phrase “Ave Maria” as a football term (the “Hail Mary Pass”), particularly at 
Notre Dame,437 the oral arguments, as one might expect, proceeded to address im-
portant issues in the litigation. One issue was whether to apply Pearson, which 
would allow the court to forego addressing the constitutional issues altogether.438 
Another was whether the audience would have recognized the religious significance 
of “Ave Maria,”439 and whether school officials may decide what is and is not reli-
gious expression.440 However, the oral arguments also revealed something about 
the motives of the school administrators in pursuing such an intolerant policy to-
wards religious expression at graduation. In response to Judge Smith’s question of 
whether the school district may have been too careful in prohibiting the perfor-
mance of a piece of music merely because of its title, the attorney for the school 
district, Mr. Patterson, made the following point: 
But I can tell you this, judge, is that I cannot tell my client to be not careful 
enough in this situation. We have already got budget constraints and every 
time I stand up here, we get one more teacher out of that classroom and I 
got to tell my client you’ve got to be careful, you can’t bring on a lawsuit 
because they’re expensive.441 
Thus, fear of a costly lawsuit that might compromise the educational mandate of 
the school may overrule all other considerations, including reasonableness. Ironi-
cally, the school district provoked a lawsuit by being as careful as it was to avoid an 
Establishment Clause violation. Later, Judge Tallman asked Patterson about 
whether he would advise his client to prohibit the instrumental performance of a 
                                                                
 436. Oral Argument, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (2009) (No. 07-35867), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?283553-1/nurre-v-whitehead-oral-argument.  
 437. Id. at 8:45. 
438. Id. at 4:04 (regarding the Pearson issue, which the Supreme Court had issued one day before 
the Nurre oral arguments). See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text. 
439. Id. at 9:58. 
 440. Id. at 23:17. 
 441. Id. at 21:02. 
 
2018 THE “AVE MARIA” EFFECT 795 
 
work such as the “Ode to Joy” from Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony because of a po-
tential lawsuit regarding the religious expression of some of its lyrics.442 Here is the 
full exchange on the subject: 
Judge Tallman 
[T]he problem that, that I have in trying to figure out where we draw the 
line is what would you do for example if Ms. Nurre had come back and said 
I would like to play from . . . Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, “Ode to Joy.”. . 
. There’s nothing in the title that suggests that it might be religious. You 
would actually have to know something about the history and the lyrics 
but this is going to be played as an instrumental piece. What would your 
advice be to Superintendent Whitehead if Ms. Nurre had proposed “Ode 
to Joy”? 
Mr. Patterson 
If, in fact, I thought that there was a likelihood that there would be an ar-
ticle in the newspapers and that . . . indeed somebody might bring a claim, 
I would advise her that you better take the safe side and you better do 
exactly what . . . Deputy Superintendent [Karst Brandsma] did and said, I’m 
requesting that music selections of graduation be entirely secular or you 
increase your graduation program and allow both secular and non-secular 
music to occur443 
                                                                
 442. Oral Argument, supra note 436, at 26:20. Though generally considered secular in nature, the 
“Ode to Joy” does have some rather religious lyrics. For example: 
Brothers, above the starry canopy 
There must dwell a loving father. 
Do you fall in worship, you millions? 
World, do you know your creator? 
Seek Him in the heavens; 
Above the stars must he dwell. 
Aaron Green, Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy”: Lyrics, Translation, and History, THOUGHTCO. (Aug. 26, 2017), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/beethovens-ode-to-joy-lyrics-history-724410. The German title is “An die 
Freude,” and these lines read as follows in German:  
Brüder, über’m Sternenzelt 
Muß ein lieber Vater wohnen. 
Ihr stürzt nieder, Millionen? 
Ahnest du den Schöpfer, Welt? 
Such’ ihn über’m Sternenzelt! 
Über Sternen muß er wohnen.  
Id. 
 443. Oral Argument, supra note 436 at 26:20; cf. supra notes 81–85 and 376 and accompanying 
text, indicating that, aside from “Ave Maria,” there was a good amount of secular music played at the Jack-
son High School graduation of 2006.  The courts paid no attention to this, which begs the issue, how much 
must the graduation program be expanded to include secular and non-secular music so that the school is 
still on “the safe side”?  
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Patterson’s advice that the school “take the safe side” reveals the real standard 
school administrators may well be applying in deciding whether to ban student re-
ligious speech from a graduation ceremony.444 It is not any judicial test for an Estab-
lishment Clause violation. It is not the threat of a lawsuit. It is not even whether 
someone has complained about the proposed musical work. The actual test is based 
on whether the school’s zealously cautious lawyer perceives any possibility that 
something critical might appear in the local newspaper. This test does not rely on 
any legal standard, but rather on the real or imagined fear of some unfavorable 
opinion some member of the public might have, regardless of how extreme, intol-
erant, or unreasonable that opinion may be. In this case, the decision to prohibit 
“Ave Maria” was not based on any constitutional standard, threat of a lawsuit, or 
complaint about “Ave Maria.”445 It was based on a complaint that concerned a very 
different musical performance a year before.446 This is not consistent with Weis-
man’s view of graduations: “We do not hold that every state action implicating re-
ligion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive. People may take offense at 
all manner of religious as well as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not 
in every case show a violation.”447 With some justification, Nurre’s attorney, Mr. 
Vander Wel, spoke of this as the “whiff test:” 
Essentially, what the school district is asking for here is some kind of whiff 
test. If there’s a whiff of religion whether it’s in a newspaper article or 
whether it’s in a lawsuit or whatever. If there’s a whiff of religion then we 
need to prohibit it. That’s the conservative approach that Mr. Patterson is 
advocating. And that does not comport with the establishment clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.448 
School administrators might not themselves harbor any hostility toward religion, 
but if the “whiff test” is indeed the standard, this test is the quintessence of hostility 
toward religion, because it accommodates the most hostile possible view of religion 
that may be imagined regardless of how unreasonable or even absurd the view may 
be.449 This is what “zero tolerance” is all about. 
Certainly, school administrators fear lawsuits because of how costly they are 
to the school’s budget.  As Patterson suggested, every dollar spent on a lawsuit is 
                                                                
 444. Id. 
445.  Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009). 
446.  Id. at 1091. 
 447. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992).  
 448. Oral Argument, supra note 436, at 32:26. 
 449. Brief of Appellant, supra note 38, at 34 (“The actual purpose of [Whitehead’s] order was to 
kowtow to the vocal minority who believe that all traces of religion should be removed from public life, 
regardless of whether the purposes and policies served by the Establishment Clause are implicated.”);  see 
also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at *25–26 (“In applying the endorsement test, the [Sixth 
Circuit] warned against the danger that religious expression will be suppressed in response to those who 
look upon religion with a ‘jaundiced eye.’ . . . [The Sixth Circuit wrote]: . . . ‘We believe that the plaintiffs’ 
argument presents a new threat to religious speech in the concept of the “Ignoramus’s Veto.”  The Ignora-
mus’s Veto lies in the hands of those determined to see an endorsement of religion, even though a reason-
able person, and any minimally informed person, knows that no endorsement is intended, or conveyed.’” 
(quoting Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1553 
(6th Cir. 1992))). 
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a dollar taken away from the essential mission of the public school, the education 
of children.450  It appears that in recent years, the intrusion of the courts, statutory 
mandates, and the involvement of parents have all led to a greater litigiousness in 
schools and greater pressure on school administrators to avoid lawsuits.451  In any 
event, the lack of evidence of any real controversy and the potent concern about 
litigation costs articulated in the oral arguments suggest that the rationale of 
“controversy” was a bit disingenuous on the part of the Ninth Circuit.  The school 
administrators and their legal counsel were primarily concerned with the specter 
of a costly lawsuit which the lone complaint in the Herald might have imparted to 
them.  Better to “play the safe side” than take a risk. 
Consider the situation of Principal Cheshire when he rejected Moffat’s offer 
to list “Ave Maria” as “A Selection by Franz Biebl.” He said, “[I]t would be unethical 
to inaccurately or untruthfully list the titles to pieces.”452 Cheshire didn’t explain his 
rationale for why such a listing would be unethical or untruthful.453  There would 
have been nothing untruthful or deceptive about listing “Ave Maria” as “A Selection 
by Franz Biebl.” It was indeed a selection by Franz Biebl.454 If the school had thus 
listed the music in the graduation program, the most reasonable interpretation for 
the omission of the religious title would have been that the school was attempting 
to avoid the appearance of an implied endorsement of religion. But under Chesh-
ire’s rationale, it would have been preferable to actually advertise the religious 
background of “Ave Maria,” making a government endorsement of religion more 
plausible. On the other hand, hiding this background was unacceptable to Chesh-
ire’s way of thinking because that would be untruthful and unethical. Either way, 
the students would not be able to perform their choice of music, another double-
bind. 
                                                                
 450. See supra note 441 and accompanying text. 
 451. See generally, James Wasser, I’m Calling My Lawyer, AASA: The School Superintendents As-
sociation, http://aasa.org/SchoolAdministratorArticle.aspx?id=6506 (providing advice in addressing law-
suits against schools and stating in regard to a particular school district where legal expenses exceeded 
$500,000 for 2003-04, “The number of lawsuits, the amount of administrative/staff time preparing for and 
appearing in the courtroom and subsequent expenses were unacceptable. These lawsuits were taking pub-
lic money and valuable time away from our students.”); Ron Schachter, “See You in Court,” District Admin-
istration (Apr. 2007), https://www.districtadministration.com/article/see-you-court (stating, "In Florida, 
we've spent millions and millions of dollars defending against lawsuits" and “82 percent of teachers and 77 
percent of principals say they have made decisions driven by a fear of legal challenges.”); Gary Hopkins, Has 
the Threat of Lawsuits Changed Our Schools?, Education World, The Principal Files, http://www.education-
world.com/a_admin/admin/admin371.shtml (quoting a middle school principal as stating, "The current le-
gal atmosphere creates a more cautious approach for me and my district. . . . We are always considering 
the legal ramifications of issues with students and staff. The threat of a lawsuit, no matter how frivolous, is 
something that colors many decisions we make.").  
 452. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.   
 453. Patterson commented at oral argument, “But the point was that the principal [sic] here in, 
in, indicating that Ave Maria despite the fact that it was going to be an instrumental was going to be listed 
on the program. And the suggestion was made, well, why don’t we just take that off? And the point was is 
we’re not going to take that off because that wouldn’t be truthful, that would be deceptive and we’re not 
going to allow that because we want to be transparent.”  Oral Argument, supra note 436, at 25:37. 
 454. Matthew Oltman, The Iconic One Hit Wonder: The History and Reception of Franz Biebl’s Ave 
Maria 1-2 (July 2017) (unpublished DMA dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln) (on file with Student 
Research, Creative Activity, and Performance – School of Music, University of Nebraska-Lincoln). 
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Why unethical? Could it be that if the school were to allow the performance 
of “Ave Maria” without identifying its proper religious name, perhaps the school 
could then be accused of surreptitiously subjecting dissenters to religious music 
without their knowing it? Perhaps this might be an even worse violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause than forcing a captive audience to listen to religious music iden-
tified as such, because in that case at least the audience would know of the impos-
ture. What if such dissenters discover they like the music which they otherwise 
would despise had they known of its religious association? If this is indeed a harm, 
the only solution is banning the music with its religious title. But if that is necessary, 
would it not be necessary to ban any other expression of art, history, or knowledge 
with a religious connection? Must public school authorities enforce a blanket ban 
on a student speaker’s mention of the opposition to slavery on the basis of religion 
by Christians such as William Wilberforce, 455 or the big bang theory of the Catholic 
priest, Georges Lemaître?456 The vast constriction of knowledge is patent. As Justice 
Alito put it, “Why . . . should the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning apply only to musical 
performances and not to other forms of student expression, including student 
speeches at graduation ceremonies and other comparable school events?”457 
Cheshire could have relayed Moffat’s offer to his superiors such as Brandsma 
and Whitehead, to see if it could be acceptable as a compromise. After all, even in 
the Lassonde case, the principal did not outright forbid any proselytizing speech, 
but negotiated a resolution of the issue.458 However, the reader may recall White-
head’s testimony that the previous year was Cheshire’s first as principal of Jackson 
High School.459 Not knowing that he was supposed to examine the lyrical contents 
of any musical performance as well as the title, Cheshire approved the choral per-
formance of “Up Above My Head” without knowing its lyrics, which were the source 
of the controversy that concerned Whitehead.460 The testimony implies some 
blame may have been placed on the principal for the complaints.  Cheshire may 
have been right to conclude that the School District Administration had made a final 
decision and the best thing for the students would be to move on so they could 
                                                                
 455. See generally BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, LEWIS TAPPAN AND THE EVANGELICAL WAR AGAINST SLAVERY 6 
(1997) (discussing William Wilberforce’s opposition to slavery on the basis of his Christian faith); ERIC 
METAXIS, AMAZING GRACE: WILLIAM WILBERFORCE AND THE HEROIC CAMPAIGN TO END SLAVERY (2007) (discussing Wil-
liam Wilberforce’s opposition to slavery on the basis of his Christian faith).  
 456. See generally THE BIG BANG AND GEORGES LEMAÎTRE: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOUR OF G. 
LEMAÎTRE FIFTY YEARS AFTER HIS INITIATION OF BIG-BANG COSMOLOGY, LOUVAIN-IA-NEUVE, BELGIUM, 10–13 OCTOBER 
1983 (André Berger ed. 1984) (discussing Georges Lemaître’s development of the big bang theory); JOHN 
FARRELL, THE DAY WITHOUT YESTERDAY: LEMAÎTRE, EINSTEIN AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN COSMOLOGY (2005) (discussing 
Georges Lemaître’s development of the big bang theory). 
 457. Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025, 1030 (2010); cf. Jonassen, supra note 25, at 761–62. 
 458. Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Before Plaintiff 
agreed to excise the proselytizing portions of the graduation speech, the parties engaged in discussions to 
determine what Plaintiff would and would not be allowed to say. . . . The parties eventually reached a com-
promise.”).  
 459. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 460. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
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prepare to perform another musical work.461  It may have been pointless and impol-
itic to attempt to save the performance of “Ave Maria” which the higher school 
official had definitely decided to reject.   
One more incident from the oral argument is worthy of note. Near the end of 
the session, Vander Wel declared that Nurre “had a right to choose the song and 
the question is why was that right deprived from her?”462 Judge Beezer then asked, 
“Wait a minute, is that a, is that a right or is that just part of the educational pro-
cess?”463 And then there is a pause in which Judge Beezer added under his breath 
in an impatient if not exasperated tone, “Come on . . . .”464 “Come on” is an informal 
phrase whose meaning depends a lot on the context and manner with which it is 
expressed.465 With the right intonation, the phrase is used to express disagreement, 
or disbelief, or annoyance: Oh come on, Kyle, you made the same excuse last 
week!”466 Did the phrase betray an elemental skepticism on the part of Judge Bee-
zer that Nurre’s case implicated any free speech rights at all? 
V. THE AMICI CURIAE BRIEFS 
A. The National School Boards Association 
There were two Amici Curiae briefs submitted to the Ninth Circuit in the Nurre 
case that favored the school district and warrant discussion.467 One was submitted 
by the National School Boards Association (NSBA) and several other organizations 
representing school boards and school administrators who supported the Everett 
School District.468 This brief pointed out the legal confusion surrounding Free 
Speech and Establishment Clause issues in public schools and questioned whether 
instrumental music subject to the approval of school administrators should enjoy 
free speech protection at all.469 The brief also reviewed the ill effects of litigation 
expenses on education and educators, arguing for a “play in the joints” rule by 
                                                                
 461. Deposition upon Oral Examination of Lesley Moffat, supra note 37, at 41 (quoting Cheshire 
as stating, “Graduation’s coming up.  We need to move forward with this,” and continuing “And so it was 
agreed that it would not make sense to try to hold out and do this so that these kids then at the last minute 
might not be able to.”). 
 462. Oral Argument, supra note 436, at 31:37. 
 463. Id. at 31:41. 
 464. Id. at 31:47. The Transcript from Westlaw, supra note 100, at *11, has “go on” rather than 
“come on.”  The reader, however, may listen to the video recording, supra note 436, to decide what the 
judge actually said.  In the author’s opinion, it was, “come on,” with the intonation described above. 
465. See Cambridge Dictionary, Meaning of “come on” in the English Dictionary, CAMBRIDGE 
DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/come-on (last visited Mar. 30, 2018). 
 466. Id. 
467. See Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association, et. al., in Support of Defendant-
Appellee, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F 3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-35867), 2008 WL 1723135 [hereinafter 
NSBA Brief]; Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defendant-Appellee’s Request for Affirmance, Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-
35687), 2008 WL 1723136 [hereinafter Americans United Brief]. 
 468. NSBA Brief, supra note 467.   
 469. Id. at 9 (“Also at least debatable is whether the selection of a musical composition for final 
approval by school authorities constitutes protected speech at all -- i.e., whether it represents a constitu-
tionally protected viewpoint against which school officials could have discriminated.”). 
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which school officials may be afforded qualified immunity or some discretion in al-
lowing or disallowing the performance of a work like “Ave Maria.”470 
In effect, the brief was against the recognition of student rights, and the NSBA 
got what it wanted. Except for Justice Alito, all the judges who reviewed this case 
openly sympathized with the educators for the confusion in this area of law which 
the courts themselves have caused.471 Not only did Judge Lasnik speak of school 
administrators “being whipsawed” by the contending demands of Free Speech and 
the Establishment Clause,472 but Judge Smith observed that school officials “often 
find themselves in a Catch-22.”473 In recognition of the unsettled questions of law 
involved in this case, the district court gave Whitehead qualified immunity on all 
counts,474 and also ruled that the municipality had no liability because of the judge’s 
findings of no constitutional violations.475 Because the appellate court found that 
there was no violation of Nurre’s constitutional rights, it did not reach the qualified 
immunity issue.476 Finally, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, guaranteeing that 
this area of law would continue to be unsettled and confused, thereby providing 
school administrators with a good argument for qualified immunity and for taking 
“the safe side” in the future by banning any suggestion of a religious reference at 
graduation.477 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Pearson provided even more cover for 
school administrators, because under that ruling, a court may dismiss an alleged 
constitutional violation by examining the issue of qualified immunity before or even 
without addressing the constitutional issue.478 Except for cases of plain incompe-
tence and knowing violation of the law, Pearson guarantees that a case like Nurre 
will almost always be dismissed, without any assessment of the violation of free 
speech. Matthew J. Shechtman has illustrated this problem well in his article, Pierc-
ing Pearson: Is Qualified Immunity Curbing Students’ Religious Speech Rights?479 
Confronted with the difficult question of whether a school has violated a student’s 
right to free speech because of religious expression, an issue “scarcely clarified by 
Supreme Court jurisprudence,” courts have 
[A]n easy out in the form of qualified immunity dismissal. Without ever 
addressing whether the student’s rights exist under the First Amendment, 
the school board and its policies can theoretically persist indefinitely under 
this legal regime . . . This potentially continuous immunity loop works to 
the detriment of students’ rights to free speech and religious exercise. It 
also allows for the entrenchment of poor school policy and the limitation 
of thought diversity at the most critical stages of child development.480 
                                                                
 470. Id. at 18–19. 
471. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 559 U.S. 1025 (2010). 
 472. Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
 473. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1102. 
 474. Nurre, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1239–40 (9th  Cir. 2009). 
 475. Id. at 1240–41. 
 476. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1099 (“While Nurre could maintain a post-graduation claim for monetary 
damages, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants—White-
head and the District—because Nurre failed to show any constitutional violation.”). 
 477. See supra note 443 and accompanying text. 
 478. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 479. Shechtman, supra note 25. 
 480. Id. at 19–20 (footnotes omitted). 
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This is the “Ave Maria” effect which Nurre illustrates. The state of the law pro-
vides school administrators with the incentive to exclude all religious expression 
from high school graduations, whether violative of the Constitution or not, to elim-
inate any possibility of complaints or lawsuits, and even if this leads to “zero toler-
ance” for any expression that might be construed as religious, the uncertain state 
of the law provides these officials with qualified immunity under which such a blan-
ket exclusion to avoid a lawsuit is acceptable under the Establishment Clause de-
fense as long as it was not implemented by incompetence or in knowing violation 
of the law. How could any school administrator who bans religious expression be 
found incompetent or in knowing violation of the law if the law is not clarified? 
Such a zero-tolerance policy, however, is not reasonable under the standards 
of the limited public forum under which it should be tested. Amidst the sympathetic 
shelter they granted to school administrators, most of the judges in Nurre demon-
strated little concern for the rights and interests of students, who, after all, were 
the alleged victims of constitutional violations and the supposed beneficiaries of 
public school education, but who have no remedy even if their rights were violated. 
B. Americans United for Separation of Church and State 
Another Amicus Curiae Brief came from Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State.481 Unlike the opinions of the district and appellate courts, this 
brief rejected forum analysis altogether by identifying all speech at a public school 
graduation as the school’s own speech, or government speech, so that students had 
no free speech rights at all: 
Jackson High School did not create a forum for private expression by hav-
ing its Wind Ensemble perform a song at its graduation ceremony . . . The 
School . . . exercised complete editorial control over its carefully planned 
and scripted graduation ceremony, retaining the authority to review and 
approve the song that its Wind Ensemble played. The Wind Ensemble per-
formed only at the School’s invitation and direction . . . The Wind Ensemble 
performance constituted quintessential government speech. As such, the 
School – not any individual student – retained the authority and discretion 
to select the piece to be performed.482 
According to this brief, the graduation ceremony was “no forum at all . . . one in 
which the government is the speaker and a right of private access does not exist.”483 
Americans United, therefore, agreed that the Ninth Circuit reached the correct re-
sult, but argued that it was an error to assume there was any limited public forum.484 
“[T]he analytical framework of the government-speech doctrine provides a more 
apt characterization of the speech at issue here because . . . the performance was 
presented by a Jackson High School class, at the government’s invitation, with the 
government’s approval and involvement, and subject at all times to the govern-
ment’s control.”485 
                                                                
 481. Americans United Brief, supra note 467. 
 482. Id. at 2–3. 
 483. Id. at 5. 
 484. Id. at 8–9. 
 485. Id. 
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In contrast to the opinions of the Nurre district and appellate courts, the 
Americans United brief’s reasoning is at least coherent. By arguing that a graduation 
ceremony is no forum at all, Americans United avoids all the factual and logical in-
consistencies and arbitrary citations to authorities evident in the Nurre opinions 
that result from assuming that a limited public forum existed at the Jackson High 
School graduation, and then ignoring that assumption. But there are at least two 
major problems with the Americans United brief. The first is that it overlooks the 
district court’s finding that there was a genuine question of material fact as to 
whether the school exercised sufficient control and censorship over what the Wind 
Ensemble played at graduation—that is, there was sufficient dispute to preclude 
summary judgment based on the absence of a limited public forum. That finding 
made it a matter of Civil Procedure 101 for the court to have the jury decide the 
factual issues that would determine the type of forum the court was addressing.486 
The second problem concerns Americans United’s argument for the absolute 
exclusion of free speech at a public school graduation and its embrace of the notion 
that all speech at such events is government speech.487 This position rests on a set 
of citations to opinions which purportedly identified the purpose of graduation cer-
emonies. The brief quotes the following statement from ACLU v. Black Horse Pike 
Regional Board of Education: “[h]igh school graduation ceremonies have not been 
regarded, either by law or tradition, as public fora where a multiplicity of views on 
any given topic, secular or religious, can be expressed and exchanged.”488 This state-
ment originated from a district court opinion in Lundberg v. West Monona County 
School District, which stated without any legal citation or historical authority, 
                                                                
 486. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 487. Americans United admitted of only one case as an instance in which the “government ha[s] 
completely ceded authority over the selection and presentation of graduation-ceremony content” so that 
the resulting expression would “qualify as free speech.”  Americans United Brief, supra note 466, at 23.  
Adler v. Duval County School Board addressed the issue of “whether the Duval County school system’s policy 
of permitting a graduating student, elected by her class, to deliver an unrestricted message of her choice at 
the beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies is facially violative of the Establishment Clause.”  206 
F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), aff’d en banc, 250 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit 
ruled that such a policy does not violate the Establishment Clause even if it were to result in a graduation 
prayer or, presumably, a proselytizing message, as long as the school did not review the chosen speech. 250 
F.3d at 1342.  
[T]he total absence of state involvement in deciding whether there will be a graduation mes-
sage, who will speak, or what the speaker may say combined with the student speaker’s com-
plete autonomy over the content of the message [means] that the message delivered, be it 
secular or sectarian or both, is not state-sponsored. 
 Id.  at 1342 (quoting Adler, 206 F.3d at 1071).  Adler is different from Nurre to the extent that the policy in 
Adler would permit a religious message at graduation, so that Adler is a true Establishment Clause case.  
Nurre does not involve a religious message, so that it is not really an Establishment Clause case, but rather 
a case in which Establishment Clause concerns lead to censorship of much more than religious expression, 
violating the right of Free Speech.  Thus, Americans United for Separation of Church and State advanced an 
analysis that accepts Adler, which would allow religious messages at a graduation, or messages that could 
presumably be racist, sexist, or homophobic, as long as school authorities had nothing to do with the mes-
sage, but disapproves Nurre’s case, where the performance of a musical work at graduation would have 
had little or nothing to do with religion at all. 
 488. 84 F.3d 1471, 1478 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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“[g]raduation ceremonies have never served as forums for public debate or discus-
sions, or as a forum through which to allow varying groups to voice their views. 
Schools hold graduation ceremonies for very limited secular purposes—to congrat-
ulate graduates of the high school.”489 The statement then appeared in the Third 
Circuit opinions of Brody v. Spang,490 Black Horse, and finally in the Fifth Circuit’s 
opinion for Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District,491 which cited Brody rather 
than Lundberg for the proposition, prompting one of the dissenting judges to aptly 
observe, “[T]he majority panhandles a remote district court’s musings as Third Cir-
cuit law without proper attribution.”492 In fact, the statement is untrue. 
In 1940, the University of Pennsylvania accepted a Ph.D. dissertation submit-
ted by William L. Fink, the vice-principal of Reading High School in Reading, Penn-
sylvania.493 It was entitled, “Evaluation of Commencement Practices in American 
Public Secondary Schools.”494 For his dissertation, Fink surveyed and analyzed the 
graduation practices of three hundred and thirty-two public high schools from all 
over the United States.495 The study consists mostly of the answers that cooperating 
school officials provided in response to Fink’s questionnaire about the practices of 
their high school commencement exercises.496 A particular area of interest was the 
extent of student participation in planning and organizing the graduation exer-
cises.497 Fink presented a table categorizing the varying degrees of student partici-
pation permitted by the schools in planning the ceremonies.498 The table also indi-
cated the number of schools which placed themselves in each of these categories.499 
 
Pupil Participation in Planning Program                      Number of Schools 
I.  Class has no voice in planning the program   93 
II. Class had some voice in planning the program                               128 
III. Class had considerable voice in planning the program                 80 
IV. Program was entirely class planned    20 
V. Any other method        5 
VI. No information        6 
TOTAL                     332500 
                                                                
 489. 731 F. Supp. 331, 339 (N.D. Iowa 1989). 
 490. 957 F.2d 1108, 1119–20 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 339).  
 491. 168 F.3d 806, 820 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Brody, 957 F.2d at 1117) (“Neither its character nor 
its history makes the subject graduation ceremony in general or the invocation and benediction portions in 
particular appropriate fora for such public discourse.”). 
 492. Id. at 832 n.12 (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
 493. William Leroy Fink, Evaluation of Commencement Practices in American Public Secondary 
Schools (1940) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania). Mr. Fink is identified as the vice-
principal of Reading High School in several articles from a local newspaper, for example, Students in Service, 
READING EAGLE, Nov. 10, 1943, at 16, https://news.google.com/newspa-
pers?nid=1955&dat=19431110&id=N6khAAAAIBAJ&sjid=fJoFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3750,135668&hl=en.  
 494. Fink, supra note 492, at 30. 
 495. Id. at 30. 
 496. See generally id. 
 497. See generally id. 
 498. Id. at 89. 
 499. Id.  
 500. Fink, supra note 493, at 89. 
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As the author observed, “[S]chools in which pupils have at least some voice in 
planning the commencement program outnumber more than two to one schools in 
which the pupils have no such privilege.”501  The table also reveals that schools in 
which students either had a considerable voice in planning or planned the entire 
graduation program themselves made up just over thirty percent of all the schools 
that responded.502 
From the high schools that responded, Fink distilled a set of seventeen master 
objectives, under which he listed general commencement practices that he be-
lieved contributed to the achievement of these master objectives; then, under the 
general practices, Fink listed specific examples of what the students actually were 
allowed to do at their graduation exercises.503 Among the master objectives and 
their supporting general practices and specific examples are the following: 
Master Objective VI: To offer an opportunity for active student participa-
tion.504 
General Practice 
1. Members of the class have a voice in choosing the commencement 
theme.505 
Specific Example 
In Manhasset, Long Island, “[a] panel discussion prepared for 
assembly became the basis of a commencement program . . 
. .”506  
General Practices 
2. [Students] participate actively in planning the program.507 
3. The program is presented wholly by the class, except for the presen-
tation of diplomas and awards.508 
                                                                
 501. Id. 
 502. Id. at 89. 
 503. Id. at 72–113. From the schools that had responded, Fink selected one at random from each 
of the then forty-eight states and asked the principals of these schools to list their objectives in planning 
their graduation exercises. Id. at 41. Through a process Fink called “telescoping,” he assembled one hundred 
and fifty-five objectives which he distilled from the following sources: a jury of education professionals, the 
literature on commencement, responses of forty-eight principals of responding schools selected at random 
one from each state, and a group of college professors. Fink reduced these objectives into seventeen cate-
gories which he called “master objectives.” Id. at 4769. He then added the general practices and specific 
examples which supported the master objectives. Id. Fink collected these examples from commencement 
programs and announcements, from responses he got to his questionnaire, and from the Pennsylvania high 
school commencements he personally attended in 1938 and 1939. Fink, supra note 492, at 71. 
 504. Id. at 88. 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. at 8889. 
 507. Id. at 89. 
 508. Id.  
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6.  The script is pupil written; it is not edited by adults to the point 
where it ceases to be the work of the pupil.509 
Master Objective VII: To encourage creative effort in a large range of activi-
ties.510 
 
General Practice 
 
1. Under proper guidance, the class is permitted to plan a program which is 
truly representative of the philosophy of the class.511 
 
Specific Example 
 
In Plymouth, Massachusetts, a senior class planned “an interesting com-
mencement program featuring a New England town meeting.”512 
 
General Practice 
 
2. The program reflects the degree of originality which the class possesses.513 
 
Specific Example 
 
 In Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, students presented a program with a dra-
matic production. One of its episodes was a discussion of “the problems of 
American youth.”514 
 
General Practice 
 
3. The script of the program represents a creative work in English composi-
tion.515 
 
Specific Example 
 
In Lincoln, Nebraska, the teachers committee selected two compositions 
for oral presentation at commencement.516 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
 509. Fink, supra note 493, at 89. 
 510. Id. at 90. 
 511. Id. 
 512. Id. at 91. 
 513. Id.  
 514. Id. 
 515. Fink, supra note 493, at 91. 
 516. Id. 
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General Practice 
 
4. Composing, harmonizing, or rendering musical compositions challenges cre-
ative effort.517 
Specific Example 
 
Among several examples of musical presentations, the students in 
Muhlenberg Township, Pennsylvania presented a program entitled 
“America’s Musical Heritage” featuring “Indian, Pilgrim, and Negro 
music.”518 
According to Fink’s study, during the nineteen thirties, graduating seniors at Amer-
ican public high schools commonly presented panel discussions, town hall meet-
ings, dramatic and musical performances, and readings of student works at their 
graduation ceremonies as exhibits of their educational achievements. Almost a 
third of all high schools permitted students to plan a considerable portion of their 
graduation ceremonies themselves.519 This taxonomy of pre-World War II com-
mencement practices in American public high schools is good evidence of the free-
dom and variety of creative expression, including political expression, that many 
secondary schools of the time afforded their students at commencement. Further 
historical research reveals that the student speeches traditionally delivered by val-
edictorians and salutatorians at American public high school commencements find 
their origin in student speeches delivered by each one of the graduates at com-
mencement as a demonstration of what every graduating student had learned.520 
The argument of Americans United is thus based on a false premise. Contrary 
to Americans United,521 graduation ceremonies by both tradition and government 
delegation celebrated the achievements of the graduates, not simply by handing 
out diplomas, but through exhibitions of what the students had learned and the 
talents they had developed through their own self-expression, even permitting 
spontaneous debate in what today would probably be termed limited public fo-
rums.522 The argument of Americans United, stripped of its historical and judicial 
underpinning, is revealed to be the same tautology discussed earlier: that student 
                                                                
 517. Id. 
 518. Id. at 91–92.  
 519. See supra note 500501 and accompanying text.  
 520. Jonassen, supra note 25, at 766–75.  
 521. Americans United Brief, supra note 466. 
 522. Of course, one must not naively idealize the era. School officials probably retained ultimate 
authority to allow or forbid student expression at graduation. This was also the time of segregated schools 
and the Jim Crow South, long before Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), put an 
end to the legality of segregating public schools by race, and long before the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in voter registration, 
schools, the workplace, and public accommodations. There was far less diversity of ethnicity and race in the 
schools. However, for evidence that even in a segregated school in Alabama during the 1920s, a student 
believed that the principal could not dictate to him what to say in his valedictorian speech, and was allowed 
to give his own speech, see RICHARD WRIGHT, BLACK BOY: A RECORD OF CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH 202–06 (World 
Publ’g Co. 1950) (1937). 
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speech at graduation is subject to censorship because it is being censored.523 The 
tautology effectively excludes the possibility that the students have any free speech 
rights predicated on the establishment of a limited public forum. But if free speech 
does not exist whenever the government decides to exercise censorship, the ques-
tion arises: Is there any forum in which free speech rights are guaranteed?524 What 
is to prevent the state from simply censoring speech in any forum, including the 
traditional public forum, if the state’s power to censor is all that is needed to justify 
censorship? Whether in a limited public forum or in a traditional public forum free 
speech exists, if it exists at all, only because of the guarantees found in the govern-
ment’s compact with the people, the Constitution, in which the government makes 
a covenant to restrain itself in limiting speech, regardless of the government’s 
power to censor speech completely. 
For all its consistency, the brief submitted by the Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State exhibits an intellectual tendency towards intolerance 
bordering on totalitarianism. It skirts the issue of whether any free speech rights 
exist based on the circumstances of the case and lends facile support to government 
control for any speech the government objects to no matter how unreasonable. As 
this Article has argued several times, this case was not about freedom of religious 
expression. It was really about freedom of artistic expression. The fact that Ameri-
cans United got behind this suppression of artistic expression merely because of the 
name of the prohibited musical work indicates how the unreasonable imposition of 
Establishment Clause limitations can lead to zero-tolerance prohibition of expres-
sion far beyond genuine religious expression, even to cultural icons like the “Ode to 
Joy.” It is also an indication of how hostility to religion can lead to the suppression 
of free speech rights having little to do with religion. 
To see this, one need look no further than the survey of William L. Fink, who 
documented musical and dramatic performances, debates, and new England style 
town hall meetings at public high school graduations in the 1930s and ’40s.525 This 
was a liberal tradition of a bygone era, which, to some extent, is also reflected in 
Tinker whose author, Justice Fortas, writing in 1969, was perhaps not so far re-
moved from Fink’s time period to have forgotten the importance of free expression 
in public school education: 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarian-
ism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. 
. . . In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients 
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be 
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially ap-
proved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid rea-
sons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expres-
sion of their views.526 
                                                                
 523. See supra Section III(D)(ii)(b)(2). 
 524. See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text on the varying tests the courts apply to 
government restrictions on speech depending on the type of forum involved. 
 525. See supra notes 493–518 and accompanying text. 
 526. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
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Compare this to the contemporary assessment of a distinguished constitutional 
scholar: “Student speakers, such as valedictorians, are only permitted to deliver 
speeches that the school authorities accept as furthering the goals and objectives 
of the graduation ceremony.”527  School authorities “can decide that the only stu-
dents permitted to speak will recite the principal's favorite poem.”528 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In its Amicus Curiae brief, the National School Boards Association made the 
following point: 
[L]awsuits like this one frequently lead to ironic results. . . . [L]itigation os-
tensibly intended to defend freedom of expression in schools often has the 
opposite effect. . . . [I]f allowing students to make an initial selection of 
music is to be construed as opening a limited open forum and exposing 
school officials and the public fisc to greater potential liability . . . Amici 
fully expect that the prudent if regrettable response will be to avoid the 
question in the future by having school officials alone make every such se-
lection.529 
In this way, the National School Board Association elegantly told the judges that in 
the event Nurre should vindicate her free speech rights, the victory would only lead 
to greater repression of student speech. As it is, even though Nurre lost, one may 
rest assured that the school officials of the Everett School District and others will 
control student expression at graduation all the more tightly so that there would be 
no possibility that any court could conclude that the school had created a limited 
public forum. This is a classic no win situation. A “Catch 22” indeed. 
When the Supreme Court in Weisman spoke of the “high degree of control” 
principals exercise over the program, speeches, timing, movements, dress, and de-
corum of the students at graduation,530 when the Cole opinion referred to the “ple-
nary control” schools exercise especially over student speech at graduation,531 
when courts flatly state that graduation ceremonies have never been “regarded, 
either by law or tradition, as public fora where . . . views . . . can be expressed and 
exchanged,”532 these courts were not reflecting the traditional nature of graduation 
practices which Fink recorded in the nineteen thirties and forties.533 But these as-
sessments of graduation ceremonies might well reflect what has become standard 
operating procedure for high school graduations today, when school administrators 
and their lawyers defensively exercise control over student expression at gradua-
                                                                
 527. Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and Religious Expression at High School Graduations: Constitu-
tional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society, 5 NEXUS 61, 6162 (2000). 
 528. Id. 
 529. NSBA Brief, supra note 467, at 17–19.  
 530. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992). 
 531. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch., 228 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 532. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1478 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 533. See Fink, supra note 493. 
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tion by scrupulously reviewing and scrubbing student speech clean of any expres-
sion that could conceivably lead to litigation.534 As Nurre demonstrates, school offi-
cials do this because the complicated and uncertain state of the law puts them in 
fear of lawsuits and controversy if they make a mistake in allowing students free-
dom of expression at graduation. Thus, schools implement a zero-tolerance policy 
which can cover much more than what can reasonably be considered religious ex-
pression. What is significant about the Nurre decision is that it marks the point in 
which the courts have tacitly given their blessing to all this with little recourse in 
sight. 
Fink’s survey was taken before the Supreme Court accorded students any 
rights of free speech in cases such as Barnette in 1943 (holding that the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment protects students in public schools from being 
forced to salute the American flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance)535 and Tinker 
in 1969 (holding that the free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects the 
right of students in public schools to wear black armbands in protest to the War in 
Vietnam).536 It came before the Supreme Court developed the public forum doc-
trine in the mid 1980s.537 Fink’s dissertation predated the development of the gov-
ernment speech doctrine.538 It also predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Weis-
man in 1993 (holding that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment pro-
hibits public schools from inviting a cleric to recite a nondenominational prayer at 
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a public school graduation).539 The disturbing reality emerges that if indeed there 
has been a sea change in graduation ceremonies from greater freedom of student 
expression to absolute and complete control by school authorities, this change has 
not been the result of any tradition, but rather the result of the intrusion of the 
courts upon the discretion of school administrators and officials. The plenary con-
trol the courts speak of is not a custom of American education, but rather a creation 
of the courts. 
Perhaps Justice Black in his Tinker dissent and Justice Thomas in his Morse 
concurrence were correct to argue that the Court should not usurp the discretion 
of school officials.540 But for a reason that neither of these jurists perceived: That is, 
the involvement of the courts in the issues of Free Speech and the Establishment 
Clause in public schools would ultimately diminish the free speech of students by 
incentivizing a zero-tolerance policy that prohibits all student expression at gradu-
ation for reasons that ultimately have little to do with student rights, but a great 
deal to do with avoiding any liability as school officials clutch ever more tightly to 
their budgets and their careers. 
Also contrary to the traditional notions of student speech at graduation is the 
vision of public school government speech that Americans United enthusiastically 
advocated. This vision is, however, the logical outcome of case law, which insists 
that everything that happens at a public school graduation, including the speech 
and musical expression of the students, is really the school’s speech. Students who 
have earned the right to ostensibly deliver their own speeches at graduation, but 
then find this right conditioned on acceptance of school censorship,541 become, as 
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Justice Alito put it, mere puppets of school officials.542 The appropriate disclaimer 
for any student expression at a public school graduation should then be: “The views 
expressed have been censored by the school administration and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the student.”543 This is a far more genuine issue of transpar-
ency than hiding the title of “Ave Maria” ever could be. 
The Supreme Court should rethink its jurisprudence regarding public high 
school graduations. The courts should take into consideration the deleterious ef-
fects of the fear of litigation the case law now inspires. This means the courts ought 
to provide more guidance regarding violations of Free Speech and the Establish-
ment Clause. On the other hand, the courts might also step back to allow school 
administrators a bit of the “play-in-the-joints” discretion at graduation recom-
mended by the National School Boards Association,544 so that litigation only occurs 
where school officials allow or perpetrate clear and obvious violations of students’ 
rights at graduation. Certainly, many school administrators will, to some extent, 
abuse their discretion in limiting student expression, or in permitting religious ex-
pression. However, as in the period Fink studied, other administrators will make 
good decisions balancing student Free Speech with the Establishment Clause so that 
a freer, more creative culture will return to at least some public high school gradu-
ations where administrators no longer labor under the abject fear of being sued, or 
feel it necessary to become minor tyrants in suppressing student speech. In this 
way, the public school graduation may once more become a celebration of student 
learning and creativity and not a government exercise in zero-tolerance, nor an ex-
hibition of the “Ave Maria” effect.545 
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